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EXISTENTIALIST THEMES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF "FAITH" 
BY BULTMANN AND TILLICH 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of t h i s thesis i s t o assess the influence of existentialism 
on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h presented by Bultmann and T i l l i c h and 
evaluate t h e i r use of t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t thought. 
F i r s t , we show that the general character of existentialism may be 
cl a s s i f i e d i n t o two broad themes: the Place of the I n d i v i d u a l , which 
shows his concern f o r his understanding of himself and his r e l a t i o n t o 
others; and E x i s t e n t i a l i a , which describe the various modes of existence 
of the i n d i v i d u a l , his feelings and experiences. We then show that 
Bultmann and T i l l i c h are p a r t i c u l a r l y indebted t o four e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s : 
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger. We therefore proceed 
t o o u t l i n e the relevant doctrines of these philosophers, thus 
discovering numerous e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes. Next, we use the broad 
themes discovered i n Chapter One as the framework f o r our analysis of 
Bultmann's and T i l l i c h ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . I n 
t h i s analysis, we e l i c i t several e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes used by 
Bultmann and T i l l i c h , noting that these have s i m i l a r i t i e s with those 
of the four e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s reviewed previously. We argue' that a l l 
these e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes of Bultmann and T i l l i c h are derived from, 
or p a r a l l e l t o , those of our four e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ; the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of f a i t h offered by Bultmann and T i l l i c h i s thus e x i s t e n t i a l i s t both 
i n general approach and i n par t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l derivation. This 
resul t i s confirmed when a b r i e f comparison i s made with the concepts 
of f a i t h held by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers and Heidegger. 
We argue that i t i s both v a l i d and p o s i t i v e l y h e l p f u l t o formulate 
an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h such as i s expounded by 
Bultmann and T i l l i c h . Despite some c r i t i c i s m of such an approach, we 
conclude that Bultmann and T i l l i c h have i n fact made a valuable 
contribution t o our analysis and understanding of f a i t h . 
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PREFACE 
This thesis i s an investigation i n t o the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
influences apparent i n Bultmann and T i l l i c h and t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of f a i t h . As such, we are concerned with the concept of f a i t h 
rather than i t s contents, i . e . with fides qua creditur (the f a i t h by 
which i t i s believed), rather than fides quae creditur (the f a i t h which 
i s believed). This d i s t i n c t i o n has long been made i n the study of 
r e l i g i o n and i n philosophical theology, but i t i s often blurred both 
i n discussion and experience. I t s c l a r i t y w i l l be reasserted i n 
t h i s thesis, but we w i l l f i n d that T i l l i c h , as a systematic theologian, 
succeeds better i n t h i s respect than Bultmann, who i s p r i m a r i l y 
concerned with analysis and exposition of the New Testament. Our 
t h e s i s , then, i s not concerned with r e l i g i o u s doctrines, but rather 
with the a t t i t u d e , act, and experience of f a i t h . 
Because of t h i s i t i s highly appropriate that we should examine 
the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t influence and i t s results i n Bultmann*s and 
T i l l i c h 1 s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h , since existentialism i s l a r g e l y 
concerned with the a t t i t u d e s , acts and experiences of man. I n other 
words, existentialism i s probably the best approach one could take 
i n analysing the nature and character of f a i t h , and i t w i l l be seen 
that both Bultmann and T i l l i c h r e l y on existentialism t o i n t e r p r e t 
f a i t h , using e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes which are either d i r e c t l y borrowed 
or derived from e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , or are similar or p a r a l l e l t o the 
concepts of contemporary e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . This th e s i s , then, i s a 
study i n the philosophy of r e l i g i o n . I t i s an attempt to demonstrate 
the application of existentialism t o the concept of f a i t h and t o see 
whether f a i t h can be v a l i d l y and successfully interpreted i n terms of 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes. 
The method and argument of t h i s thesis w i l l be based on an 
exposition of the nature of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy, so i n the 
f i r s t chapter we w i l l describe the general character of existentialism. 
From t h i s i n i t i a l review and analysis, two main broad themes of 
existentialism are discovered; the Place of the I n d i v i d u a l , and 
E x i s t e n t i a l i a . These two themes w i l l be used as the framework f o r 
our analysis of Bultmann's and T i l l i c h ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of f a i t h . Next, i n our second chapter, we f i n d that not only are 
Bultmann and T i l l i c h indebted t o existentialism i n general, but are 
by t h e i r own admission also p a r t i c u l a r l y indebted t o Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Jaspers and Heidegger. We w i l l make, therefore, a b r i e f 
review and analysis of t h e i r respective e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophies, 
and draw out a number of par t i c u l a r terms and concepts which we w i l l 
also f i n d t o be the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes relevant t o our study of 
Bultmann and T i l l i c h on f a i t h . 
I n our t h i r d and fourth chapters on Bultmann and T i l l i c h 
respectively we analyse t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h not only w i t h i n 
the two broad e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes found i n Chapter One, but also 
more with reference to the p a r t i c u l a r detailed e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes 
found i n Chapter Two. When examining the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes 
used by Bultmann and T i l l i c h , we observe that these themes have t h e i r 
antecedents i n those themes we have already discovered i n Chapter Two, 
so thereby i n i t i a l l y j u s t i f y i n g our i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of these themes 
used by Bultmann and T i l l i c h as being e x i s t e n t i a l i s t . This 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s analysed i n some d e t a i l t o show that the thought of 
Bultmann and T i l l i c h i s derived from, or p a r a l l e l t o , the thought of 
the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . I n our f i n a l chapter we also show that the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ' concepts of f a i t h are also harmonious with those 
of Bultmann and T i l l i c h . 
We argue that i t i s not only v a l i d t o in t e r p r e t f a i t h i n terms 
of philosophy, but that existentialism i n p a r t i c u l a r i s the most 
appropriate means by which t o make t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , because the 
interests of both existentialism and f a i t h have so much i n common i n 
terms of the l i f e of the individual man. We conclude that Bultmann 
and T i l l i c h are not only indebted t o existentialism i n t h e i r 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h , but that t h i s influence i s both valuable and 
enlightening i n our understanding of the nature of f a i t h . 
As such, t h i s thesis provides not only a contribution t o 
the systematic study of f a i t h and an analysis of exis t e n t i a l i s m , but 
also describes and analyses i n some d e t a i l the extent and nature of 
e x i s t e n t i a l influence on Bultmann and T i l l i c h i n t h e i r understanding 
of f a i t h . From t h i s we f i n d that f o r Bultmann Kierkegaard i s more 
important than i s often realised, and tha t there are some positive 
s i m i l a r i t i e s of thought with Jaspers. Then with regard t o T i l l i c h , 
we f i n d that Schelling and Nietzsche are also s i m i l a r l y under-rated, 
and again there are some s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t i e s of thought between 
T i l l i c h and Jaspers. Again with Bultmann, we f i n d that Heidegger i s 
not the sole influence, whilst i n T i l l i c h ' s case, though he speaks of 
an indebtedness t o Heidegger, Heidegger's influence on him i s n e g l i g i b l e . 
Above a l l , however, we f i n d that Bultmann and T i l l i c h see 
existentialism only as a t o o l f o r analysis and not as a corrective f o r 
theology. Their use of i t , then, i s i n i t i a l l y quite modest, f o r 
regarding i t even as a method f o r evangelism and apologetic, they 
provide f o r us a v a l i d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the nature of f a i t h i n terms 
of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes which ordinary men may understand. 
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Chapter One 
THE MATURE AND CHARACTER OF EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHY 
Introduction 
E x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy i s a term used t o c l a s s i f y the work of 
so many divergent thinkers who applied t h e i r philosophy t o d i f f e r e n t 
subjects of i n t e r e s t , that a consensus of method or content i n t h e i r 
thought i s barely possible. Each e x i s t e n t i a l i s t has another interest 
which coincides with his p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy, so that 
his existentialism gives support t o t h i s other interest both as a 
philosophical basis and as a philosophical analysis of that p a r t i c u l a r 
i n t e r e s t . As with the term "philosophy" i t s e l f , i t i s easier t o 
describe the scope of e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy ("Existential" here 
being understood as describing p a r t i c u l a r philosophies rather than the 
at t i t u d e of the philosophers) than t o define what e x i s t e n t i a l 
philosophy actually i s . I t i s , therefore, useful t o see whether i t 
would be possible t o give a general review of the nature and character 
of e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy, and seek some broad themes which may be 
safely described as " e x i s t e n t i a l i s t " , such that a framework fo r our 
study w i l l emerge and the use of the term made clear. A l l t h i s helps 
to demonstrate the significance of existentialism as related and 
relevant t o man, but i t also serves t o remind us that existentialism 
as such i s a mode of thought which analyses human l i f e , rather than 
a set of doctrines which should govern i t . 
One approach t o discovering the nature and character of 
ex i s t e n t i a l philosophy i s t o look at the etymology of the word 
" e x i s t e n t i a l " . This approach may be deemed v a l i d i n t h i s instance 
because t h i s very approach i t s e l f has been employed by some 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s themselves, especially Heidegger and T i l l i c h , besides 
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Husserl, t o whose phenomenology we w i l l refer t o l a t e r . "Existence" 
comes from the Latin ex-sistere, which involves the state and r e l a t i v e 
place of being, i . e . , t o emerge, appear, proceed, be v i s i b l e or 
manifest, t o be out(side), apart from, take up a p o s i t i o n , t o (cause 
t o ) stand, place, be placed, be, and become. This etymology i s i n 
fact viewed with suspicion by p h i l o l o g i s t s , and i t i s i n any case a 
most misleading way of answering the question. However, i t i s 
possible t o glean something about existentialism from t h i s analysis 
for i t makes clear the point that these thinkers have certain motives 
i n common. These are the desire to view human existence as separable 
from the world of nature and society and t o commend a certain status 
of man as a goal f o r human l i f e . I t i s t h i s technical meaning of 
"existence" and " e x i s t e n t i a l " we shall c a l l "status". E x i s t e n t i a l 
philosophy, then, i s concerned with "status"; the status of the 
individual both i n his own r i g h t and also i n r e l a t i o n to others. 
A more promising method of discovering the nature and character 
of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy i s t o look at the h i s t o r y and development 
of such thought concerning existence as the complex status and 
relationship of the i n d i v i d u a l . The f i r s t point to be noted here i s 
that e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophers have the common characteristic of 
being concerned with the problems and concepts of existence, rather 
than with those of essence. Right from the opening of his huge 
work Being and Time , Heidegger points out that the question of being, 
of e x i s t e n t i a l analysis, once broached by the ancient Greek philosophers, 
was dropped and neglected throughout the h i s t o r y of philosophy, and 
2 
that i t must now be taken up once again. Traditional philosophy as 
f a r back as the c l a s s i c a l Greeks has distinguished between existence 
and essence, and has concentrated i t s study almost exclusively on 
essence. By contrast, e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy i s concerned with people and 
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things i n existence, investigating and analysing situations and 
circumstances, and probing the o r i g i n and significance of the human 
predicament. And here we notice that where as t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy 
was more concerned with the essence of things, e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy i s 
more concerned with the status, the existence, s i t u a t i o n and predicament 
of the individual human being and society as found i n the world with a l l 
the pressures of l i f e - both external and i n t e r n a l - influencing them. 
Bearing these comments i n mind, we may say that e x i s t e n t i a l 
philosophy has i t s s t a r t i n g point with in d i v i d u a l meditations on l i f e , 
although e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy i s more than j u s t t h a t . Whenever an 
individual muses on his personal existence as being i n r e l a t i o n t o 
himself, others, and the world, and thereby comes to grips with human 
problems, experiences, and emotions, he may be embarking on e x i s t e n t i a l 
philosophy. But t o make i t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , however, 
such meditation must be conducted i n i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , subjective, terms, 
with the subject-object dichotomy of t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy broken 
down, as the object of r e f l e c t i o n i s the r e f l e c t i n g subject himself. 
The theme of the meditation, then, i s the s e l f and others i n actual 
existence, not any remote philosophical essences. From such 
meditations come the asking of ultimate questions, and the formulating, 
of a peculiar vocabulary to account f o r the concepts and terms raised 
thereby. 
Many commentators on existentialism have developed t h i s idea 
of the h i s t o r i c a l heritage of e x i s t e n t i a l thought. Jaspers spoke of 
the " a x i a l age", that period round about 500 BC when Hebrew prophets, 
Greek philosophers, the Indian Upanishads, Zarathustra of Persia, and 
the Chinese Confucius and Lao-Tse a l l flourished. Jaspers said that 
t h i s early period displayed the characteristics of e x i s t e n t i a l 
- k -
philosophy i n that 
... man becomes conscious of being as a whole, of 
himself and his l i m i t a t i o n s . He experiences the 
te r r o r of the world, and his own powerlessness. He 
asks rad i c a l questions .... He experiences absoluteness 
i n the depths of self-hood and i n the l u c i d i t y of 
transc endenc e.^ 
I n similar vein, Bultmann finds such e x i s t e n t i a l philosophising about 
l i f e i n the Christian era; Jesus l i v e d e x i s t e n t i a l l y i n the face of 
death, speaking of decision, commitment, obedience, and authentic 
existence; Paul witnessed t o r e l i g i o u s conversion experience and 
self-understanding; Gnosticism, i n i t s terminology and character of 
ultimate dualism, was also called " e x i s t e n t i a l i s t " by Bultmann. 
This whole mode of thought reached a climax i n the "Philosophies of 
L i f e " of the nineteenth century. These meditations and philosophies 
attempted t o get behind the subject-object s p l i t t o a fundamental 
concept of l i f e . I n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terms, they t r i e d t o unite man 
as an individual personality, and unite him with the world. Now 
whilst t h i s background may be h i s t o r i c a l l y important f o r existentialism, 
there i s a certain danger i n l a b e l l i n g a l l t h i s mode of thought 
" e x i s t e n t i a l i s t " ; the term begins t o lose i t s significance and meaning. 
I t i s therefore of l i m i t e d value t o refer back t o purely a mode of 
thought. There are other factors which go t o make up existentialism, 
and we must look at these now. 
Phenomonology was developed by Edmund Husserl^ (from the idea of 
Franz Brentano) as a "descriptive psychology" or "descriptive science" 
(not as an empirical enquiry, pace Brentano), and t h i s was adopted and 
adapted by many e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophers including Heidegger, 
during t h i s century. The object of the exercise was t o re-establish 
the ancient r e l a t i o n between Being and Thought, and t o abolish the 
subject-object dichotomy. Just as Descartes had a method of 
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systematic doubt i n order t o reach the indubitable, so Husserl had 
a method of "bracketing" (the epoche)» by which he suspended judgement 
regarding s u p e r f i c i a l empirical assertions with t h e i r doubtful 
presuppositions and f a l l i b l e deductions. I n t u i t i o n of the essence i s 
to be attained by t h i s suspension of judgement. This i s the 
phenomenological "reduction", whereby an object which i s present to 
consciousness i s reduced to the pure phenomenon by putting i n brackets, 
i . e . , excluding from further i n t e r e s t , those elements which do not 
belong t o the universal essence. I f t h i s procedure i s followed 
completely, one i s said t o come t o "the things themselves", which 
are quite pure, being freed from human d i s t o r t i n g factors. 
Copleston provides the following i l l u s t r a t i o n : -
Suppose, f o r example, that I wished t o develop a 
phenomenological analysis of the aesthetic experience 
of beauty. I suspend a l l judgement about the s u b j e c t i v i t y 
or o b j e c t i v i t y of beauty i n an ontological sense and 
direc t my attention simply t o the essential structure g 
of aesthetic experience as "appearing" t o consciousness. 
I t i s t h i s "appearing" which provides the etymological background 
to the word "phenomonology", which was exploited by both Husserl and 
Heidegger. Phenomonology thus shows that a l l meaning and significance 
the world has i s the product of, and i s bestowed by, man. The 
resultant anthropocentricity i s also a mark of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
philosophy. 
There are, however, differences between Husserl's phenomonology 
and e x i s t e n t i a l phenomonology. Whereas Husserl was concerned with 
essences, e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s are concerned with existence; and whereas 
Husserl tended towards Idealism, e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s decisively r e j e c t 
Idealism. Furthermore, whereas Husserl employed the epoche i n his 
phenomonology, Heidegger (and others) rejected t h i s method. As a 
re s u l t of a l l t h i s , Heidegger's phenomonology was somewhat d i f f e r e n t 
- 6 -
from Husserl's, being more descriptive, employing the approach of 
etymology t o remove presuppositions, and seeing phenomonology more 
i n terms of a revelation of experience i n existence (enlightenment) 
rather than a deduction through method t o essences. Nevertheless 
some of the objections t o phenomonology may also be applied t o 
existentialism. Both invoke an individualism which encourages 
solipsism, and t r e a t external objects as being over and against the 
individual person, with both t h e i r existence or relevance at the 
manipulation or disposal of the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Seen i n philosophical perspective, existentialism i s an aspect 
of ontology, which i n t u r n i s a type of metaphysics. Metaphysics 
may be defined as the systematic r e f l e c t i o n by man on various aspects 
of the world as he knows i t . Thus there were speculative metaphysics 
i n the seventeenth century, Kant could speak of "a metaphysic of 
morals" and I d e a l i s t s of the l a s t century and t h i s were also i n fact 
constructing metaphysics. The same applies t o ontologists who study 
the nature of "being". Existentialism as the study of the nature of 
"existence", i s obviously closely related t o ontology, being that 
part of ontology concerned with the d e t a i l s of "being", pertinent t o 
the existence of man. As such, existentialism contains more records 
of man's basic experiences of existence than ontology which s t i l l 
retains i t s abstract character. The d i f f i c u l t y , however, i s that 
existentialism, which opposes the p r i n c i p l e of the system would appear 
thus t o be i n c o n f l i c t with the systematic nature of metaphysical 
thought. This tension was never resolved by Kierkegaard, who wrote 
systematically about the unsystematic nature of man's existence; 
whilst the tension was avoided by T i l l i c h , who preferred t o speak of 
ontology rather than metaphysics, but who then wrote i n a very 
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systematic way, and so balanced his interest i n existentialism by a 
deep-seated sympathy f o r essentialism. Heidegger, always avowedly an 
ontologist, f i r s t investigated the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t aspects of ontology, 
but then l a t e r switched t o other broader aspects of ontology and 
metaphysics. Jaspers wanted t o avoid the term "ontology", but i n 
the end found himself speaking of "periechontology". For our purposes 
here, however, we should j u s t notice that existentialism i s an aspect 
of ontology and so should be seen i n that l i g h t . 
So f a r , we have seen that existentialism deals with the "status" 
of the i n d i v i d u a l (the etymological approach), and i s conducted i n 
terms of subjective meditations on existence and i t s human experiences 
of the meditative in d i v i d u a l i n question ( h i s t o r i c a l approach). Also 
we have noted that r e j e c t i o n of the subject-object s p l i t , exemplified 
by phenomenology, i s also characteristic of existent i a l i s m , w h i l s t 
ontology, because l i k e existentialism i t r e f l e c t s on being, i s also 
a factor which makes up the nature and character of existentialism. 
From a l l these factors, and dominating them a l l , however, i s the 
major characteristic of any e x i s t e n t i a l i s t ; his i n f i n i t e passion and 
involvement with the subject at hand. This i s not j u s t enthusiastic 
i n t e r e s t , i t i s the l i f e blood of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t which not only 
throbs through his words but actually writes them. I n t h i s chapter 
we aim t o show that e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophers have some common 
charac t e r i s t i c s , some broad themes, and that - as we sha l l show l a t e r -
Bultmann and T i l l i c h belong t o t h i s t r a d i t i o n , both h i s t o r i c a l l y and 
philosophically. 
Philosophically t h i s t r a d i t i o n i s maintained by an essential 
element of personal involvement, f o r , as D.E. Roberts said:-
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Every e x i s t e n t i a l i s t w r i t e r attempts, i n his own 
fashion, t o formulate the difference "between the 
kind of t r u t h which can be appropriated without 
personal commitment, and the kind of t r u t h which 
cannot. 
Truth f o r the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i s what he knows for himself accounts f o r 
man and his being i n actual existence. Our two broad ov e r a l l 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes, then, are "the Place of the I n d i v i d u a l " , and 
o 
"E x i s t e n t i a l i a " - a Heideggerian term denoting those feelings and 
experiences of the individual i n his e x i s t e n t i a l predicament j u s t 
expounded. 
The Place of the Ind i v i d u a l . 
The place (status) of the in d i v i d u a l has two aspects which we 
must examine i n t u r n ; one i s that of the relationship between the 
individual and himself, the other i s that of the relatio n s h i p between 
the individual and others. For each aspect we sh a l l see how Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger t r e a t the place of the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Before we do, however, we should make clear that t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
o rientation does not necessarily imply "individualism", or "subjectivism" 
i n the narrow sense of those words. This common accusation against 
existentialism w i l l be shown i n t h i s study t o be grossly exaggerated, 
especially i n the case of Bultmann and T i l l i c h , i f not quite unfounded. 
(a) The Individual and Himself 
There are two aspects i n the relatio n s h i p between the individual 
and himself. The f i r s t i s self-assertion, involving a personal ethic 
and courage, the other i s s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n and analysis, i . e . , 
introspection or s u b j e c t i v i t y . We shall look at these i n t u r n . 
( i ) Self-assertion. 
By self-assertion, we are r e f e r r i n g t o those motives, forms, 
and aspects of an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t attempt to assert the individual status 
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of a pa r t i c u l a r person. We may usefu l l y begin with Kierkegaard's 
reference t o the "I n d i v i d u a l " , "the Unique"; the fact that "The 
paradox of f a i t h i s t h i s , that the ind i v i d u a l i s higher than the 
u n i v e r s a l . . . " 1 0 For him, the indi v i d u a l i s the person who stands 
out from the crowd, the person who asserts himself with d i g n i t y and 
personal ethic. The i n d i v i d u a l , however, does not make his s e l f -
assertion a cause t o exult over others; Kierkegaard's in d i v i d u a l 
was, l i k e Kierkegaard himself, a humble man, a s o l i t a r y man but 
pri v a t e l y self-confident of t h i s status as an individual i n r e l a t i o n 
t o society. With the concept of projection, Heidegger 1 1 (and 
Sartre) said that t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l individual should i n fact attempt 
to thrust out i n t o society, and challenge i t s mediocrity, and 
investigate the p o s s i b i l i t i e s l i f e opens up f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Two aspects are raised here. F i r s t i s the thrusting 
assertiveness of the i n d i v i d u a l , and here Nietzsche spoke i n very 
strong terms. The basic motivating force i n l i f e , he said, i s 
"The W i l l t o Power", when the individual s t r i v e s not only to survive 
4 
but also to conquer. The self-assertive individual must make the 
e f f o r t t o achieve s u p e r i o r i t y , and t h i s would r e s u l t i n the formation 
of an e l i t e which constantly asserts i t s e l f . The individual i s , then, 
t o have the courage t o go i t alone. The other aspect i s . t h a t of the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s which confront the i n d i v i d u a l , and through which he 
asserts himself. Jaspers developed t h i s aspect of the individual i n 
12 
the context of "Choice" . When I am faced with a choice, i t i s 
then that I re a l i s e that i t i s my decision alone u l t i m a t e l y and my 
choice i s my self-assertion. Another context i n which i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
13 
i s realised i s i n "Boundary Situations" , when one i s at the l i m i t or 
boundary of one's existence and human c a p a b i l i t i e s or p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
Such points of c r i s i s remind one that one i s alone i n l i f e u l t i m a t e l y , 
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and that any step forward i n t o the unknown or towards "Transcendence" 
i s a personal individual decision and act. We s h a l l be looking at 
t h i s aspect i n greater d e t a i l l a t e r . 
Arising from a l l t h i s i s the e t h i c a l aspect of an individual's 
self-assertion, involving a personal ethic and courage, which 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s c a l l "Authentic Existence". "Authentic" comes from 
the Greek otu9e.v —/js , meaning an absolute r u l e r or master (by-
destroying a l l opposition), and the r e f l e x i v e pronoun OLVTO^ . This 
etymology helps t o explain the individual e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ' opposition 
t o and contempt of public mediocrity. Also, of course, there i s the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "ex-sist"; stand out. As a r e s u l t , 
i t i s characteristic of existentialism t o advocate individualism and 
su b j e c t i v i t y i n a positive sense t o many things i n l i f e . For a l l 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , the et h i c a l motive fo r self-assertion i s important, 
because of t h e i r d i s t r u s t of the public morality. This d i s t i n c t i o n 
was made by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, whose importance f o r 
existentialism i s seen by one commentator as providing the 
lU 
"Ethical Origins" f o r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy. We w i l l consider 
the e t h i c a l implications of individualism i n existentialism i n a 
separate section of t h i s chapter, but we should note here that the 
idea of conscience being the voice of authentic existence i n the s e l f -
assertive individual opposing society and i t s degenerate morality 
(e.g. Heidegger^) presupposes that the ind i v i d u a l i s superior t o 
society, at least i n questions of morality and i n t e g r i t y . This, too, 
w i l l be investigated l a t e r . 
( i i ) S e l f - r e f l e c t i o n 
By s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , we are thinking here of introspection with 
analysis; a type of s u b j e c t i v i t y , when the in d i v i d u a l r e f l e c t s on 
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himself and his status. The p r i n c i p l e involved here i s that one 
should stand outside one's s e l f and examine one's se l f as an individual 
person, and also t o see one's self as others do. I t could he 
called "the phenomenological approach i n practice", for one i s 
looking at one's self as a whole ("bracketed"), as an existent r e a l i t y , 
and asking such questions as "Who am I " , "What i s my body?", "What 
i s my mind?". 
Kierkegaard revelled i n t h i s a t t i t u d e of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n as i t 
expresses the status of the individual over and against a l l else i n a 
peculiar way by making the r e f l e c t i v e i n d i v i d u a l the c r i t e r i o n and 
judge of a l l . His characteristic declaration " i t i s impossible more 
strongly t o express the fact that s u b j e c t i v i t y i s t r u t h and that 
o b j e c t i v i t y i s repellence, repellent even by v i r t u e of i t s a b s u r d i t y " ^ 
teaches us that a l l knowledge and t r u t h i s subjective; for unless I 
know something myself, know that something i s true f o r me, there i s 
no r e a l knowledge and t r u t h of significance there. One has to 
appropriate a l l knowledge and t r u t h f o r oneself, produce i t , and 
take interest i n i t . On s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , James Collins said 
For Kierkegaard, s u b j e c t i v i t y means inwardness or the 
e x i s t e n t i a l a t t i t u d e of the individual soul....A 
man's s u b j e c t i v i t y i s his personal, inward condition 
i n respect to the moral law and r e l i g i o u s l i f e , a 
phase of human r e a l i t y which i s not open t o s c i e n t i f i c 
inspection. I n t h i s sense, e x i s t e n t i a l knowledge 
must be both subjective and edifying. ^ 
or, as Wahl interpreted s u b j e c t i v i t y : "... true existence i s 
18 
achieved by i n t e n s i t y of f e e l i n g " . 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were described by Jaspers as sharing a 
19 
common fee l i n g of personal f a i l u r e , exceptionality, and loneliness. 
Unlike Kierkegaard, however, Nietzsche's s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n was r e s t l e s s , 
c r i t i c a l to the point of n i h i l i s m , and involved a psychological b a t t l e 
- 12 -
between the lower i n s t i n c t s (which include mediocrity) and the higher 
i n s t i n c t s (which include v i r t u e and supremacy). This psychological 
b a t t l e of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n led t o the eventual insanity and the death 
of Nietzsche. We have mentioned previously another type of b a t t l e 
t o do with s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n ; that of the subject-object. Jaspers 
made a d i s t i n c t i o n between "Truth-Objectivity" and "Truth-Subjectivity", 
20 
and by t h i s sought t o rel a t e the two opposing views. As the l a t t e r 
i s a r e a l i s a t i o n of the former, and the former a c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n of 
the l a t t e r , he argued, you cannot have one without the other. Indeed, 
Jaspers united the two, which i s what we would have expected from our 
previous references t o the phenomenological method. The psychological 
aspect i s s t i l l present with Jaspers, however, f o r by his analysis, 
s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n by the individual makes him realise his finiteness 
against Existenz and Transcendence, which i s emphasized at the boundary 
si t u a t i o n of human knowledge, experience and endurance. 
The significance of s u b j e c t i v i t y f o r the establishing of the 
t r u t h was also emphasised by Heidegger. Using the etymological 
approach we would have expected, he points out that " t r u t h " i s i n 
Greek o t \ ^ e u c , which, having distinguished the alpha-privative, 
i s o*--\»j£fcu£, which means "that which i s unveiled, unhidden". Truth, 
then, i s something which I as an individual discover and appropriate 
21 
by personal s e l f r e f l e c t i o n . Thus, as with Kierkegaard, Nietszche 
and Jaspers, t r u t h f o r Heidegger i s subjective, or at least must be 
accepted as such. Connected with t h i s are Heidegger's two key 
22 
concepts of the understanding and the pre-understanding. 
Understanding, being of the t r u t h , would be subjectively ascertained, 
as we have j u s t seen. However, pre-understanding ( p r i o r understanding) 
refers t o those personal, subjective, presuppositions any ind i v i d u a l 
- 13 -
necessarily brings t o bear on his understanding as such. This 
pre-understanding i s the r e s u l t of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , and both are 
deemed natural and r i g h t by Heidegger i n order t o in t e r p r e t the 
world, i . e . , understand i t , at a l l . 
(b) The Individual and Others 
Kierkegaard, the father of modern e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy, 
developed his individualism mostly as a reaction against the Hegelian 
system which denied the place and po t e n t i a l of the i n d i v i d u a l . I t 
has also been noted that the etymological meaning of the term "to 
e x i s t " and " e x i s t e n t i a l " i s "to stand out", "to stand apart from". 
However, t h i s i s only the semantic source of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t individualism; 
we must now emphasise that t h i s individualism i s possible only given 
that there i s society, the world, against which an ind i v i d u a l may 
assert himself. Thus existentialism broadly holds the ideal of 
individual human existence i n contradistinction from mere social 
existence. Each e x i s t e n t i a l i s t has his own version of that i d e a l , 
as we shall see shortly, but possibly underlying that ideal i s the 
often unquestioned assumption that individuals preceded society 
h i s t o r i c a l l y , that individuals only l a t e r formed society, so that 
individualism i s therefore j u s t i f i e d . That assumption may or may not 
be actually correct (and many anthropologists challenge i t today), 
but we cannot discuss t h i s point further here. 
( i ) The Individual 
As we have seen already, i t was largely on e t h i c a l grounds that 
Kierkegaard and Nietszche promoted the status of the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Common observation was - and i s - s u f f i c i e n t i n order t o discern the 
difference between public and private morality. The individual has 
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his own personal moral standards and reputation (which the i n d i v i d u a l 
would want t o rank high) t o maintain whilst he l i v e s - and i s seen to 
l i v e - as an i n d i v i d u a l . But the crowd, the public, does not -
indeed, cannot - have such moral standards. The r e s u l t i s that the 
individual tends t o l e t his behaviour decline when he i s part of the 
crowd. Whereas Kierkegaard's e x i s t e n t i a l i s t c a l l to individualism 
then i s a c a l l to the individual either to maintain his private 
morality i n public places, or t o withdraw from the public altogether, 
Nietszche rather c a l l s on the i n d i v i d u a l t o impress his superior ethic 
on the public. 
Another aspect of the individual i s that of choice and freedom. 
But t h i s apparent freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l i s deceptive, f o r as 
Jaspers pointed out, i t i s somewhat l i m i t e d . His observation that 
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" I am autonomous but not s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t " asserts the status of the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l , but adds, almost with some regret, that t h i s 
status does not carry with i t the independence that the i n d i v i d u a l 
would l i k e . 
We can go further into the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t view of the 
relationship of the individual t o society by looking at Heidegger, 
whose eth i c a l views are similar t o those of Kierkegaard outlined 
above. Heidegger, well known f o r his c r i t i c i s m of society, 
nevertheless never forgets that the i n d i v i d u a l can exist only with 
society there. His view of the relationship under discussion i s 
always balanced:- man i s "being-with-others" and "being-in-the-world". 
Indeed, a l l t h i s i s included i n what Heidegger c a l l s our " f a c t i c i t y 1 1 ; 
that i s , the facts of our present s i t u a t i o n . The relationship of 
the individual t o society and the world i s characterised by "Care" 
(or "Concern"), which has three factors: f a c t i c i t y , p o s s i b i l i t y , and 
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fallenness. P o s s i b i l i t y i s what l i e s open to us i n our f a c t i c i t y . 
Fallenness, a rather d i f f e r e n t type of category, denotes the 
succumbing of the individual t o society and the world. Besides t h i s 
p r a c t i c a l concept of "Concern", Heidegger sees the world i n p r a c t i c a l 
terms i n r e l a t i o n t o the i n d i v i d u a l ; the world and i t s contents are 
"being-ready-to-hand". This i s the everyday world, seen i n human 
terms and u t i l i t a r i a n values. 
This view that the i n d i v i d u a l , although he must assert himself 
and stand out from the crowd, must also l i v e i n relationship t o society 
25 
e x i s t e n t i a l l y , i s expounded by T i l l i c h . Alongside the " s e l f -
a f f i r m a t i o n " of the i n d i v i d u a l , there must be "the courage to p a r t i c i p a t e " 
i n society, which i s the "courage t o be - i n spite of non-being". 
Clearly, with t h i s view we have moved away from Kierkegaard's s o l i t a r y 
i n dividual t o a more balanced social i n d i v i d u a l , but i n a l l these views 
we notice the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t preoccupation with the status of the 
in d i v i d u a l . 
( i i ) Society 
We must now look at the generally derogatory views the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s have of society. For the most part, they regard 
society and the world as amorphous bodies which impinge on the freedom, 
ethic, and personality of the i n d i v i d u a l . 
26 
I t was f o r a lack of moral propriety that Kierkegaard and 
27 
Nietzsche especially attacked society. This attack may well be 
j u s t i f i e d i n terms of the responsible i n d i v i d u a l , as we l l as j u s t i f i e d 
against the nineteenth century European background. However, i t i s 
only r i g h t t o notice that society can impose an ethic which raises the 
moral standards of many individuals; e.g. by laws against petty t h e f t , 
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assault, and bribery. Nevertheless, as a warning against, and a 
condemnation of, the crowd mentality, t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme i s 
j u s t i f i e d . Of more doubtful j u s t i f i c a t i o n - though not without i t -
i s Nietzsche's advocacy of an " e l i t e " which should r i s e supreme above 
society and govern i t , imposing i t s superior ethic. 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche had l i t t l e respect f o r society as a 
whole. Kierkegaard referred t o A r i s t o t l e ' s "Multitude", and called 
society the "crowd" and the "public" i n contradistinction t o the 
in d i v i d u a l and the personal. Nietzsche called society the "herd", 
and condemned i t s mediocrity, lack of i n i t i a t i v e and self-respect. 
But t h i s rough treatment of society was ameliorated by Jaspers, 
who, although he called i t the "mass" and the "public", did not 
condemn i t out of hand. His view of the mass of people was not so 
much derogatory as j u s t simply patronising; the i n d i v i d u a l would be 
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the salvation of society. He appears almost sad f o r the human 
prospect: " A l l ideals of man are impossible, because man's 
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p o t e n t i a l i t i e s are f i n i t e . There can be no perfect man." Men are 
obviously not equal. 
The other main e x i s t e n t i a l i s t c r i t i c i s m of society i s that i t i s 
amorphous, nebulous, insidious, pervasive i n influence and power; and, 
because of a l l t h i s , i s d i f f i c u l t t o pin down and repel e f f e c t i v e l y . 
Heidegger attacks the anonymous powers of others, whom he called "Das 
Man".^ He notes that i n our common parlance we speak of "they"; how 
"they" say and do things which impinge on the i n d i v i d u a l , who himself 
i s unable t o i d e n t i f y or control these forces, be they people or systems. 
The world i s a snare fo r the i n d i v i d u a l , who i s enticed i n t o i t s 
amorphous impersonalisation and systematisation: i . e . , inauthentic 
existence. Heidegger's existentialism i s a warning t o a l l about 
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society and the world, and a c a l l t o the i n d i v i d u a l t o r i s e above i t a l l 
and not be dragged down int o i t , and so lose his personal i d e n t i t y . 
Heidegger described society and t h i s inauthentic existence of the 
subservient person i n r e l a t i o n t o the world i n terms of i d l e chatter 
(rather than useful discourse), c u r i o s i t y (rather than study), and 
ambiguity (rather than c l a r i f i c a t i o n ) . Society has of i t s e l f no 
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standards f o r which t o aim or maintain. 
ADDENDUM - ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Authentic Existence: Personal aspects. We have seen that knowledge, 
understanding, t r u t h , experience, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and freedom are a l l 
personal and subjective i n character. At l e a s t , t h i s would be so for 
the individual who was l i v i n g and authentic existence, i . e . , who 
t r u l y stands out and asserts his status. Secondly, we saw that t h i s 
individualism and s u b j e c t i v i t y can take d i f f e r e n t forms and emphases. 
Thus Kierkegaard thought nothing of himself, but even less of the 
public, so that at the end of the, day he could never be arrogant, 
only humble. Not so with Nietzsche, who, being more consistent on 
t h i s matter, claimed personal superiority over others because to his 
mind he was j u s t being honest; f o r him, his ethic and i n t e l l e c t were 
superior, and t h i s position he asserted i n true e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s t y l e , 
with r e l i s h . Thirdly, there i s the essential personality, privacy, 
and loneliness of the existent i n d i v i d u a l . This i s inevitable when 
the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t purports t o stand out and assert himself; he does 
inev i t a b l y become - or t r y t o become - independent of others. Thus 
i t i s true t o say - as did Kierkegaard, with his theory of " i n d i r e c t 
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communication" - that one can never r e a l l y know another person, 
because there i s always that p r i v a t e , lonely part which cannot be 
disclosed, and i f i t were, i t would not be understood properly, e.g., 
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secrets, emotions, and prejudices. Fourthly, there i s the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t picture of the in d i v i d u a l standing alone, not, here, 
against society, but against what one can only c a l l " l i f e i t s e l f " . 
But j u s t what i s t h i s enigmatic l i f e - f o r c e ? For Kierkegaard i t was 
God; f o r Nietzsche i t was an amalgam of the Abyss, Nothingness, or 
j u s t L i f e ; f o r Jaspers i t was divine Transcendenz and Existenz; w h i l s t 
for Heidegger i t i s , paradoxically, a l t e r n a t e l y Being or Nothing. A l l 
t h i s , of course, has e t h i c a l implications, f o r i t i s important on both 
a philosophical and r e l i g i o u s l e v e l that even so called n i h i l i s t s and 
atheists s t i l l recognise that man i s faced with an ultimate, on which 
he 
l i f e depends, before whom he stands and to whom^is answerable. 
Problems of Authentic Existence: Practical Aspects. From the 
above b r i e f review, i t can be seen that certain personal p r a c t i c a l 
problems of authentic existence arise f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . Kierkegaard, 
fo r example, noted that l i f e does not proceed i n an orderly progress, 
but rather i n a series of d i s j o i n t e d events, which may be experienced 
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as discontinuous "leaps". L i f e i s essentially r i s k y . The f i r s t 
of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t problems i s p o s s i b i l i t y , which f o r the 
individual presents the problems of choice and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
Secondly there i s contingency i n l i f e , which presents the problems 
of r i s k and uncertainty. Thirdly there i s dilemma, which demands -
f r u s t r a t i n g l y - decisions. Fourthly there i s tension, which, because 
i t i s such a perennial e x i s t e n t i a l problem, can be regarded only i n 
terms of paradox, since these tensions cannot be resolved. F i f t h l y , 
there arise with a personal care i n the world, and with others, the 
problems of the feelings of despair, f a i l u r e , g u i l t , and "Angsfe". 
F i n a l l y , there i s the problem of the s e l f i n i t s solitude, an 
introspective relationship which becomes so loathesome t o even the most 
conceited i n d i v i d u a l . 
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These personal problems are important, especially f o r the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t . The whole philosophy of existentialism i s based 
on a discourse on personal feelings and experiences. We might add 
that the " f a i l u r e " of existentialism to provide solutions t o these 
problems i s not only i n the best t r a d i t i o n of philosophy but serves 
t o emphasise the basically descriptive and analytic character of 
existentialism. (Both Bultmann and T i l l i c h re-emphasise t h i s very 
p o i n t ) . The v a l i d i t y and usefulness of existentialism depends on the 
q u a l i t y and accuracy of i t s description and analysis of the human 
s i t u a t i o n , together with i t s pointers towards new p o s s i b i l i t i e s and 
ethics. 
Inauthentic Existence: Ethics. By way of providing a c o r o l l a r y 
to the foregoing, we must notice that whereas authentic existence was 
conceived i n terms of both individualism ( i n c o n t r a - d i s t i n c t i o n to 
society) and personal ethics, inauthentic existence i s seen mostly 
i n terms of ethics alone. Thus Kierkegaard said that i t i s wrong arid 
bad t o regard the public morality as objective. I n fact the public 
ethic i s bad i n i t s e l f , and an i n d i v i d u a l would be wrong t o p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n i t . The individual retains his a u t h e n t i c i t y by his independence 
and becomes inauthentic when he succumbs to t h i s public ethic. 
Nietzsche, as we have seen, said something very similar i n effect 
with his concept of the morality of slaves. This morality i s of the 
submissive public, the herd. The i n d i v i d u a l , to assert his authentic 
s e l f , his authentic existence, must r i s e above t h i s morality - and 
mentality - of slaves, r e j e c t i t , and adopt the stance of the mentality 
and morality of the masters, the l o f t y i n d i v i d u a l , and the e l i t e . 
Heidegger, following Kierkegaard, also described inauthentic existence 
i n terms of "Everydayness", irresoluteness, and loss of personal 
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i d e n t i t y and status, and deliberate forgetfulness, which i s 
dishonesty with oneself. Inauthentic existence i s the one thing 
which e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s p r i m a r i l y warn us against, f o r i t represents 
the demise of the i n d i v i d u a l . 
E x i s t e n t i a l i a 
(a) Existentialism and Ontology 
As we have seen e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, existentialism i s an 
aspect of ontology. We sh a l l now see that a set of ontological 
categories dealing with existence may be formulated, giving r i s e t o 
a peculiar e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terminology and vocabulary which i s sometimes 
known as " e x i s t e n t i a l i a " . Ontology has been defined as the philosophy 
or discourse on "being" i t s e l f as such; the study of what existence 
i t s e l f i s , considered apart from any question as t o the nature of any 
part i c u l a r existent. I t i s the attempt t o discover the fundamental 
categories of a l l being. Of ontological categories, T i l l i c h says 
I t i s not the function of these concepts to describe the 
ontological nature of r e a l i t y i n terms of the subjective 
or the objective side of our ordinary experience. I t i s 
the function of an ontological concept t o use some realm 
of experience t o point t o characteristics of b e i n g - i t s e l f 
which l i e above the s p l i t between s u b j e c t i v i t y and 
obj e c t i v i t y . . . ^ 5 
I t i s f i t t i n g that T i l l i c h says t h i s w i t h reference to Nietzsche, 
because we can see the close connection between what T i l l i c h said here 
and what we said e a r l i e r about the "philosophies of l i f e " which so 
attracted Nietzsche. I n a d i f f e r e n t place and context, T i l l i c h 
distinguished four levels of ontological concepts. The f i r s t i s the 
ontological structure of subject-object which i s the i m p l i c i t condition 
of the ontological question. The second l e v e l examines the elements 
which constitute the ontological structure of being (as compared with 
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the concepts of the elements). The t h i r d l e v e l of ontological 
concepts expresses the power of being t o exist and the difference 
between essential and e x i s t e n t i a l being. The fourth l e v e l deals with 
those concepts which t r a d i t i o n a l l y have been called categories, that i s , 
the basic forms of thought and being. 
I t i s i n these l a s t two levels of ontological concepts 
especially that we f i n d an i n t e r - r e l a t i o n with e x i s t e n t i a l i s t concepts, 
because i t i s i n these levels - which Heidegger c a l l s " e x i s t e n t i a l i a " 
and Jaspers c a l l s "existenzen" - that we are dealing with an analysis 
of human l i f e and experience. I t i s possible t o produce a 
vocabulary or glossary of such e x i s t e n t i a l i s t - o n t o l o g i c a l concepts 
as used by e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophers. These concepts ref e r t o 
human experiences, t o human feelings, and t o the reactions of the 
individual t o himself, other people, and the world. Thus wh i l s t 
ontologies categorise factors of being, existentialism describes 
those factors i n terms of human experiences. This d i s t i n c t i o n i s not 
j u s t one of d e t a i l but also of method; whereas ontology i s a branch of 
philosophical theory, existentialism i s more a description of human 
experiences. Ontological categories are either t o be analysed and 
tested e x i s t e n t i a l l y , or to be derived from a philosophy of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
description and analysis. I n either case the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p i s 
close, but ul t i m a t e l y the v a l i d i t y of ontology must be tested by 
existentialism. We sh a l l now look at some major ontological-
e x i s t e n t i a l concepts, f o r i t w i l l be i n such terms that Bultmann and 
T i l l i c h w i l l be seen t o describe " f a i t h " i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes. 
(b) Basic E x i s t e n t i a l i a 
( i ) Being and Nothing. 
For ontology, on the one hand, the concepts of "Being" and 
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"Nothing" are purely t h e o r e t i c a l . Ontological discourse i s thus 
able t o range in t o t h e i r l o g i c a l status. A r i s t o t e l i a n s distinguished 
r e a l being from conceptual being. A l l negative e n t i t i e s came i n the 
realm of conceptual being because no empirical t e s t i s possible. On 
the other hand, e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , especially Heidegger, claim that 
Being and Nothingness can be experienced, as both are i n fact r e a l 
e n t i t i e s of a sort. Being i s realised and experienced by individual 
beings. This i s not Platonic metaphysics but an acknowledgment that 
a l l beings owe t h e i r existence t o the fact and v i t a l i t y of Being. 
Nothingness i s more obviously experienced. E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s may 
employ t h e i r technical word "angst", but i t i s also experienced i n 
terms of emptiness, boredom, apathy, lack of purpose, and ba s i c a l l y 
the psychological perception that there i s r e a l l y Nothingness i n the 
future because there i s no being there yet, and that even the present 
world would be - and actually i s - Nothing i f man did not give i t 
the significance he does. His very f a i l u r e t o l i v e up t o t h i s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y also makes for the r e a l i t y of the experience of 
Nothingness f o r many people today. 
For Kierkegaard, Being i s the "Wholly Other", which though i t 
a t t r a c t s us, i t i s basically elusive. Jaspers distinguished, 
formally, Being as object, Being as subject, and Being i n i t s e l f , but 
as his whole e x i s t e n t i a l i s t ontology i s rather complex, we w i l l discuss 
i t l a t e r i n our next chapter. For Heidegger, "Sein" (Being as such) 
and "Dasein" (Being-there; human being) are not j u s t i n t e r - r e l a t e d 
(the f i r s t represents ontology, the second existentialism, i n 
Heidegger's "Ontic-Ontological" d i s t i n c t i o n ) , but are inter-dependent. 
In his e x i s t e n t i a l analysis of Being, Heidegger also distinguishes 
things which exist as part of the world inanimate or undeveloped by 
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man, from things which are moulded "by man f o r his use, as wel l as 
many other modes of being, which w i l l also be discussed l a t e r i n the 
next chapter. We may note here, though, that f o r Heidegger Being 
has the character almost of the divine, which reveals i t s e l f by i t s 
absence. 
As f o r Nothingness, most e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s experience and 
describe i t by the term "angst", which, however, has d i f f e r e n t 
connotations f o r d i f f e r e n t philosophers of existence, as we sh a l l see 
below. Of "Nothingness" i t s e l f o n t o l o g i c a l l y , Heidegger speaks i n 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terms of f i n i t u d e , death and g u i l t . Nothingness i s 
i 
not the r e s u l t of negation, rather, according t o Heidegger, we can 
negate only because Nothingness makes i t possible. By contrast, 
Nietzsche, having spoken of the death of God, declared "Do we not 
36 
now wander through an endless Nothingness?" Nietzsche, although 
regarding l i f e i n n i h i l i s t i c terms, was exhilarated by the challenge 
now before men, especially i n regard t o the transvaluation of a l l 
values. 
( i i ) Freedom, P o s s i b i l i t y and Projection. 
These metaphysical-ontological categories also rest on 
e x i s t e n t i a l experience, as we w i l l now show. 
Kierkegaard formulated his doctrine of individual human freedom 
against the Hegelian system which denied i t . For Kierkegaard, freedom 
i s man's greatness and his grandeur. On the other hand, as a Christian, 
Kierkegaard f e l t obliged t o speak of grace as God working on and 
through t h i s freedom. But i n the l a s t r e s o r t , with or without the 
grace of God, man i s responsible f o r his use, delegation, or misuse, 
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of his own freedom. For Nietzsche, man became free as soon as 
he realised that God was dead - but t h i s new found freedom brings 
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aweful r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and a void which few men can equal. For 
Jaspers, man has freedom because Transcendence i s concealed. 
(Jaspers* doctrine here could be regarded as the believer's answer 
or corrective t o Nietzsche). I f Transcendence were revealed t o us 
d i r e c t l y , says Jaspers, i t would dominate us morally and e f f e c t i v e l y , 
so we would not be free. Jaspers makes four points here. F i r s t , 
human freedom vanished as divine Transcendence appears, so that 
eventually we are compelled t o do the r i g h t . Secondly, t h i s "non-
choice" i s superior i n effect t o choice as such because the decision 
and r e s u l t i s that of Transcendence. Thirdly, our freedom i s l i m i t e d 
by our s i t u a t i o n , being "consigned" t o myself and my world and my 
apprehension of Transcendence; i . e . freedom i s always i n r e l a t i o n t o 
something else which makes t h i s point more e x i s t e n t i a l than ontological. 
F i n a l l y , there i s Jaspers' doctrine of " r e p e t i t i o n " , the concept that 
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I must take personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r my freedom myself. For 
Heidegger, freedom i s ult i m a t e l y an i l l u s i o n , f o r our freedom and i t s 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s are l i m i t e d by f a c t i c i t y , and our l i v e s by death. On 
the other hand, we do have some freedom, and t h i s should be exercised 
with "resolute d e c i s i o n " . ^ 
Following on from freedom i s the concept of p o s s i b i l i t y . One 
of Kierkegaard's complaints against Hegel was that his system l e f t no 
room fo r p o s s i b i l i t y ; and that simply t h i s i s not true t o l i f e . I n 
fact every man i s continually faced with a l l sorts of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , 
of which some are progressive and others are re g r e s s i v e . ^ Jaspers 
often spoke of "possible existence", meaning that existence i s not 
k2 
ready made but i s always about to be. Heidegger introduced the 
experiential l i m i t i n g f act t o p o s s i b i l i t y , that of what he called 
" f a c t i c i t y " . A l l our p o s s i b i l i t i e s are possible only w i t h i n the l i m i t s 
of the circumstances. Heidegger has been accused of not allowing 
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f o r such l i m i t i n g factors on p o s s i b i l i t y , but i n fact... he. urges 
that the individual should assert himself over and against what would 
k3 
otherwise l i m i t his p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
Connected with p o s s i b i l i t y i s the concept of pro j e c t i o n , 
developed mostly by Heidegger. According t o him, "projection" i s a 
synonym f o r "ex-sist"; the ind i v i d u a l should assert himself - almost 
as an extrovert - and proceed i n self-confidence and determination. 
For Heidegger, projection of oneself i s a resolute acceptance of one's 
"thrown-ness" i n t o the world, and a bold taking up of those 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s l a i d open before one. Discussing projection, we 
can see that the e x i s t e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s i n terms of psychology 
rather than ontology. E x i s t e n t i a l analysis recognised incapacity, 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y , and f a i l u r e , as aspects of projection and i t s working 
out, and i t i s i n such experiences that we w i l l see Bultmann and 
T i l l i c h couch t h e i r discussion of f a i t h i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes. 
( i i i ) Finitude and Death. 
These categories, commonly taken f o r granted, are taken seriously 
by most e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . 
For Jaspers, f i n i t u d e i s realised i n two ways. One i s when we 
come up against, or simply acknowledge, Transcendence. I t may be 
that man meets Transcendence and so admits his own f i n i t u d e , or i t 
may be that man realises his own f i n i t u d e and recognised Transcendence 
beyond i t . The f i r s t i s more r e l i g i o u s , the second more r e f l e c t i v e , 
even philosophical, but either way, the fact i s man i s f i n i t e . The 
other way man recognises his f i n i t u d e i s i n " l i m i t situations". These 
are moments or periods of personal c r i s i s when the in d i v i d u a l has 
reached his l i m i t s , or the boundary, of his experiences; his ultimate 
p o s s i b i l i t y . Here, i n t h i s extreme s i t u a t i o n , he realises that he i s 
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f i n i t e and acknowledges the i n f i n i t u d e of Transcendence over his 
1*5 
imminent s i t u a t i o n . For Heidegger, man's f i h i t u d e i s a basic 
e x i s t e n t i a l concept. Man i s "thrown" into the world, and t o that 
extent i s neither master of himself nor of his s i t u a t i o n . That alone 
i s evidence of his f i n i t u d e , whilst his consequent a t t i t u d e t o the 
world - "Care" - also implies t h i s . Care i s composed of f a c t i c i t y , 
p o s s i b i l i t y , and f a l l i n g . Our f a c t i c i t y i s our si t u a t i o n i n which we 
are l i m i t e d , and which also l i m i t s our p o s s i b i l i t i e s . F a l l i n g i s what 
happens when an individual f a i l s t o e x i s t , stand out, take advantage 
of his p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and descends to the l e v e l of the world. We 
cannot escape our f i n i t u d e . 
I t has often been said that i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t , i f not 
impossible, t o give an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t analysis of death. As 
Heidegger admitted, death i s such a personal t h i n g ; the only 
death I can r e a l l y know i s my own when i t happens t o me. Human 
experience i s "being-towards-death". Man must l i v e i n f u l l and 
constant awareness of his death. Death, for Heidegger, i s the 
ultimate p o s s i b i l i t y , but s t i l l paradoxically a p o s s i b i l i t y , 
because man can either seize t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y p o s i t i v e l y or shy 
away from i t negatively. Death i s part of l i f e , but i s loss of 
being. So unless we know about death we cannot speak of " l i f e 
a f t e r death". I n a l l t h i s , Heidegger i s not a n i h i l i s t because 
of his positive approach to death, f o r he wants to provide 
a r e a l i s t i c perspective t o l i f e , and also provide a clue t o 
the meaning of l i f e ( i . e . , "being"). 
The point about e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f i n i t u d e and 
death i s that psychologically and philosophically these factors should 
af f e c t people's l i v e s . They enforce the essential loneliness, or 
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individualism, of men which the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y 
emphasise, and should influence people's conduct whilst they are a l i v e . 
This w i l l a f f e c t any e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . 
( i v ) "Angst" 
Resulting from the common e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a t t i t u d e t o society 
and the world, there are the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t concepts of estrangement 
and "Angst". The fee l i n g of estrangement i s due p a r t l y t o 
individualism, and p a r t l y t o adverse views of the world and society. 
Existentialism i s a c a l l t o the ind i v i d u a l t o stand apart from the 
world and society, the implication being that the individual can do 
better f o r himself by so doing. Clearly, the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t f e e l i n g 
of estrangement from the world and society natu r a l l y soon follows. 
In i t s ontological form, t h i s estrangement i s linked with the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t concept of "Angst". I n t h i s context, "Angst" arises 
as the individual r e f l e c t s on his own being and the world, i n face 
of the p o s s i b i l i t y of non-being, i . e . , nothingness, and death. 
This "Angst" i s a general anxiety, uneasiness, apprehension, which i s 
experienced mentally and s p i r i t u a l l y . Unlike fear, from which i t i s 
distinguished, "Angst" i s not directed at a pa r t i c u l a r object. 
Fear can be assuaged by dealing with i t s object, but t h i s i s not 
possible with "Angst" as i t i s a general f e e l i n g of anxiety and not 
a specific fear. 
Kierkegaard's views on "Angst" are set out i n his book 
translated The Concept of Dread . According t o Kierkegaard, "Angst" 
i s due p a r t l y t o choice, which gives r i s e t o temptation and the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of error. Connected with t h i s , "Angst" i s also p a r t l y 
due t o the basic ambiguity of l i f e , when one becomes anxious about 
contingencies and the uncertainty of the future - and indeed, also of 
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the present. "Angst" i s also p a r t l y due to the elusiveness of 
Being. The way i n which "Angst" i s experienced i s described by 
Kierkegaard as "giddiness". This concept i s meant t o convey the 
psychological whirlwind and pressures "Angst" exerts and t o show that 
i t i s active and not passive. This, of course, means that there i s 
an objective r e a l i t y t o "Angst" (though i t i s not a t h i n g , but an 
experience) i n l i f e . "Angst" i s experienced i n face of many things, 
and coming t o terms with "Angst" i s regarded as d i s c i p l i n a r y . 
Nietzsche described "Angst" as the abyss which faces the 
in d i v i d u a l . But instead of speaking of anxiety, he spoke of facing 
i t with courage which overcomes fear with pride by grasping the 
1+8 
abyss. His philosophy of l i f e did not deny "Angst", but challenged 
i t with a view t o overcoming i t . By contrast, Jaspers described the 
indiv i d u a l as "surrounded", "captivated", "hemmed i n " ; t h i s i s the 
power and influence of "Angst"; i t i s insidious and pervasive. "Angst" 
i s also the ontological choice between Being and Non-Being (Nothingness). 
Jaspers distinguished " v i t a l dread" from " e x i s t e n t i a l dread". V i t a l 
dread i s about l i f e , whereas e x i s t e n t i a l dread i s about our 
existence, the experience of being i n l i m i t (boundary) si t u a t i o n s . 
Jaspers also spoke of the giddiness of dread, but that man must triumph 
over t h i s dread. He must have the courage, i n a world without 
guarantees, t o l i v e on and by the values that he creates f o r himself -
1+9 
a doctrine which was anticipated by Nietzsche. 
Heidegger attached great significance t o "Angst" although he 
was quite prepared t o describe i t i n terms of human feelings such as 
boredom or nervousness. "Angst", he says, i s inspired by the 
recognition of what i t means to be a "being-in-the-world", with i t s 
frustrated p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and, of course, the ultimate unavoidable 
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p o s s i b i l i t y , death. "Angst" i s also over whether one can have 
authentic existence or not. Most people never face up t o "Angst", 
says Heidegger, so never make ultimate e x i s t e n t i a l i s t decisions, 
and thus remain l o s t i n the inauthentic l i f e of "Das Man". "Angst" 
i s also the r e a l sense of the experience of Nothing, "because "Angst" 
removes a l l the props to t h i s l i f e , and by so doing, also emphasises 
the e x i s t e n t i a l , even lonely, place of the i n d i v i d u a l . ^ 0 
Conclusions 
The object of t h i s chapter i s t o describe the general nature 
and character of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy, i n order t o see what would 
make for an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of anything. Having 
realised the v a r i e t y of ideas contained w i t h i n the philosophy of 
existentialism, i t can be seen that there are two major themes of 
existentialism; the place of the i n d i v i d u a l , and e x i s t e n t i a l i a (the 
feelings and the experiences of the i n d i v i d u a l ) . These two broad 
themes w i l l be used as a framework fo r our review of Bultmann's 
and T i l l i c h ' s discussion of " f a i t h " , and w i l l serve t o i d e n t i f y 
general existentialism i n t h e i r thought. Within these two broad 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes, subsidiary themes have been seen, where there 
was a l i m i t e d amount of agreement amongst the four e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s 
discussed. Their t h i n k i n g , as described, does however r e f l e c t 
the general nature and character of existent i a l i s m , and reference w i l l 
be made i n l a t e r chapters t o these subsidiary e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes 
as they recur i n the thought of Bultmann and T i l l i c h on " f a i t h " . 
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Chapter Two 
THE HERITAGE OF PARTICULAR EXISTENTIALISTS AMD THEIR DOCTRINES 
Having examined the general character of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy, 
and noting i t s broad themes, we now have to see the precise nature of 
Bultmann's and T i l l i c h ' s indebtedness to existe n t i a l i s m , and also 
examine i n some d e t a i l the relevant doctrines of those e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s 
whom Bultmann and T i l l i c h acknowledge. 
BULTMANN 
Introduction 
Bultmann responded enthusiastically t o the German translations 
of Kierkegaard i n the 1920s, and studied these works keenly. About 
t h i s same time he also read Nietzsche with i n t e r e s t . Bultmann also 
met existentialism i n the person of Heidegger, who was a professor of 
philosophy at Marburg and published his Being and Time whilst 
Bultmann was a professor of theology there. These two men organised 
j o i n t seminars at which Bultmann would have learned much of Heidegger's 
existentialism. Bultmann retained his high regard f o r t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r philosophy, although t h i s regard was l i m i t e d only t o the 
early Heidegger he knew at Marburg. However, as we shall now see, 
Bultmann's view of existentialism was much wider, but i n terms of 
h i s t o r i c a l perspective and influence on his work he has been accused, 
r i g h t l y , of losing sight of these other perspectives, and so unduly 
l i m i t i n g himself t o j u s t one man's views i n j u s t his early stage of 
philosophical thought. 
E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Philosophers acknowledged by Bultmann 
Bultmann makes regular, but b r i e f , references and allusions 
t o Kierkegaard. For him, Kierkegaard was a seminal influence not so 
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much d i r e c t l y "but i n d i r e c t l y , f o r Kierkegaard was an important 
influence on Jaspers and Heidegger.^" 
Bultmann's relationship with Jaspers has varied - and 
2 
osc i l l a t e d - from one of great respect t o one of i r r i t a t i o n . What 
promised t o have been a f r u i t f u l and c l a r i f y i n g dialogue degenerated 
over the years in t o an argument, mostly because t h e i r exchanges 
were r e a l l y a confusion of issues. Jaspers expected Bultmann t o be 
more philosophically orientated, whereas Bultmann expected Jaspers 
to be more sympathetic t o the Christian evangelical task at hand. 
The ov e r a l l influence as such of Jaspers on Bultmann i s therefore 
minimal.^ 
The influence of Heidegger on Bultmann, however, i s almost 
completely p o s i t i v e , and i n many discussions with him Bultmann learned 
k 
t o appreciate the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t viewpoint. When Bultmann said that 
he sought t o answer the question "How does the New Testament understand 
human existence?" he answered "... I seek t o show the f r u i t f u l n e s s of 
the ontological analysis of Heidegger..." though, Bultmann claims, 
without being dependent on him.'' Existentialism, he says, i s based 
on C h r i s t i a n i t y , and i s therefore a v a l i d way of in t e r p r e t i n g f a i t h 
and theology.^ For example, "... 'existence* must be the 
methodological s t a r t i n g point of theology, since the l a t t e r ' s 
7 
theme i s existence i n f a i t h . . . " 
General Acknowledgement of Existentialism by Bultmann 
Bultmann's debt t o existentialism i s a fundamental feature 
of his theology. This i s often noted by his c r i t i c s , and i s 
f r e e l y admitted by Bultmann himself. Clearly t h i s raises the problem 
of the v a l i d i t y of allowing philosophy t o influence theology. 
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Bultmann realises t h i s , but declares "The theme of philosophy i s 
g 
unbelieving existence; that of theology i s believing existence." 
The common theme i s "existence"; the two disciplines are therefore 
t a l k i n g about the same t h i n g , Bultmann goes on t o argue, but from 
d i f f e r e n t standpoints. Theology neither supplements nor corrects 
philosophical analysis, i t i s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which d i f f e r s . 
Inasmuch as they correlate, Bultmann says, we have a "Natural Theology". 
In his famous 19^1 Demythologising essay, t h i s controversy, 
simmering f o r some years, reached a climax when Bultmann declared 
"... our task i s t o produce an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the 
Q 
du a l i s t i c mythology of the New Testament..." Bultmann observed 
that 
Some c r i t i c s have objected that I am borrowing 
Heidegger's categories and forcing them upon the 
New Testament. I am a f r a i d t h i s only shows that 
they are blinding t h e i r eyes t o the r e a l problem. 
I mean, one should rather be st a r t l e d that philosophy 
i s saying the same thing as the New Testament, and 
saying i s quite independently.^ 
Jaspers then accused Bultmann of v i r t u a l l y closing his eyes t o other 
types of philosophy and metaphysics. Existentialism, especially as 
represented by Heidegger, Jaspers pointed out, i s hardly representative 
of "philosophy" as a whole.^ However, Bultmann, i n f a c t , makes i t 
quite clear that whilst existentialism can give a correct analysis of 
man, and pinpoint the problems of his existence, i t neither seeks nor 
offers any solutions. E x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy may r i g h t l y analyse 
the p l i g h t of man, but i t cannot provide the solution of redemption 
required which the Christian Gospel o f f e r s . Rather, i t i s f a i t h and 
theology which alone can provide the correct solutions t o man's 
e x i s t e n t i a l predicament by declaring the gospel of salvation and 
12 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . This self-imposed l i m i t a t i o n on the influence of 
existentialism i n his thoughts (a l i m i t a t i o n c r i t i c i s e d by Jaspers 
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and his theological colleague Heinrich Ott ) should be recognised 
when discussing Bultmann's theology. 
Thus for Bultmann, existentialism, the predominant influence 
on his theology, i s only a means and not an end: 
E x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy, while i t gives no 
answer t o the question of my personal existence, 
makes personal existence my own personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
and by doing so i t helps t o make me open t o the word 
of the Bible. ... e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy can of f e r 
adequate conceptions f o r the in t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
Bible, since the in t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Bible i s concerned 
with the understanding of existence.^ 
The content of mythology must therefore be seen t o correspond t o r e a l 
human experiences spoken of by the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . Faith i n God 
i s myth unless i t i s given an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Bultmann thus argues that although he has thereby regarded man and 
his s i t u a t i o n or existence e x i s t e n t i a l l y without reference t o God, 
t h i s i s r i g h t because 
... i t i s grounded i n the e x i s t e n t i a l insight that the 
idea of God i s not at our disposal when we construct 
a theory of man's existence. ... I cannot f i n d God by 
looking at or int o myself.15 
Bultmann thus s t i l l retains the concept of revelation, i t s offence 
and i t s c r i s i s , as the answer t o the problems of man analysed by 
exi st ent i a l i sm. 
TILLICH 
Introduction 
I n t e l l e c t u a l l y , the major influence on T i l l i c h was Schelling, 
on whom he did his early research work (Ph.D. and L.Th. dissertations).' 
But there were other influences, such as Nietzsche, whom T i l l i c h 
found challenging and exh i l a r a t i n g , and also depth psychology, which he 
17 
found easy to-place alongside general e x i s t e n t i a l analysis. 
T i l l i c h was always a philosopher as well as a theologian. His 
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philosophical expertise may well have played a part i n his cautious 
approach t o existentialism, (and Heidegger i n p a r t i c u l a r ) , - a 
factor which was lacking i n Bultmann. 
E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Philosophers acknowledged "by T i l l i c h 
Perhaps i t i s because of T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r e s t i n the h i s t o r y of 
re l i g i o u s and philosophical thought that not only are more 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s acknowledged, but also t h e i r influence i s more 
evident. Besides some references t o Pascal, whom T i l l i c h regarded 
18 
as the one characteristic precursor t o existentialism, T i l l i c h 
also mentioned Lessing, Marx, Hamann, and Holderlin. 
T i l l i c h ' s greatest i n t e r e s t , however, was i n Schelling,and he 
was greatly influenced by him. His close a f f i n i t y t o Schelling i s 
extremely important f o r our purposes, because Schelling f e l l 
between the two stools of essentialism and existentialism. Whereas 
on the one hand Schelling was c r i t i c a l of Hegel, on the other hand 
Kierkegaard was disappointed that Schelling's c r i t i c i s m did not go 
far enough. T i l l i c h himself always had a high regard f o r a l l three 
thinkers, and t h i s balance of sympathies has r e s u i t a n t l y q u a l i f i e d 
his sympathy f o r existentialism. He regarded Schelling's c r i t i c i s m 
19 
of Hegel t o be decisive f o r existentialism, especially i n i t s 
20 
influence on Kierkegaard. T i l l i c h described the doctrines of 
21 
Schelling i n some detail-, pertinent points would include his rooting 
philosophy i n l i f e , his asking of philosophical questions, followed 
by offers of r e l i g i o u s answers, and he taught a l l t h i s i n his lectures, 
some of which Kierkegaard attended. T i l l i c h acknowledged that 
Schelling influenced him greatly i n formulating Christian doctrine, 
22 
and enabled him t o accept existentialism l a t e r . 
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T i l l i c h n aturally acknowledges the place of Kierkegaard i n 
the history and development of existentialism, and of his own interest 
23 
i n the subject. The actual heritage of Kierkegaard, T i l l i c h noted, 
was f i r s t his c r i t i c i s m of Hegel, second his views on e t h i c a l 
existence and the human s i t u a t i o n (anxiety, despair), t h i r d the 
nature of f a i t h as leap and exi s e n t i a l t r u t h , and f i n a l l y , his c r i t i c i s m 
2k 
of theology and the church. 
The influence of Nietzsche on T i l l i c h has often been under-
estimated. T i l l i c h not only accords Nietzsche a place i n the 
development of existentialism, but he refers t o Nietzsche often with 
25 
undisguised enthusiasm. This influence came to the fore i n his 
The Courage t o Be , where T i l l i c h not only develops a key concept of 
26 
Nietzsche, but makes e x p l i c i t and positive references t o him. I t 
was i n fact T i l l i c h ' s personal opinion that "Christian theologians 
can learn very much from hinu 
T i l l i c h made l i t t l e reference t o Jaspers, and did not claim 
t o have been influenced at a l l by him. However, there are s t r i k i n g 
28 
s i m i l a r i t i e s i n t h e i r thought, which we s h a l l examine l a t e r . At 
t h i s point, we may mention j u s t three areas of s i m i l a r i t y ; t h e i r 
moderate but not excessive existentialism (including t h e i r common use 
of the term "boundary s i t u a t i o n " ) , which s t i l l retains a place f o r 
existentialism; t h e i r willingness not t o be r e s t r i c t e d by the Bible 
i n terms of expounding C h r i s t i a n i t y and r e l i g i o n i n general; and 
t h e i r transcendent concept of God with a l l i t s attendant vocabulary. 
T i l l i c h ' s references t o Heidegger are comparatively l i m i t e d . 
He na t u r a l l y acknowledged Heidegger's place i n the development of 
29 
existentialism, but he was wary of Heidegger's influence on him:-
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I t took years before I became f u l l y aware of the 
impact of t h i s encounter on my own th i n k i n g . I 
resisted, I t r i e d t o learn, I accepted the way of 
thinking more than the answers i t gave.30 
We sh a l l see, therefore, that the influence of Heidegger on T i l l i c h 
i s minimal. 
From t h i s b r i e f survey, i t can be seen that T i l l i c h i s 
influenced more by nineteenth century e x i s t e n t i a l i s t thought than by 
that of the twentieth century. Yet i t has been argued, by his 
production of an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t systematic theology, T i l l i c h 
31 
alienated himself from the s p i r i t of Kierkegaard. This c l e a r l y 
raises problems regarding the nature of T i l l i c h ' s existentialism, and 
t h i s w i l l now be examined i n more d e t a i l . 
General Acknowledgement of Existentialism by T i l l i c h . 
T i l l i c h ' s meeting with existentialism was gradual rather than 
sudden, as was the case with Bultmann. The background t o T i l l i c h ' s 
existentialism i s wider than that of Bultmann inasmuch as i t extends 
t o l i t e r a t u r e as well as r e l i g i o u s and philosophical thought. For 
example, he c i t e s Hamlet; "My i n s t i n c t i v e sympathy today f o r what 
i s called existentialism goes back i n part t o an e x i s t e n t i a l 
32 
understanding of t h i s great work of l i t e r a t u r e . " The philosophical 
background, as we have seen already, i s to be found i n Schelling, 
Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. Also, T i l l i c h said that he could see 
33 
existentialism i n the Pauline description of man's estrangement. 
We should, however, be very careful i n speaking of T i l l i c h ' s 
existentialism i n view of his own cautious estimate of i t : - "Often 
I have been asked i f I am an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theologian, and my answer 
i s always short. I say, f i f t y - f i f t y . This means t h a t , f o r me, 
3^ 
essentialism and existentialism belong together." 
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T i l l i c h , seems t o have thought i t inevitable f o r a theologian 
t o be sympathetic t o existentialism. The e x i s t e n t i a l thinker must 
have passion and i n t e r e s t , he observed; "The thinking of the 
E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Thinker i s based on his immediate personal experience. 
But, a l l t h i s must apply t o the theologian too:- "The a t t i t u d e of 
the theologian i s ' e x i s t e n t i a l ' ... The theologian, i n short, i s 
36 
determined by his f a i t h . " T i l l i c h was speaking of himself as 
well when he said of the theologian:-
Being inside the c i r c l e , he must have made an 
e x i s t e n t i a l decision; he must be i n the s i t u a t i o n 
of f a i t h . . . . Every theologian i s committed and 
alienated; he i s always i n f a i t h and i n doubti_he 
i s inside and outside the theological c i r c l e . 
The theologian "... acknowledges the content of the theological c i r c l e 
as his ultimate concern.... i t does not depend on the i n t e n s i t y and 
38 
certitude of f a i t h . . . " T i l l i c h also describes his existentialism 
i n terms of another spatial metaphor - the "boundary" or " l i m i t " 
s i t u a t i o n ; a term possibly derived from Jaspers' General Psychopathology 
(1913). 3 9 
T i l l i c h has been unusually clear about his understanding of 
what existentialism i s - but i t i s very broad. "Existentialism 
gives and analysis of what i s means t o e x i s t " , he said,** 0 using 
"to e x i s t " i n the technical sense of the word we noted the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s implied i n Chapter One. Existentialism "... looks 
at man i n his predicament of time and space, and sees the c o n f l i c t 
between what exists i n time and space and what i s essentially 
given." 
Like Bultmann, T i l l i c h distinguished between the problems 
which e x i s t e n t i a l analysis of man ra i s e , and the answers which only 
f a i t h and theology can provide. Thus "E x i s t e n t i a l philosophy asks 
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i n a new and radical way the question whose answer i s given t o 
f a i t h i n theology." Theology must use e x i s t e n t i a l analysis, but 
kk 
then provide Christian answers. Of himself, T i l l i c h has said 
"As a clergyman and theologian, I cannot be anything other than a 
layman and philosopher who has t r i e d t o say something about the 
l i m i t s of human existence." On the other hand he declared 
"nevertheless I was and am a theologian, because the e x i s t e n t i a l 
question of our ultimate concern and the e x i s t e n t i a l answer of the 
Christian message are and always have been predominant i n my s p i r i t u a l 
l i f e . " ^ Theology and philosophy share a common concern fo r Being,^ 
for the e x i s t e n t i a l analysis of man i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h that of 
Ch r i s t i a n i t y : - the essential goodness of creation, the f a l l , and 
potential s a l v a t i o n . ^ 
KIERKEGAARD 
B r i e f l y , the philosophical background of Kierkegaard may be 
said t o be a rev o l t against the prevailing Hegelian e s s e n t i a l i s t 
system, and an early enthusiasm, (which was l a t e r deflated) f o r 
Schelling, who also attacked Hegel, but not hard enough f o r 
Kierkegaard. His philosophical hero and model was Socrates; f i r s t 
because of his method of persistent questioning, and second because 
Socrates l i v e d out his philosophy, and did not separate philosophy 
from l i f e . Kierkegaard's existentialism i s thus a philosophy of 
personal experience, which i n his pa r t i c u l a r case, was couched i n a 
part i c u l a r Christian s e t t i n g . 
Underlying the philosophical tenets of Kierkegaard's 
existentialism i s his declaration "Logical system possible; 
E x i s t e n t i a l system impossible." This was not j u s t an attack on 
the Hegelian system, but a demonstration of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of 
ty i n g down and systematising the existent individual and his 
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e x i s t e n t i a l i a (to use our phrases). For Kierkegaard, existentialism 
describes the ups and downs of l i f e , i t s v a r i e t y of experiences and 
emotions, a l l of which change with the moods and circumstances of 
the i n d i v i d u a l ; how then can these be systematically set out? 
L i f e i t s e l f cannot bear t h i s , f o r only an existing i n d i v i d u a l could 
possibly w r i t e a system: "But a philosophy of pure thought i s fo r 
an existing i n d i v i d u a l a chimera, i f the t r u t h that i s sought i s 
something t o exist i n . To exist under the guidance of pure thought 
i s ... impossible. 
When Kierkegaard comes t o describe l i f e , then, we f i n d not a 
l o g i c a l system but a complex picture of process ( i n contradistinction 
t o the s t a t i c nature of the Hegelian- and l o g i c a l - system). For 
example, he never speaks of someone being a Christian, but rather 
always of someone becoming a Christian. 
My idea i s that i f C h r i s t i a n i t y i s the highest 
good, i t i s better f o r me to know d e f i n i t e l y that 
I do not possess i t , so that I may put f o r t h every 
e f f o r t t o acquire i t ; rather than that I should 
imagine that I have i t , deluding myself, 5jo that 
i t does not even occur t o me t o seek i t . 
The emphasis here i s on the fact of development i n the f a i t h ; 
development which would work i t s e l f out i n terms of conduct, the 
l i v i n g i n freedom, and the s t r i v i n g towards a r e a l i s a t i o n of the 
ide a l . 
Such development i n l i f e Kierkegaard described i n terms of 
three spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the e t h i c a l , and the 
r e l i g i o u s . By a "sphere" or "stage" of l i f e , he meant the outlook 
and conduct, i . e . , the general a t t i t u d e , of the ind i v i d u a l towards 
l i f e . The aesthetic sphere of l i f e i s basically secular and 
natural, with ordinary human motives and goals w i t h i n t h e i r human 
l i m i t a t i o n s ; i n short i t i s bondage to the world. The et h i c a l 
sphere of l i f e i s experienced when moral principles are brought 
to bear on outlook and conduct. Standards of behaviour are 
introduced, which raise l i f e and i t s values above that of the 
aesthetic stage, although the world i s s t i l l the context of l i f e . 
The t h i r d sphere of existence i s the r e l i g i o u s stage of l i f e . This 
l i f t s the outlook of the individual above and beyond the l i m i t a t i o n s 
of t h i s world giving him wider perspectives w i t h duly corrected 
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values. Such i s the q u a l i t a t i v e difference between these stages 
of l i f e (or spheres of existence), there can be no smooth t r a n s i t i o n 
between them but only a "leap" from one to another. The nature 
of t h i s decisive act, however, we w i l l look at i n greater d e t a i l 
below, because i t forms part of Kierkegaard's description of the 
nature and character of f a i t h . We may note at t h i s point, though, 
that t h i s general idea implies the s t r i v i n g s and struggles i n l i f e 
and f a i t h ; another instance of the f l u i d i t y of existence f o r which 
Hegel's system refused t o allow. 
In connection with t h i s l a s t main point i n Kierkegaard's 
concept of time, which revolves round his twin themes of "the 
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Instant" and "contemporariness with Christ". The Instant i s 
a moment i n e t e r n i t y , not a moment i n time, i n that t h i s moment i s 
of eternal significance. Collins put i t i n t h i s way, that the act 
of f a i t h "... occurs i n the Instant, a kind of synthesis of time 
and e t e r n i t y , i n which the believer i s rendered contemporanious 
with Christ." This concept of contemporanity i s a good instance 
of Kierkegaard's existentialism, f o r , as a description of the state 
of the believer, i t emphasises the closeness of the believer t o the 
object of b e l i e f , and so picturesquely portrays the degree of 
involvement and passion of t h i s i ndividual believer, which thereby 
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tends t o dissolve the normal d i s t i n c t i o n between subject and 
object. 
From t h i s dynamic view of existence and time, we can see 
how Kierkegaard placed such stress on the concept of p o s s i b i l i t y : -
" P o s s i b i l i t y means I can."^ P o s s i b i l i t y thus arises because of 
the freedom enjoyed by the i n d i v i d u a l . However, t h i s freedom and 
i t s attendant p o s s i b i l i t i e s raise such a plethora of decisions and 
re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s that the indi v i d u a l i s overcome by a general sense 
of dread: 
I n a l o g i c a l system i t i s convenient enough t o say 
that p o s s i b i l i t y passes over in t o a c t u a l i t y . I n 
r e a l i t y i t i s not so easy, and an intermediate 
determinant i s necessary. This intermediate 
determinant i s dread »g. a determinant of ... 
trammeled freedom ... 
How i s the dread raised by freedom and p o s s i b i l i t y t o be overcome? 
Kierkegaard i s clear that these challenges must be seized and 
wrestled w i t h , and that they can be overcome only by f a i t h : -
But i n order that the indi v i d u a l may thus 
absolutely and i n f i n i t e l y be educated by 
p o s s i b i l i t y , he must be honest towards 
p o s s i b i l i t y , and must have f a i t h . By f a i t h 
I mean what Hegel i n his fashion c a l l s very 
r i g h t l y 'the inward c e r t a i n t y which anticipates 
i n f i n i t y . * When the discoveries of 
p o s s i b i l i t y are honestly administered, 
p o s s i b i l i t y w i l l then disclose a l l f i n i t u d e s and 
idealise them i n the form of i n f i n i t y i n the 
indiv i d u a l who i s overwhelmed by dread, u n t i l i n 
tur n he i s victorious by the a n t i c i p a t i o n of 
his faith.57 
Faith i s thus seen t o be personal conviction which faces the 
unknown and triumphs over a l l possible t r i a l s and circumstances. 
Although we have already previously glanced at Kierkegaard's 
concept of "angst" (variously translated as "dread" "anxiety", etc.) 
we must now look at i t i n more d e t a i l , f o r i t i s the fundamental 
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emotion and experience which he saw underlies human existence and 
the l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l : - " i f at the beginning of his education 
he misunderstands the anguish of dread, so that i t does not lead 
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him t o f a i t h but away from f a i t h , then he i s l o s t . " Dread, f o r 
Kierkegaard (and the other e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ) i s a peculiar t h i n g : -
... i t i s d i f f e r e n t from fear and similar concepts 
which refer t o something d e f i n i t e , whereas dread 
i s freedom's r e a l i t y as p o s s i b i l i t y f o r p o s s i b i l i t y . . . 
Dread i s a Qsympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic 
sympathy. 
In his Concept of Dread. Kierkegaard i n fact inserts a r e l i g i o u s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of dread i n terms of s i n , and expounds dread mostly i n 
t h i s way.^ In a more philosophical vein, however, he saw dread i n 
terms of ontology, which i s more characteristic of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . 
His view of dread takes an even more sombre character i n his l a t e r 
work The Sickness unto Death, when he speaks i n terms of despair. 
F i n a l l y we come t o Kierkegaard's concept of f a i t h , which i s 
both detailed and complex. F i r s t there i s the aspect of f a i t h as 
self-understanding, or as he put i t "Faith i s the immediacy a f t e r 
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r e f l e c t i o n " , f o r as we would expect with an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , the 
self-understanding of f a i t h would not be a passive, uninvolved, non-
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i n s p i r i n g a t t i t u d e of mind, but an action i n l i f e . The s e l f -
understanding of f a i t h includes a process of humbling oneself 
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under despair and an acceptance of despair i n f a i t h . Kierkegaard 
thus says that his d e f i n i t i o n of f a i t h i s "By r e l a t i n g i t s e l f t o i t s 
own s e l f and by w i l l i n g t o be i t s e l f , the self i s grounded 
transparently i n the Power which constituted i t . " ^ ^ As we shall see, 
f a i t h exists i n spite of our understanding, and i n fact gives us a 
new self-understanding. 
Secondly, f o r Kierkegaard, f a i t h i s passion. T i l l i c h himself 
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quotes Kierkegaard's "famous d e f i n i t i o n of t r u t h " which Kierkegaard 
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also said " i s the d e f i n i t i o n of f a i t h " :— "An object of uncertainty-
held fast i n the most passionate and personal experience i s the 
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t r u t h , the highest t r u t h attainable f o r an Existing i n d i v i d u a l . " I n 
f a c t , i n a true e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s t y l e , Kierkegaard declares that passion 
i s necessary f o r l i f e anyway; "Every moment of i n f i n i t y comes 
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about by passion, and no r e f l e c t i o n can bring a movement about." 
This i s further emphasised with respect t o f a i t h : "Faith i s a 
miracle, and yet no man i s excluded from i t ; f o r that i n which a l l -
human l i f e i s u n i f i e d i s passion, and f a i t h i s a passion."^ In 
fact Hegel had a doctrine of the passions, as did Kierkegaard; but 
whereas fo r Hegel the passions are deceptive and external t o the 
in d i v i d u a l , f o r Kierkegaard the passions are i n t e r n a l , expressive of, 
and external from,the i n d i v i d u a l : "A believer i s one who i s i n f i n i t e l y 
interested i n another's r e a l i t y . This i s a decisive c r i t e r i o n f o r 
70 
f a i t h . . . " Clearly t h i s makes Kierkegaard's description of f a i t h 
as passion very t y p i c a l l y e x i s t e n t i a l i s t . 
Thirdly, we may note at t h i s point that f a i t h was also 
described by Kierkegaard i n terms of " i n f i n i t e resignation" i . e . , 
renunciation; "In the i n f i n i t e resignation there i s peace and rest and 
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comfort i n sorrow - that i s , i f the movement i s made normally." 
Just as he speaks of "the movements of f a i t h " , so Kierkegaard also 
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speaks of "the movements of i n f i n i t y " . I t s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t character 
i s discernible immediately:-
The i n f i n i t e resignation i s the l a s t stage p r i o r t o 
f a i t h , so that one who has not made t h i s movement 
has not f a i t h ; f o r only i n the i n f i n i t e resignation 
do I become clear t o myself with respect t o my eternal 
v a l i d i t y , and only then can there be any question of 
grasping existence by v i r t u e of f a i t h . ' 3 
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Kierkegaard himself notes nevertheless that t h i s i n f i n i t e resignation 
of f a i t h i s s t i l l a positive act; i t i s not passive but active. 
We have already mentioned the "leap" as the mode of t r a n s i t i o n 
between the stages of l i f e as described by Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard 
7k 
got the term from Lessing , and he used i t to attack Hegel, saying 
"For the leap i s neither more nor less than the most decisive protest 
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possible against the inverse procedure of the Method." The leap, 
however, i s also a mark of f a i t h i t s e l f , and i s often mentioned as 
such by Kierkegaard, but the movement also describes the q u a l i t a t i v e 
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leap i n t o s i n . The leap of f a i t h i s described i n dramatic terms: 
The d i a l e c t i c of f a i t h i s the f i n e s t and most 
remarkable of a l l ; i t possesses an elevation, of 
which indeed I can form a conception, but nothing 
more. I am able t o make from the spring board 
a great leap whereby I pass into i n f i n i t y , my 
back i s l i k e that of a tight-rope dancer, having 
been twisted i n my childhood, hence I f i n d t h i s 
easy; with a one-two-threeI 
Elsewhere, the leap of f a i t h i s described as a necessary, though b r i e f , 
act of the i n d i v i d u a l , when proofs are l e f t behind, and f a i t h comes 
• * •+ 78 i n t o i t s own. 
The f i f t h aspect of f a i t h as described by Kierkegaard i s r i s k , 
a very r e a l r i s k i n that i n f a i t h , as i n the leap, there i s no area 
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of c e r t a i n t y towards which t o aim. 
Without r i s k there i s no f a i t h . Faith i s 
precisely the contradiction between the 
i n f i n i t e passion of the individual's inwardness 
and the objective uncertainty. I f I am 
capable of grasping God objec t i v e l y , I do not 
believe, but precisely because I cannot do 
t h i s I must believe. I f I wish t o preserve 
myself i n f a i t h I must constantly be intent 
upon holding fast the objective uncertainty, 
so as to remain out upon the deep over seventy 
thousand fathoms of water, s t i l l preserving 
my f a i t h . 8 0 
S i t t i n g q u i e t l y i n a ship while the weather i s 
calm i s not a picture of f a i t h ; but when the 
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ship has sprung a leak, enthusiastically t o 
keep the ship a f l o a t by pumping while yet not 
seeking the harbor; t h i s i s the picture. And 
i f the picture involves an im p o s s i b i l i t y i n the 
long run, that i s but the imperfection of the 
picture; f a i t h assists. While the understanding, 
l i k e a despairing passenger, stretches out i t s arms 
toward the shore, but i n vain, f a i t h works with a l l 
i t s energy i n the depths of the soul; glad and 
victorious i t saves the soul against the understanding. 
Elsewhere, Kierkegaard comments "For without r i s k there i s no f a i t h , 
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and the greater r i s k , the greater the f a i t h . . . " Whilst we should 
beware of under-estimating the extent of the r i s k (and leap) of f a i t h , 
i t would be a misinterpretation of Kierkegaard's argument t o protest 
that his description of the r i s k of f a i t h makes f a i t h foolhardy and 
i r r a t i o n a l . Rather, i t shows the fervour and non-rationality of f a i t h , 
that i n re a l l i f e f a i t h i s not comfortable but challenging, not the 
result of passivity but the working out of inner tensions and c o n f l i c t s ; 
and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n realised only by e x i s t e n t i a l experience and analysis. 
This understanding of f a i t h brings us t o our s i x t h aspect of 
f a i t h as expounded by Kierkegaard; that of the absurd and the paradox. 
Making an oblique reference, i n f a c t , t o his former fiancee Kierkegaard 
said that the knight of f a i t h 
says ' I believe nevertheless that I sh a l l get her, 
i n v i r t u e , that i s , of the absurd, i n v i r t u e of the 
fact that with God a l l things are possible. 1 The 
absurd i s not one of the factors which can be 
discriminated w i t h i n the proper compass of the 
understanding: i t i s not i d e n t i c a l with the improbable, 
the unexpected, the unforeseen.... the only t h i n g that 
can save him i s the absurd, and t h i s he grasps by 
f a i t h . So he recognises the i m p o s s i b i l i t y , and that 
very instant he believes the absurd... 
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Kierkegaard saw further a "tremendous paradox" , and indeed he 
stressed the e x i s t e n t i a l necessity f o r paradox i n l i f e : 
However, one should not think s l i g h t i n g l y of the 
paradoxical; f o r the paradox i s the source of the 
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thinker's passion, and the thinker without paradox o r 
i s l i k e the lover without f e e l i n g : a p a l t r y mediocrity. 
And t h i s same paradox characterises f a i t h and "the Moment". 
F i n a l l y , we must look at Kierkegaard's "Knight of Fait h " , which 
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i s so v i v i d l y portrayed i n Fear and Trembling. This i n d i v i d u a l i s 
a rare breed, and yet i s an ordinary man... at least apparently 
ordinary f o r Kierkegaard wanted t o stress that anyone could become 
a knight of f a i t h i f only he l i v e d by f a i t h . By his conduct, the 
knight of f a i t h i n fact 
... has made and every instant i s making the 
movements of i n f i n i t y . With i n f i n i t e resignation 
he has drained the cup of l i f e ' s profound sadness, 
he knows the b l i s s of the i n f i n i t e , he senses the 
pain of renouncing everything, the dearest things 
he possesses i n the world... He resigned everything 
i n f i n i t e l y , and then he grasped everything again by 
v i r t u e of the absurd. He constantly makes the 
movements of i n f i n i t y , but he does t h i s w i t h such 
correctness and assurance that he constantly gets 
the f i n i t e out of i t , and there i s not a second when 
one has the notion of anything else. 0" 
Later, Kierkegaard emphasises the solitariness of the knight of f a i t h , 
with i t s attendant feelings, experiences, r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ; he i s 
"absolutely nothing but the i n d i v i d u a l , without connections or 
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pretensions". The knight of f a i t h , sums up and embodies a l l those 
aspects of f a i t h we have found described by Kierkegaard; his 
character w i l l be seen l a t e r t o influence Bultmann's and T i l l i c h ' s 
concept of the individual believer. 
NIETZSCHE 
Our review of Nietzsche w i l l follow three main themes, f i r s t , 
his psychological concepts, second his social concepts, and f i n a l l y 
his r e l i g i o u s concepts. Again, we w i l l r e s t r i c t ourselves only t o 
those doctrines relevant t o Bultmann and T i l l i c h . 
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Nietzsche's psychological concepts are threefold; the Apollo-
Dionysian dichotomy, the w i l l , and that of v i r t u e and courage, 
which r e f l e c t the respective influences of Greek mythology, Schopenhauer, 
and the philosophies of l i f e current i n the nineteenth century. 
Two points should be observed about Nietzsche's concept of 
Apollo-Dionysius; f i r s t i s that these figures were interpreted -
and also misinterpreted - by him, and represent outlooks on l i f e ; second 
is that the character of Dionysius as expounded by Nietzsche changes, 
the e a r l i e r Dionysius being the antithesis of Apollo, the l a t e r 
Dionysius being the synthesis of Apollo and the e a r l i e r Dionysius, and, 
i n t h i s hybrid form i s the antithesis of Christ. In the e a r l i e r phase, 
as represented by The B i r t h of Tragedy, Apollo represents the t r a d i t i o n a l 
idea of Greek culture as beauty, a r t , harmony, and wisdom, whereas 
Dionysius represents the orgiastic drunkenness and abandon which 
arises from carefree l i v i n g , but which results i n a general threat 
to order and decency, and t o impending destruction without discrimination. 
Nietzsche argued that both elements are required f o r the b i r t h of 
tragedy, and i n t h i s early work he kept the two forces i n balance, 
seeing the creative effect of the dichotomy i n drama and l i f e . This 
balance of power between the two forces forms the basis of the 
l a t e r hybrid Dionysius of "Dionysius versus the Crucified". Here 
Dionysius represents the r e b i r t h of v i t a l i t y , the re-affirmation of 
l i f e , the sublimation of passion, that i s , a f u l l y mature - humanistic -
man. I t i s t h i s l a t t e r concept of Dionysius which Nietzsche ex t o l l e d , 
and a l l i e d himself t o , and i t s significance as a fi g u r e f o r emulation 
may be compared - and contrasted - with that of the knight of f a i t h 
portrayed by Kierkegaard. 
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Man i s motivated by the w i l l t o power; indeed, l i f e jLs fete© 
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the w i l l t o power. Hollingdale comments "One has misunderstood 
Nietzsche completely unless one realises that he visualised the 
overcoming of the s e l f as the most d i f f i c u l t of a l l tasks, as well 
as the most desirable; that he considered the w i l l t o power to be the 
only drive a l i v e i n man; that a strong w i l l t o power was needed f o r 
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the hardest task..!' This i s i l l u s t r a t e d by Nietzsche's observation 
that "Wherever the w i l l t o power declines i n any form there i s every 
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time also a physiological regression, decadence." 
The same c r i t i c a l approach i s applied by Nietzsche t o his 
concept of courage: "A very popular error; having the courage of 
one's convictions; rather i t i s a matter of having the courage f o r an 
attack on one's co n v i c t i o n s ! ! ! " ^ Nietzsche presents t h i s radical 
courage i n t h i s way:-
Do you possess courage, 0 my brothers? Are you 
stout-hearted? Not courage i n the presence of 
witnesses, but hermits' and eagles' courage, 
which not even a god observes any more? I do not 
c a l l c o l d - s p i r i t e d , mulish, b l i n d , or intoxicated 
men stout-hearted. He possesses heart who knows 
fear but masters fear; who sees the abyss, but sees 
i t with pride. He who sees the abyss, but with 
an eagle's eyes - he who grasps the abyss with an 
eagle's claws: he possesses courage.93 
Here, then, i s the courage that only the true e x i s t e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l 
could display. 
We now t u r n t o the social concepts of Nietzsche. We shall look 
f i r s t at his attack on society, and then we w i l l look at his positive 
ideas; the concepts of the Higher Man, the E l i t e , and Superman. 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche presents a poor picture 
of society. In the famous section "Of the Rabble", he does not 
attempt to hide his disgust at society: " L i f e i s a fountain of 
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d e l i g h t ; but where the rabble also drinks a l l wells are poisoned." 
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Nietzsche's attack on society i s closely linked with his attack 
on C h r i s t i a n i t y : 
- At t h i s point I s h a l l not suppress a sigh. There are 
days when I am haunted "by a f e e l i n g blacker than the 
blackest melancholy - contempt of man. And so as t o 
leave no doubt as t o what I despise, whom I despise: i t 
i s the man of today, the man with whom I am f a t e f u l l y 
contemporary.... be i t called ' C h r i s t i a n i t y ' , 'Christian 
f a i t h ' , 'Christian church' ,.. 9 5 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche's c r i t i c a l and hard view of society i s 
mitigated i n his l a s t works:- 'When the exceptional human being handles 
the mediocre more gently than he does himself and his equals, t h i s i s 
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not mere politeness of the heart - i t i s simply his duty." Nietzsche 
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urges man t o r i s e above mediocrity. Nietzsche portrays "Superman" 
(more l i t e r a l l y translated "Overman") conveying the emphasis i n the 
concept which i s "overcoming" - overcoming oneself and overcoming 
a l l others:- " I teach you the Superman. Man i s something that should 
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be overcome. What have you done t o overcome him?" Man must 
overcome himself, r i s e above himself and his animal nature; i t i s a 
process and a struggle: "And l i f e i t s e l f t o l d me t h i s secret: 'Behold', 
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i t said, ' I am that which must overcome i t s e l f again and again." 
We now come t o the r e l i g i o u s ideas and concepts of Nietzsche; 
these w i l l be considered w i t h i n two broad themes or sections, f i r s t 
his c r i t i c i s m of C h r i s t i a n i t y with i t s attendant consequences, second 
his positive views on f a i t h . 
For Jesus as a man, Nietzsche had great respect, f o r he was 
the only r e a l Christian who has ever l i v e d . " T h i s 'Bringer of 
glad t i d i n g s * died as he l i v e d , as he taught - not t o 'redeem mankind' 
but t o demonstrate how one ought to l i v e . " ^ " ^ " This popular theology of 
redemption was a r e v i v a l of pre-Christian myths by Paul, what Nietzsche 
called "Ecclesiastical c r u d i t i e s " , and i s i n fact what Jesus came to 
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counter i n his personal teaching. On the other hand, Nietzsche 
had l i t t l e respect f o r the teachings of Christ as such; his r e l i g i o -
e t h i c a l ideas promote a denigration of man as they take from him the 
glory of being an animal i n nature with i t s rugged strength and beauty, 
and make man decadent; indeed, C h r i s t i a n i t y brought sin into the world 
through i t s preoccupation with i t . Besides attacking Paul f o r 
deviating from Jesus, Nietzsche also attacked the church f o r emulating 
and expanding t h i s false Pauline theology, and for not adhering 
s t r i c t l y t o the teachings of Jesus. 
In his Beyond Good and E v i l , Nietzsche makes his f i r s t mention 
of the d i s t i n c t i o n between the morality of the masters and the morality 
103 
of the slaves. The master morality rises above the slaves 1, i t 
creates the values which the slaves look up t o , i t i s i n control of 
the s i t u a t i o n by d i s c i p l i n i n g the slaves who are subservient t o the 
masters. From t h i s we see the pride and self-respect of the masters 
i n contrast to the poor humiliated slaves. These respective 
moralities are the outworkings of two respective mentalities; 
Nietzsche attacked C h r i s t i a n i t y f o r teaching a slave mentality and 
morality rather than a master mentality and morality. The doctrine 
of resentment arises out of the dichotomy between these two 
mentalities and t h e i r m o r a l i t i e s , for whenever an in d i v i d u a l realises 
that he has been forced in t o a slave s i t u a t i o n he resents i t . 
The message that God i s dead had many complex factors i n the 
mind of Nietzsche. For example, at one point he says "'God i s dead; 
God has died of his p i t y f o r man'" 1 0\ whilst a l i t t l e l a t e r he appears 
to have considered that i n fact God never r e a l l y existed:- "The 
s p i r i t of t h e i r Redeemers consisted of holes; but in t o every hole 
they had put t h e i r i l l u s i o n , t h e i r stop-gap, which they called God."^^ 
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In a l a t e r work, Nietzsche saw unbelief i n terms of maturity of 
thought, because the t r a d i t i o n a l view of God has not worked out i n 
practice (e.g. as judge, rewarder), so people rej e c t Theism. 1 0^ 
Nevertheless Nietzsche not only declared the death of God but also 
the death of the d e v i l and h e l l ; the over-riding emphasis i s r e a l l y 
on the autonomy of man who i s now free of these e x t r a - t e r r e s t r i a l 
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interferences. I n certain respects, Nietzsche's message that God 
i s dead i s t r u e , and he was r i g h t t o say so: i n fact he attacked false 
concepts of God, and showed that more enlightened men had realised 
the f a l s i t y of these concepts; i n t h i s way he sums up most of the 
modern arguments against Theism and C h r i s t i a n i t y . 
But f o r Nietzsche t h i s was not an event or fact of no 
consequence; indeed, i n the person of his Madman, Nietzsche actually 
experienced the death of God, and t h i s experience - as a good 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t - he relayed t o man. For Nietzsche, the death of 
God was not a disaster but a r e l i e f and j o y , and also an invigorating 
challenge. The r e l i e f and joy was i n the sense of freedom, not 
j u s t from the s t r i c t u r e s of r e l i g i o n as such, but also from the 
pu r i t a n i c a l ethic which Theism and C h r i s t i a n i t y imposed on man. 
The autonomy of man could once again be expressed. The invigorating 
challenge i s that now that God i s dead, the Christian ethic i s 
discredited, and i n t h e i r place stands a gaping nothingness, an abyss; 
man i s seen to be the creator of values, and the great challenge i s 
for man t o rebuild his world humanistically and secularly. 
With the death of God, man i s challenged to transvalue his previous 
values, that i s , t o create new values of his own. Revaluation, 
rather, i s process of s e l f - c r i t i c i s m , to see how much old morality 
i s hypocrisy, dishonesty, and b l a t a n t l y immoral as such by i t s own 
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standards. As Kaufmann puts i t : -
The revaluation culminates i n the claim that the so-
called goodness of modern man i s not virtuous, that 
his so-called r e l i g i o n i s not r e l i g i o u s , and that his 
so-called t r u t h s are not t r u t h f u l . ®9 
F i n a l l y , we come t o Nietzsche's concept of f a i t h . I n 
The Anti-Christ, his basic view i s t h a t f a i t h occurs because there i s 
a weakness of w i l l and a lack of i n t e l l e c t u a l enquiry. Thus Nietzsche 
declares 
The pathos that develops out of t h i s i s called f a i t h : 
closing one's eyes with respect t o oneself f o r good and 
a l l so as not t o suffer from the sight of incurable 
f a l s i t y . 1 1 0 
Similarly r e l i g i o u s f a i t h i n e v i t a b l y attacks the d i g n i t y and autonomy 
of man by pretending t o refe r him t o something beyond himself:-
The 'Christian', that which has been called c h r i s t i a n 
f o r two millennia, i s merely a psychological s e l f -
misunderstanding. Regarded more closely, that which 
has ruled i n him, i n spite of a l l his ' f a i t h ' , has been 
merely the i n s t i n c t s - and what i n s t i n c t s ! 'Faith' has 
been at a l l times, with Luther f o r instance, only a 
cloak, a pretext, a screen, behind which the i n s t i n c t s 
play t h e i r game - a shrewd blindness t o the dominance of 
certain i n s t i n c t s . . . . 'Faith' - I have already called i t 
the true Christian shrewdness - one has always spoken 
of f a i t h , one has always acted from i n s t i n c t . 1 1 " 
In short, f a i t h i s abhorrent:- "... there i s today s t i l l no lack of 
those who do not know how indecent i t i s t o 'believe' - or a sign of 
112 
decadence, of a broken w i l l t o l i v e . . . " Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche 
also attacks c h i l d i s h C h r i s t i a n i t y : -
Heaven belongs t o children; the f a i t h which here finds 
utterance i s not a f a i t h which has been won by struggle -
i t i s there, from the beginning, i t i s as i t were a 
return t o childishness i n the s p i r i t u a l domain. 1 1^ 
Besides the commonplace elaborations Nietzsche makes t o these positions, 
we should note three positive themes he expounds on f a i t h : the 
doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, a m o r f a t i , and what Hans Vaihinger has 
called The W i l l t o I l l u s i o n . The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence 
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probably came t o Nietzsche through his classical studies, with special 
reference t o the Greek c y c l i c a l view of histo r y . However, he did 
not take over t h i s ancient idea without some c r i t i c a l modifications, 
nor without some reference t o other exponents of the idea. I t 
i s not without h i s t o r i c a l as well as philosophical significance, 
however, that the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence has been called the 
l l U 
"Dionysian Faith". These factors combine t o refute the argument 
that Niezsche may have been a romantic; rather the doctrine of 
Eternal Recurrence i s u l t i m a t e l y t r a g i c , whilst the Dionysian f a i t h 
i s austere. Hollingdale says 
Nietzsche arrived at the theory of the eternal 
recurrence as a consequence of two philosophical 
requirements; the need t o explain the world and 
the need t o accept i t . ' 
This doctrine inevitably leads t o a resignation t o f a t e , an acceptance 
of l i f e with both i t s good and i t s bad sides together, and the hard 
d i s c i p l i n e which t h i s necessitates on the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Here there i s no glimmer of hope or progress; i t i s the 
negative (or at least neutral) side t o his a t t i t u d e of amor f a t i , 
i t i s , as Hollingdale says, 
... the Lutheran acceptance of the events of l i f e as 
di v i n e l y w i l l e d , with the consequent affi r m a t i o n of 
l i f e as such as divine, as a product of the divine 
w i l l , and the implication that t o hate l i f e i s 
blasphemous 
The doctrine of Eternal Recurrance, and the motto of amor f a t i , 
present a passive accepting f a i t h which takes things as they are. 
By contrast, but s t i l l held i n tension by Nietzsche, i s his 
recognition of the place of i l l u s i o n i n l i f e and f a i t h . I n an essay 
l l 8 
e n t i t l e d Nietzsche's W i l l t o I l l u s i o n , Vaihinger argues that 
Nietzsche bears out the thesis of his whole volume The Philosophy of 
"As I f " that there are f i c t i o n s , that they are recognised as such, but 
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they cannot be discarded because they are necessary f o r t h e f u n c t i o n 
of human l i f e and thought. Nietzsche, t h e r e f o r e , can speak o f 
" l y i n g , i n the extra-moral-sense", a r t and drama as an a e s t h e t i c 
i l l u s i o n , r e l i g i o n and t h e freedom o f t h e w i l l also as i l l u s i o n s -
but necessary ones; indeed, l i v i n g i n i l l u s i o n i s t h e i d e a l , so even 
moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s o n l y an i l l u s i o n , though o f course, a very 
necessary one f o r a s t a b l e s o c i e t y . T r u t h i s not t h e a n t i t h e s i s o f 
e r r o r , but t h e r e l a t i o n o f one e r r o r against another; " t r u t h i s t h e 
most expedient form o f e r r o r " , f o r i t i s t h a t which f u n c t i o n s i n t h e 
circumstances. The A n t i - C h r i s t a t t a c k s much t h a t i s i l l u s i o n ( c f . 
" I n s p i t e o f " ) , but cannot deny t h e s e c u r i t y t h a t i l l u s i o n produces. 
This whole philosophy o f "As I f " i s c l e a r l y an important aspect o f 
an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a n a l y s i s o f f a i t h as i t deals w i t h t h e t h e o r y , 
p r a c t i c e , and experience o f f a i t h i n terms o f t h e l i f e o f t h e b e l i e v e r . 
JASPERS 
Jaspers was the co-founder w i t h Heidegger o f German e x i s t e n t i a l 
philosophy, and was i n f a c t q u i t e e x p l i c i t about the e x i s t e n t i a l 
119 
nature o f h i s philosophy, although he hi m s e l f admitted t h e great 
d i f f i c u l t y he had i n communicating t h e concept o f Exist e n z , because 
. i t i s so i n e f f a b l e . 
Existenz cannot be o b j e c t i v e l y d e f i n ed or expressed, Jaspers argued, 
because Existenz i s t o do w i t h being; "... Existenz i s not a concept; 
121 
i t i s a sign t h a t p o i n t s 'beyond a l l o b j e c t i v e n e s s " 1 . He 
contrasted Existenz w i t h mundane existence, and declared " I am 
122 
Existenz i f I do not become an o b j e c t f o r myself." Jaspers went 
even f u r t h e r : "Existenz warns me t o detach myself from t h e world 
123 
l e s t I become i t s prey". Such detachnuant, such e l u c i d a t i o n o f 
Existenz r e s u l t s from personal d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h mundane existence 
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i n t h e wor l d . I n d i v i d u a l freedom, t h e n , f o r Jaspers, i s analagous 
12U 
w i t h Existenz. We may t h e r e f o r e say t h a t Existenz r e f e r s t o t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l person, but not t o h i s o b j e c t i v e , imminent, p h y s i c a l s t a t e , 
but t o h i s f r e e transcendent sphere o f l i f e ; i t i s t h e mark o f an 
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i n d i v i d u a l ' s a u t h e n t i c i t y . Experiences o f Existenz may be 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d , as Hoffman commented:-
Since Existenz thus cannot be d e f i n e d , but o n l y 
circumscribed, Jaspers r e s o r t s t o a set o f ' e x i s t e n t i a l ' 
c a t e g o r i e s , vaguely analagous t o Heidegger's E x i s t e n z i a l e , 
and d e r i v e d from t h e Kantian c a t e g o r i e s , over against 
which they stand. 
Thus t h e Existenzen of Jaspers i s p a r a l l e l t o t h e E x i s t e n t i a l i a o f 
Heidegger t o which we have already r e f e r r e d , and on which we w i l l 
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p a r t l y base our study o f Bultmann and T i l l i c h . 
One o f t h e great f e a t u r e s and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Jaspers' 
philosophy i s the breadth as w e l l as t h e depth o f h i s o v e r a l l 
p e r s p e c t i v e . This breadth i s nowhere b e t t e r i l l u s t r a t e d than w i t h 
h i s concept o f t h e Encompassing, which seeks t o go beyond t h e small 
world o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o see ev e r y t h i n g as a whole. What each 
person normally regards as a h o r i z o n , a surrounding boundary o f 
per s p e c t i v e , i s i n f a c t a l i m i t e d h o r i z o n , f o r more horizons l i e 
beyond t h a t one, and l a r g e r ones t o o . The Encompassing, f o r Jaspers, 
i s t h a t ( t h e o r e t i c a l ) sphere w i t h i n which a l l horizons are enclosed, 
128 
so t h a t no horizons remain v i s i b l e i n i t s comprehensiveness. 
W i t h i n t h i s perspective o f Encompassing, however, Jaspers 
recognises those human horizons o f f i n i t u d e which each i n d i v i d u a l has 
and experiences. These human l i m i t a t i o n s he c a l l e d "Boundary" or 
" L i m i t " or " U l t i m a t e " s i t u a t i o n s . There are always d i f f e r e n t 
s i t u a t i o n s and these s i t u a t i o n s are always i n a s t a t e o f f l u x but 
boundary s i t u a t i o n s s t r i k e us by t h e i r general s o l i d a r i t y . 
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S i t u a t i o n s l i k e t h e f o l l o w i n g : t h a t I am always i n 
s i t u a t i o n s ; t h a t I cannot l i v e w i t h o u t s t r u g g l i n g 
and s u f f e r i n g ; t h a t I cannot avoid g u i l t ; t h a t I must 
d i e - these are what I c a l l boundary s i t u a t i o n s . 
They never change, except i n appearance. There i s no 
way t o survey them i n existence, no way t o see anything 
behind them. They are l i k e a w a l l we run i n t o , a 
w a l l on which we founder. We cannot modify them; a l l 
t h a t we can do i s t o make them l u c i d , but w i t h o u t 
e x p l a i n i n g them or deducing them from something e l s e . 
They go w i t h existence i t s e l f . 1 2 9 
As a r e s u l t , one should not avoid these boundary s i t u a t i o n s , but seize 
and embrace them as p a r t o f one's own Existenz, an act which demands 
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a sense o f m a t u r i t y t o leap from existence t o Existenz. Jaspers 
131 
pointed out t h e richness i n l i f e o f t e n s i o n i n s i t u a t i o n s and v a l u e s , 
132 
i n f a c t , "To experience boundary s i t u a t i o n s i s t h e same as E x i s t e n z 1 1 , 
and both are stepping stones t o Transcendence, because both emphasise 
the f i n i t u d e and hence immanence o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l . I n boundary 
s i t u a t i o n s , t h e e x i s t e n t i a l character o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s displayed 
as he faces s i t u a t i o n s alone, and h i s f a i t h i s t e s t e d . 
Another t h i n g which may a r i s e from boundary s i t u a t i o n s i s choice 
and d e c i s i o n . I n f a c t Jaspers deals w i t h these r e l a t e d concepts i n 
terms o f freedom, but i n e i t h e r approach, t h e emphasis i s t y p i c a l l y 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , being a common reference t o t h e r o l e and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
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o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l . Thus he says " P h i l o s o p h i c a l f a i t h , on t h e 
other hand, i s t h e f a i t h o f man i n h i s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . I n i t he 
13U 
breathes h i s freedom." From t h e f a c t o f t h i s freedom, Jaspers 
faces up t o i t s attendant r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and g u i l t : " I know I am 
f r e e , and so I admit I am g u i l t y . I answer f o r what I have done. 
135 
Knowing what I d i d , I take i t upon myself". From t h i s , Jaspers 
comes t o t h e profound r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t t h i s freedom i s thereby 
l i m i t i n g and l i m i t e d ; l i m i t i n g i n t h a t i t r e v e a l s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
which r e s t r i c t one, l i m i t e d i n t h a t i t makes assumptions about t h e 
s e l f and one's c a p a b i l i t i e s which i n p r a c t i c e are not borne out. I t 
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i s no vonder then t h a t freedom i s a product o f the w i l l . 
We now t u r n t o t h e more s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s concepts o f 
Jaspers: Transcendence, F a i t h , C a t h o l i c i t y , Ciphers, and Foundering. 
These concepts nevertheless are s t i l l i n t e g r a l l y r e l a t e d t o those 
other ideas p r e v i o u s l y discussed. Transcendence, as i t s name i m p l i e s , 
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i s the supreme, i n e f f a b l e , realm w i t h i n t h e Encompassing. Indeed, 
137 
man i s man simply because t h e r e i s Transcendence, f o r t h e r e i s a 
leap from immanence t o transcendence. 
The elusiveness o f Transcendence i s t h e same t h i n g as t h e 
elusiveness o f Being. I t i s o f u l t i m a t e s i g n i f i c a n c e but cannot be 
o b j e c t i f i e d , i t i s t h e indispensable companion o f Existenz but cannot 
be seized or r e a l i s e d by t h e i n d i v i d u a l . Jaspers i s thus l e f t 
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saying "Transcendence must be present where I seek i t " f o r i t i s 
a boundary s i t u a t i o n experience.^® 
We s h a l l t h e r e f o r e now consider f i r s t Jaspers' treatment o f 
" E x i s t e n t i a l R elations t o Transcendence"^"^, then h i s connection made 
between Transcendence and t h e d i v i n e , and then f i n a l l y h i s concept 
o f f a i t h and t h e f i n a l climax o f h i s Philosophy - "Foundering". 
The f i r s t e x i s t e n t i a l r e l a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o Transcendence 
i s through boundary s i t u a t i o n s which p o i n t t h e human l i m i t a t i o n s and 
f i n i t u d e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l over and against t h e transcendence and 
death o f l i f e i t s e l f , w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l seeking t o understand t h e 
r o l e o f Transcendence i n such d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n s by means such as 
t h e o d i c i e s , and so a c t i n g i n defiance or surrender i n response. The 
second e x i s t e n t i a l r e l a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o Transcendence i s by 
r i s i n g or f a l l i n g : - " I do not r e l a t e t o Transcendence by t h i n k i n g o f 
i t , nor by d e a l i n g w i t h i t i n the s o r t o f a c t i o n t h a t might be repeated 
1^2 
according t o r u l e s . I am soaring toward i t or d e c l i n i n g from i t " . 
- 6 l -
The t h i r d e x i s t e n t i a l r e l a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o Transcendence i s 
f a r more complex, r e f e r r i n g t o t h e "law o f t h e daytime" and t h e 
"passion o f t h e n i g h t " . Normally, these two are c o n t r a s t e d as 
reason versus passion, but as each are seen t o have t h e i r own 
e x i s t e n t i a l v a l i d i t y , each i n t u r n p o i n t s t o an aspect o f Transcendence; 
as Jaspers s a i d , " I t i s a phenomenon o f awful ambiguity". The 
temptation t o see areas o f transcendence must be r e s i s t e d ; t h e r e i s 
one Transcendence, and t h e r e i n l i e s paradox and t e n s i o n , mystery and 
the d i v i n e . F i n a l l y , t h e f o u r t h e x i s t e n t i a l r e l a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
t o Transcendence i s what Jaspers c a l l s "the One"; "To Existenz, i t i s t h e 
Ikh 
One i n which Existenz has i t s being; t o Existenz, t h e One i s e v e r y t h i n g " . 
The One may be sought transcending reason or by embracing t h e wo r l d ; i t 
i s , e i t h e r way, a process o f l o o k i n g beyond imminence but not f o r s a k i n g 
i t . 
Jaspers was both a philosopher and a C h r i s t i a n i n t h e Protestant 
lU5 
t r a d i t i o n and he t h e r e f o r e emphasises t h e place o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
lU6 
i n f a i t h . I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g then t h a t Jaspers d i d not h e s i t a t e 
t o show how God f i t t e d i n t o h i s philosophy, although he admitted, 
however, t h a t 
As a concept, t h e one God n e c e s s a r i l y leads t o a b s u r d i t i e s 
which are t o make me f e e l him as I transcend them; but i n 
an e x i s t e n t i a l sense he i s t h e hand t h a t answers me 
wherever I am r e a l l y and t r u l y myself. He i s t h e 
nearby God who j u s t i f i e s me w i t h t h e d i s t a n t one.lU7 
I n t h i s d iscussion on t h e "Transcendence o f the One D e i t y " , Jaspers, 
having e s t a b l i s h e d t h e embracing paradoxes i n t h e concept o f 
Transcendence, goes on t o i d e n t i f y them - and Transcendence - w i t h 
ll+8 
God. Transcendence - God - cannot be evoked independent o f t h e 
b e l i e v e r ; i f t h e r e i s a f a i l u r e t o b e l i e v e i n God, i t i s t h e f a i l u r e 
o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o be authe n t i c Existenz: "How can t h e being o f 
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transcendence be doubted at a l l ? I t may be doubted because our 
sense o f being has strayed i n t o t h e blindness o f mere existence: t h e r e 
lU9 
has been a f a i l u r e o f Existenz". 
Jaspers developed a considerable concept o f f a i t h and p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
f a i t h over t h e years, from h i s Philosophy, dated 1932, t o h i s 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l F a i t h and Re v e l a t i o n , dated 1962. He argued t h a t "only 
t h e f a i t h t h a t withstands doubt i s r e a l f a i t h . . . . t h e r e i s no f a i t h 
unless t h e r e i s u n b e l i e f . . . Only he who can see u n b e l i e f as a 
c o n t i n u i n g p o s s i b i l i t y f o r h i m s e l f i s a t r u e i b e l i e v e r " . ^ " ^ For 
Jaspers, f a i t h i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p made by an Existenz (an authent i c 
e x i s t e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l ) w i t h another Existenz or w i t h Transcendence, 
152 
and i s not r e f l e c t i v e but a c t i v e . I n f a i t h , n o t h i n g i s sure or 
d e f i n i t e so l i t t l e can be said w i t h c e r t a i n t y ; hence " I do not know 
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whether I b e l i e v e " . There i s a t r u t h which i s beyond the 
pragmatism o f wordly immanence, i t i s t h e t r u t h o f transcendence, 
15U 
so t h a t "Existence experiences t r u t h i n f a i t h " . 
I n Existenz t h e r e i s f a i t h and despair. Opposed t o 
both stands the d e s i r e f o r the peace o f e t e r n i t y , where 
despair i s impossible and f a i t h becomes a v i s i o n , t h a t 
i s t o say, t h e p e r f e c t presence o f p e r f e c t r e a l i t y . ^ 5 5 
We thus f i n d t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l f a i t h i s t h e i n d i v i d u a l p h i l o s o p h i s i n g 
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about h i s Existenz, and so i t cannot by nature be dogmatic. 
I n h i s l a t e work P h i l o s o p h i c a l F a i t h and Revelation , Jaspers 
expounds a p h i l o s o p h i c a l f a i t h and a philosophy o f f a i t h independent 
o f any p a r t i c u l a r r e v e l a t i o n , and compares and c o n t r a s t s w i t h 
r e l i g i o u s f a i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r r e v e l a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t o f 
C h r i s t i a n i t y . P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , 
F a i t h i s not a knowledge I have, but a c e r t a i n t y t h a t 
guides me. I n f a i t h I l i v e by the source t h a t speaks 
t o me as I t h i n k what I b e l i e v e . . . . F a i t h i s t h e s t r e n g t h 
i n which I am sure of myself, on grounds I can keep 
but not make.157 
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P h i l o s o p h i c a l f a i t h c r i t i c i s e s f a i t h i n r e v e l a t i o n f o r l i m i t i n g 
one£s view o f God, and r e v e l a t i o n a l f a i t h c r i t i c i s e s p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
f a i t h f o r a l a c k o f o b j e c t i v i t y , c e r t a i n t y , and content. Jaspers 
i s unable t o defend r e v e l a t i o n a l f a i t h , but defends p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
f a i t h because i t respects t h e transcendence o f God. 
Connected w i t h h i s d i s t r u s t o f r e v e l a t i o n a l f a i t h i s Jaspers' 
condemnation o f what he c a l l s " c a t h o l i c i t y " . Jaspers c r i t i c i s e d 
c a t h o l i c i t y as r e p r e s e n t i n g closed a u t h o r i t y i n c o n t r a s t t o open 
a u t h o r i t y or even any a u t h o r i t y a t a l l which r e j e c t e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
enquiry. C a t h o l i c i t y (and t h i s i s not j u s t l i m i t e d t o t h e Roman 
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church) i s condemned as arrogant and t o t a l i t a r i a n , and as 
unreasonable i n i t s r e v e l a t i o n a l and exc l u s i v e claims. 
Jaspers, l i k e Kierkegaard, recognised t h e place o f r i s k i n 
f a i t h ; f o r i t i s necessary i f t h e r e i s t o be freedom although t h i s 
w i l l r e s u l t i n s u b j e c t i v e i n s e c u r i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e 
i s t h e o n t o l o g i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r i s k o f f a i t h , t h e n i h i l i s t i c 
t h r e a t , which i s e x i s t e n t i a l l y experienced when p r i d e overtakes 
f a i t h . 
The conclusion and climax o f Jaspers' Philosophy i s h i s concept 
o f "Foundering", which he describes as "The f i n a l c i p h e r " . I f 
"Existenz" i s t h e cipher o f "Transcendence", then "Foundering", i s 
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t h e cipher o f "Being" or "Existenz". "Foundering i s t h e u l t i m a t e " , 
Jaspers perceived. As Thyssen put i t , "Foundering s i g n i f i e s t h e 
f r u i t l e s s n e s s o f a l l endeavours t o reach, from a f i n i t e basis such 
as consciousness- as-such or even from s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t Existenz, 
16U 
a s a t i s f a c t o r y access t o Being, i . e . , t o a r r i v e a t t h e absolute." 
Later Thyssen makes another i n t e r p r e t a t i v e p o i n t : - "... foundering 
becomes t h e new great ci p h e r f o r t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l experience o f 
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Transcendence. But i t i s not o n l y a c i p h e r . Rather i s i t t h e 
experience o f foundering which i s f u n d a m e n t a l " . 1 ^ That i s , 
"Foundering" i s not j u s t a way o f expressing "Existenz", but t h e 
a c t u a l experience o f "Existenz" i t s e l f . This basic f a c t o f Foundering, 
as Jaspers sees i t , i s r e a l l y t h e essence o f t h e t r a n s i t o r i n e s s and 
tragedy o f l i f e i t s e l f . As such, t h e n , i t i s not t o be r u n away from, 
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but t o be faced w i t h acceptance and embrace. 
Jaspers closed h i s magnum opus i n r e f l e c t i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
s e r e n i t y - "Peace i n r e a l i t y " . 
I n view o f f o u n d e r i n g , i t seems impossible t o l i v e . . . . 
The leap from f e a r t o s e r e n i t y i s t h e most tremendous 
one a man can make. That he succeeds i n i t must be 
due t o a reason beyond the Existenz o f h i s self-being... /•„ 
Undefinably, h i s f a i t h t i e s him t o transcendent being. 
I n these circumstances l i f e appears i n t o l e r a b l y senseless t o a man, 
"... but sufferance means t h a t he w i l l c l i n g t o being i n s p i t e o f 
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h i s foundering, where the c i p h e r o f foundering f a i l s him." At 
t h i s moment he gains transcendence, and w i t h i t , peace. 
HEIDEGGER 
The major p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n f l u e n c e on Heidegger was Edmund 
Husserl, whose p u p i l he was i n t h e F r e i b u r g U n i v e r s i t y , where he 
learned Husserl's phenomenological method. We have already noted 
i n our f i r s t chapter t h e s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n phenomenology made 
t o e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , so t h e i n f l u e n c e o f Husserl may be t r a c e d through 
t h e philosophy o f and i n t o the thought o f Bultmann and T i l l i c h . 
I n f a c t Heidegger's Being and Time was dedicated by Heidegger t o 
Husserl, and was f i r s t published i n 1927 i n t h e Jahrbuch f u r 
Phanomenologie und phflnomenologische Forschung e d i t e d by Husserl. 
Heidegger h i m s e l f disclaimed t h e l a b e l " E x i s t e n t i a l i s t " , and 
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when S a r t r e published h i s essay:. E x i s t e n t i a l i s m i s a Humanism 
Heidegger repudiated t h e equation. Heidegger h i m s e l f was much 
in f l u e n c e d d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, 
w h i l s t h i s concept o f Dasein i s not u n l i k e t h e concept o f Existenz 
propounded by h i s contemporary and f e l l o w founder o f German 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , K a r l Jaspers. We w i l l l i m i t our references t o 
Heidegger's philosophy t o h i s work Being and Time, as i t was t h i s book 
which i n f l u e n c e d Bultmann most, and so i s most r e l e v a n t t o t h i s t h e s i s . 
Heidegger begins Being and Time w i t h an a n a l y s i s o f Dasein, 
n o t i n g "two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Dasein... - t h e p r i o r i t y o f 1 e x i s t e n t i a 1 
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over e s s e n t i a , and the f a c t t h a t Dasein i s i n each case mine". 
I n f a c t , "The essence o f Dasein l i e s i n i t s existence... when we 
designate t h i s e n t i t y w i t h the term 'Dasein*, we are expressing not 
170 
i t s 'what' ... but i t s Being." Dasein may be a u t h e n t i c or 
i n a u t h e n t i c , a u t h e n t i c Dasein having t h e p r o p e r t y o f personal 
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possession, i . e . p e r s o n a l i t y , p o s s i b i l i t y , choice, and d e c i s i o n . 
Dasein then i s d e a l i n g w i t h t h e everyday s i t u a t i o n s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
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human being. To describe t h e circumstances o f these s i t u a t i o n s , 
Heidegger says 
A l l e x p l i c a t a t o which t h e a n a l y t i c o f Dasein gives r i s e 
are obtained by c o n s i d e r i n g Dasein's e x i s t e n c e - s t r u c t u r e . 
Because Dasein*s characters o f Being are defined i n ..„., 
terms o f e x i s t e n t i a l i t y , we c a l l them ' e x i s t e n t i a l i a ' . 
I t i s t h i s t e c h n i c a l term " E x i s t e n t i a l i a " used by Heidegger which 
we have adopted t o c h a r a c t e r i s e a basic aspect o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m 
and i t s a n a l y t i c . There i s no s a t i s f a c t o r y t r a n s l a t i o n of"Dasein"; 
s t r i c t l y t h e word means "Being-there", but i t could e a s i l y mean 
"Being-here1*'; t h e emphasis i s on t h e a c t u a l i t y o f being as such -
l i k e Jaspers' "Existenz", i t does not a c t u a l l y represent an i n d i v i d u a l 
human being, but r a t h e r represents those o n t o l o g i c a l and e x i s t e n t i a l 
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c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h a t i n d i v i d u a l person. I n f a c t Heidegger 
c a l l s man "Dasein". The reasons f o r t h i s are t o emphasise t h e "Who" 
of man (not h i s "What"), and h i s place i n t h e w o r l d , t o emphasise 
the i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y o f man, and t o emphasise t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of existence open t o such a being. 
Heidegger then proceeds t o speak o f "Being-in-the-world i n 
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general as t h e basic s t a t e o f Dasein". This serves an' immediate 
balance t o t h e note o f i n d i v i d u a l i s m s t r u c k i n t h e f i r s t chapter; 
the i n d i v i d u a l Dasein e x i s t s i n t h e world - i n f a c t , Heidegger l a t e r 
makes much o f t h e f a c t o f Dasein " b e i n g - i n " and being i n r e l a t i o n 
t o o t h e r s , as we s h a l l see. We f i n d another good example o f 
Heidegger's e x i s t e n t i a l i s m i n h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between e n t i t i e s which 
are "present-at-hand", ...untapped resources i n t h e world,and e n t i t i e s 
which are "ready-at-hand", those resources viewed f o r u t i l i s a t i o n by 
man. This d i s t i n c t i o n r e f l e c t s t h e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ' i n t e r e s t i n 
those aspects o f l i f e which come w i t h i n t h e experience and f e e l i n g s 
o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l person, i . e . , which " i n v o l v e " t h e i n d i v i d u a l . 
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Dasein encounters other e n t i t i e s i n t h e w o r l d , and e x i s t s 
alongside them. 
Heidegger i s very concerned about t h e independence o f Dasein, 
and t h e " d i s t a n t i a l i t y " i t should^have when being w i t h ^ o t h e r s . 
Dasein loses i t s e s s e n t i a l independence when i t i s among others ( t h e 
" t h e y " ) : - "We c a l l t h i s everyday u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d character o f Dasein 
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'averageness'". The Dasein which hides behind t h e "they" loses 
i t s sense o f personal i n i t i a t i v e , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and d e c i s i o n ; thus 
t h i s " t h e y ^ s e l - f M must be sharply d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e "a u t h e n t i c 
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S e l f " . '' This concept o f a u t h e n t i c existence as t h e i n d i v i d u a l , 
th e Dasein, a s s e r t i n g i t s e l f , m a i n t a i n i n g i t s s t a t u s , i s a r e c u r r i n g 
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theme i n Being and Time, as we s h a l l see. 
Heidegger argues t h a t understanding i s not a d i s i n t e r e s t e d 
r e c e p t i o n o f t h e f a c t s , but a p a r t i c i p a t i n g p r a c t i c a l knowledge i n 
existence, involvement being a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c mark o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . 
Understanding i s always p r o j e c t i n g i n t o p o s s i b i l i t i e s , never r e s t i n g 
i n any o f them, so t h a t t h e understanding, by p r o j e c t i n g , represents 
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new p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n i t s e l f . A l l understanding i s i n t e r p r e t e d 
by our pre-understanding ( p r i o r - u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) . As a r e s u l t , we 
cannot understand anything i n i t s a u t h e n t i c p u r i t y , but o n l y as we 
i n t e r p r e t i t by our pre-understanding. This e x i s t e n t i a l i s t idea 
r e f u t e s Hegel's I d e a l i s t d o c t r i n e t h a t presuppositions could be 
abolished, and also r e f u t e s h i s E s s e n t i a l i s t d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e mind 
can e x i s t independent o f t h e body. Heidegger says t h a t as the 
understanding p r o j e c t s i t s e l f on p o s s i b i l i t i e s , a development takes 
place which i s c a l l e d " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . I n f a c t , he says, a l l 
understanding i n v o l v e s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , f o r a l l comprehension i n v o l v e s 
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pre-understanding: "Like any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n whatever, a s s e r t i o n 
n e c e s s a r i l y has a f o r e - h a v i n g , a f o r e - s i g h t , and a fore-conception as 
l 8 l 
i t s e x i s t e n t i a l foundations." This i s what gives "meaning" i t s 
• ... 182 s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
According t o Heidegger, communication by Dasein may be 
authentic or i n a u t h e n t i c . Authentic communication, or " a r t i c u l a t i o n " , 
t o use Heidegger's word,is personal:- "Discoursing or t a l k i n g i s t h e way 
i n which we a r t i c u l a t e ' s i g n i f i c a n t l y ' t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f B e i n g - i n -
1 O o 
the-World." There i s , on the other hand, communication by t h e 
Idh 
"they" which i s adopted by Dasein when l i v i n g an i n a u t h e n t i c existence. 
I n a u t h e n t i c communication takes v a r i o u s forms, a l l o f which b e t r a y t h e 
d e c l i n e ( " f a l l i n g " ) o f Dasein:-
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This 'absorption i n . . . 1 has mostly t h e character o f 
Being-lost i n the publicness o f t h e 'they'. Dasein 
has, i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , f a l l e n away from i t s e l f 
as an authentic p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r Being i t s S e l f , and 
has f a l l e n i n t o t h e ' w o r l d 1 . 'Fallenness* i n t o t h e 
•world' means the absorption i n Being-with-one-another, 
i n so f a r as the l a t t e r i s guided by i d l e t a l k , 
c u r i o s i t y , and ambiguity. Through the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of f a l l i n g , what we have c a l l e d the * i n a u t h e n t i c i t y ' 
o f Dasein may now be defined more p r e c i s e l y . * 
Heidegger sees Dasein as having been "thrown" i n t o a s i t u a t i o n , 
and from t h e " f a c t i c i t y " o f t h a t s i t u a t i o n Dasein may become authen t i c 
or i n a u t h e n t i c . 
With t h i s s i t u a t i o n o f mind i t i s easy t o see why Heidegger 
could say t h a t i t i s "... as 'care' the Being o f Dasein i n general i s 
l A T 
t o be d e f i n e d " . Care i s analysed thus; " I t comprises i n i t s e l f 
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f a c t i c i t y (thrownness), existence ( p r o j e c t i o n ) , and f a l l i n g . " 
Heidegger, i n order t o master the p r o v i s i o n a l t a s k o f e x h i b i t i n g 
Dasein's Being, sought "... f o r one o f t h e most f a r - r e a c h i n g and 
most p r i m o r d i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f d i s c l o s u r e - one t h a t l i e s i n Dasein 
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i t s e l f " . His answer i s "As a state-of-mind which w i l l s a t i s f y 
these methodological requirements, the phenomenon o f a n x i e t y w i l l be 
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made basic f o r our a n a l y s i s " . This a n x i e t y i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 
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f e a r ; a n x i e t y has no a c t u a l o b j e c t , whereas f e a r does. Heidegger 
expounds on a n x i e t y as an experience of Dasein t h u s : - "That i n the 
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face of which one has a n x i e t y i s Being-in-the-world as such". 
The o b j e c t o f a n x i e t y i s thus nothing y e t e v e r y t h i n g , nowhere y e t 
everywhere. 
According t o Heidegger, t h e perceptive man, a u t h e n t i c Dasein, 
i s "Being-toward-death" which i s t h e a t t i t u d e o f s e i z i n g death as 193 th e u l t i m a t e p o s s i b i l i t y , and of gauging one's whole l i f e t o face i t . 
I n a u t h e n t i c , everyday Dasein refuses t o face or accept t h i s c hallenge, 
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t r e a t i n g i t as a fact.j*ien i t i s a p o s s i b i l i t y , but l a t e r t r e a t i n g 
19b 
i t as unr e a l when t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y has passed over i n t o f a c t ; 
"The 'they 1 does not permit us the courage f o r a n x i e t y i n t h e face 
o f d e a t h " . 1 9 5 
This leads t o an important i m p l i c a t i o n , however, t h a t a n t i c i p a t i o n , 
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being u n f u l f i l l e d , i s towards p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n the f u t u r e . I t 
t h e r e f o r e f o l l o w s t h a t : " A n t i c i p a t i o n t u r n s out t o be the p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f understanding one's ownmost and uttermost p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g -
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t h a t i s t o say, the p o s s i b i l i t y o f au t h e n t i c existence". But 
t h i s a u t h e n t i c i t y b r i n g s i t s own t e n s i o n s ; w i t h e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s , 
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i n t e r n a l f a c i n g o f death, and o v e r a l l a n x i e t y . Another 
s i g n i f i c a n t aspect o f Heidegger's e x i s t e n t i a l a n t i c i p a t i o n i n t o t h e 
f u t u r e i s t h a t o f the " n o t - y e t " : - "... th e r e belongs t o Dasein, as 
long as i t i s , a *not-yet' which i t w i l l be - t h a t which i s 
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c o n s t a n t l y s t i l l o u tstanding". I n t h i s phrase l i e s the k e r n e l o f 
a n t i c i p a t i o n and p o t e n t i a l , and the challenge o f a u t h e n t i c i t y . 
We now t u r n t o Heidegger's disc u s s i o n o f a u t h e n t i c i t y . 
Heidegger f i r s t r a i s e d t h e subject - which i s very important f o r him -
i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f Dasein, where, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y fond o f puns, 
he emphasised t h e connection between e i g e n t l i c h ( a u t h e n t i c , r e a l ) , 
and eigen ( o w n ) . 2 0 0 This a u t h e n t i c i t y i s t w o f o l d ; a r e j e c t i o n o f 
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p u b l i c v a l u e s , and a s e l f - a s s e r t i o n by choice. The v o i c e o f 
202 
conscience appeals t o Dasein t o f u l f i l i t s p o t e n t i a l i t y a u t h e n t i c a l l y , 
203 
and t h e authen t i c response i s "resoluteness". The r e s u l t i s t h a t 
" I n resoluteness we have now a r r i v e d a t t h a t t r u t h o f Dasein which 
20 U 
i s most p r i m o r d i a l because i t i s a u t h e n t i c . " Heidegger sums up 
"Resoluteness, however, i s only t h a t a u t h e n t i c i t y which, i n care, i s 
the o b j e c t o f care, and which i s p o s s i b l e as care - t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y 
205 
o f care i t s e l f " , and goes on t o argue f o r " A n t i c i p a t o r y Resoluteness 
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as t h e way i n which Dasein*s p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g - a - w h o l e has 
206 
e x i s t e n t i a l a u t h e n t i c i t y . " 
Heidegger's views on time are found o n l y i n a tr u n c a t e d form i n 
Being and Time, but he makes h i s p o s i t i o n c l e a r i n t h a t he wants t o 
view Being i n the context and perspective o f Time. This i s seen by 
him i n terms o f p o s s i b i l i t y , both i n the present and i n t h e f u t u r e , 
and i n terms o f a n t i c i p a t i o n and p r o j e c t i o n . Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t 
f o r us i n t h i s t h e s i s , however, i s another concept which appears i n 
the c l o s i n g chapters o f Being and Time - Augenblick:- "moment o f 
v i s i o n " . For Heidegger, t h i s term enfolds h i s concepts o f time and 
e c s t a s i s , and p o s s i b i l i t y , and o f r e s o l u t i o n and a u t h e n t i c i t y , and 
provides f o r theologians a glimpse o f r e v e l a t i o n from a devout 
philosopher; f o r t h i s moment o f v i s i o n may be seen t o be almost a 
movement o f f a i t h : -
That Present which i s held i n au t h e n t i c t e m p o r a l i t y 
and which i s thus a u t h e n t i c i t s e l f , we c a l l t h e 
'moment of v i s i o n ' . ( A u g e n b l i c k ) . This term must 
be understood i n t h e a c t i v e sense o f an e c s t a s i s . 
I t means t h e r e s o l u t e r a p t u r e w i t h which Dasein i s 
c a r r i e d away t o whatever p o s s i b i l i t i e s and circumstances 
are encountered i n t h e S i t u a t i o n as p o s s i b l e o b j e c t s 2 0 „ 
of concern, but a r a p t u r e which i s hel d i n resoluteness. 
We must now see what Heidegger himself had t o say about God 
20 8 
and f a i t h . God c e r t a i n l y had a place i n h i s ontology, but as 
such had no e x i s t e n t i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . E x i s t e n t i a l l y , Heidegger 
209 
( l i k e Jaspers) p r e f e r r e d t o speak i n terms o f Transcendence, a 
theme which he developed i n h i s essay "On t h e Essence o f Cause 
(or Ground)" which was w r i t t e n i n honour o f Husserl, dated 19^3. 
C o l l i n s commented t h a t f o r Heidegger, t h e i n f i n i t e God i s separate 
... not on l y from t h e realm o f t h i n g s - t h a t - a r e 
but a l s o from t h e e n t i r e meaning o f being as such 
and hence from a l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l discourse. As 
f a r as t h e philosopher i s concerned, God cannot 
come w i t h i n t h e range o f our r e f l e c t i v e thought.... 
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Heidegger hims e l f places h i s philosophy beyond 
t h e issues o f atheism and theism. 
Heidegger reminds us t h a t theology i s t h e systematic development o f 
a p r i m o r d i a l r e l i g i o u s f a i t h . As such i t i s concerned w i t h expressing 
t h e e x i s t e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between man and God, not w i t h c o n s t r i c t i n g 
and defending dogmas:-
Theology i s seeking a more p r i m o r d i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o f man's Being towards God, prescribed by t h e meaning 
o f f a i t h i t s e l f and remaining w i t h i n i t . I t i s 
slowly beginning t o understand once more Luther's 
i n s i g h t t h a t t h e 'foundation' on which i t s system o f 
dogma r e s t s has not a r i s e n from an enquiry i n which 
f a i t h i s primary, and t h a t c o n c e p t u a l l y t h i s 'foundation' 
not only i s inadequate f o r t h e problematic o f theol o g y , 
but conceals and d i s t o r t s i t . ^ ^ 
Heidegger himself s a i d t h a t o nly e x i s t e n t i a l terms could make f a i t h 
212 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . Also, F a i t h i s not t o be misapplied: f o r something 
t h a t i s impossible t o prove to"be taken merely on f a i t h " i s a 
213 
"perversion o f the problem". Heidegger thereupon makes h i s 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t d e f i n i t i o n : "... t o have f a i t h - a way o f behaving 
which i t s e l f i s always a founded mode o f Being-in-the-world." 
CONCLUSIONS 
I n t h i s chapter we have noted t h e p r i n c i p a l themes and 
do c t r i n e s o f those f o u r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s whose i n f l u e n c e Bultmann and 
T i l l i c h p e r s o n a l l y acknowledge. These e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes w i l l be 
found t o recur f r e q u e n t l y i n our treatment of ' F a i t h ' as expounded by 
Bultmann and T i l l i c h which now f o l l o w s i n our next two chapters. 
Their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f ' f a i t h ' w i l l be seen t o be e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n 
t h a t they both use terms and themes we have j u s t seen i n t h i s 
chapter t o be those of our f o u r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s and i t i s q u i t e c l e a r 
t h a t Bultmann and T i l l i c h are f o r m u l a t i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e concepts 
o f ' F a i t h ' w i t h the thought o f these e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s i n mind. 
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Chapter Three 
BULTMANN' S EXISTENTIALIST INTERPRETATION OF "FAITH" 
INTRODUCTION 
In t h i s chapter i t i s not our int e n t i o n t o make a f u l l study of 
Bultmann's treatment of f a i t h , though we sha l l be obliged t o consider 
most of what he has to say on t h i s subject. Very often i n the works 
of Bultmann the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes i n which we are interested are 
addenda t o or continuation of the exegesis of the pa r t i c u l a r t e x t 
i n question. However, we sha l l f o r the most part ignore t h i s 
B i b l i c a l exegesis and the h i s t o r i c a l work of Bultmann as we attempt 
t o expound the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes i n Bultmann's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
f a i t h . 
We have already discovered the two main broad themes of 
existentialism i n our f i r s t chapter: "The Place of the I n d i v i d u a l " 
and " E x i s t e n t i a l i a " ; these w i l l now form the framework f o r our 
discussion of Bultmann's e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . 
But there are also subsidiary e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes which Bultmann 
employs here; some we met i n the f i r s t chapter, most we discovered 
i n the second chapter. I t w i l l be shown that Bultmann i s either 
indebted t o our four e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , or he i s thinking i n the same 
terms as they. I n t h i s chapter we shall give an exposition of 
Bultmann's use of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes i n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h , 
and show the extent of the influence of existentialism with reference 
t o what we have described i n Chapters One and Two. 
In our f i r s t chapter we noted D.E. Roberts' remark that 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y seek t o expound the t r u t h which 
can be known only by personal commitment. Now Bultmann i s quite 
emphatic about t h i s , r e j e c t i n g a l l abstract descriptions and 
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expositions of f a i t h . I n one of his e a r l i e r theological works, 
Bultmann declared that f a i t h i s not "theoretical speculation" f o r 
the believer, but "the a c t i v i t y of God i n his own l i f e " . ^ I n 
emphasising - as an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t - the aspects of personal 
commitment, involvement, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n f a i t h , Bultmann has 
at least three clear l i n e s of thought. 
F i r s t , f a i t h i s not the disinterested, or even academically 
responsive, acceptance of points of doctrine and dogma. One cannot 
believe i n a doctrine, only accept i t academically, or perhaps 
2 
submit t o i t resolutely but not sympathetically. Rather, f a i t h 
3 
i s p r i m a r i l y submission t o God. I n more d i s t i n c t i v e l y e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
terms, f a i t h i s not a bl i n d acceptance of dogma, but "... the 
ill u m i n a t i o n of existence i n that authentic self-understanding that 
It 
knows God". The "submission t o God" that Bultmann realises i s 
part of f a i t h i s i n fact the acceptance of the Krepuj^^ but as we 
have seen, t h i s acceptance i s of e x i s t e n t i a l experience and involvement, 
of personal commitment, not a disinterested learning of dogma. 
Secondly, f a i t h i s not a human a t t i t u d e of mind, f o r t h i s 
does not invoke the passionate interest which e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s e x t o l . 
Bultmann i s quite clear about t h i s : - "The concept of f a i t h i s 
therefore defined eschatologically; that i s , f a i t h does not denote 
a human a t t i t u d e which could be timeless and could be assumed at 
w i l l . . . " Consequently, f a i t h "... does not have the unequivocal 
7 
character of a s p i r i t u a l or psychological a t t i t u d e " . F a i t h, then, 
i s not an a t t i t u d e of mind, nor a general fe e l i n g of confidence i n 
Q 
God. Closely connected with t h i s i s the r e j e c t i o n of f a i t h as 
Weltanschauung; "world-view". As such, f a i t h would be an uncommitted 
disinterested view of l i f e and the world, which though seeing a 
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place f o r God i n the s i t u a t i o n and system does not invoke the 
response and passion that f a i t h should have according t o the 
9 
ex i st ent i a l i st s. 
Thirdly, f a i t h i s not a theory or abstract view:- "... ons 
cannot have an abstract f a i t h i n general..."^ f o r "theoretical 
conviction" i s not s u f f i c i e n t t o be deemed " f a i t h " . ^ Faith i s 
not a theory but e x i s t e n t i a l knowledge, not abstraction but experienc 
A l l t h i s emphasises the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t view and theme that t r u t h 
involves personal experience, i n t e r e s t , and commitment, and rej e c t s 
as not substantial and i n fact i n v a l i d those claims which do not 
have the personal witness of the p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l concerned. 
On the other hand, f a i t h can take the form of a more quiet, 
or even passive, experience of God:- "... the s i l e n t and reverential 
submission t o the power c a l l i n g me int o l i f e and making me f i n i t e . . . " 
However, f a i t h i s not a general t r u s t i n God, but i t i s founded on 
1U 
past experiences of God. Faith i s man's r e l a t i o n t o the divine, 
the a t t i t u d e which governs his whole l i f e , so that f a i t h i s man's 
awareness that he i s under divine grace.^ This description of 
f a i t h as an a t t i t u d e towards l i f e does nevertheless have some basis 
i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t thought, especially as expounded by Bultmann.^ 
In a l l t h i s , we notice that the two major themes of 
existentialism - the place of the i n d i v i d u a l , and his personal 
experiences ( e x i s t e n t i a l i a ) - recur continuously. Bultmann's 
discourses on f a i t h not only may be c l a s s i f i e d w i t h i n these two 
broad e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes, but they also display some of the 
detail s of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes i n terms of s u b j e c t i v i t y , concrete 
experiences, and passionate p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Having said a l l t h i s , 
we shall now trace the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes i n Bultmann's 
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i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of ' f a i t h ' i n greater d e t a i l . 
THE PLACE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
1. The Private In d i v i d u a l . 
a) Status of the Individual 
Here we have two aspects t o consider: self-assertion, and 
personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
The self-assertion of f a i t h i s a characteristic of the 
authenticity of the i n d i v i d u a l , seen i n his personal decision of 
17 
f a i t h and i t s enaction i n terms, f o r example, of love. Faith 
gives a man special status before and with God; f i r s t i t i s an 
acknowledgement that man i s a c h i l d of God, secondly i t brings us 
into closer relationship with God. Bultmann comments 
... a paradox i s now disclosed. Community with God, 
which i s intended t o be the basis of a l l true human 
community, f i r s t of a l l tears man out of every human 
community and places him i n a ra d i c a l loneliness 
before God.... The way to God, i n f a c t , means withdrawal 
from the world.. 
Faith i s not i d e a l l y self-assertion but the assertion of Christ 
19 
i n oneself. This e x i s t e n t i a l i s t interest i n the status of the 
individual i s seen i n Bultmann's in t e r p r e t a t i o n of Romans 11:20 
which, he says, "... does not mean: you stand i n the f a i t h , but 
you have won your position through f a i t h - which i n t h i s context 
20 
denotes through f a i t h alone ..." This individual standing i n 
the f a i t h , though e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , Bultmann also finds t o be quite 
21 
B i b l i c a l , being Pauline i n character. 
The other aspect of personal status i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
individualism i s personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : f a i t h i s not j u s t a 
p r i v i l e g e , i t i s also a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . E x i s t e n t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
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i s the product of freedom and p o s s i b i l i t y , and so "Consequently, 
f a i t h can be made easier or harder and i t l i e s w i t h i n our power 
22 
to make f a i t h easier or harder f o r others." E x i s t e n t i a l personal 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s also a mark of the f i n i t u d e of man, and "... implies 
that ... the man who wishes t o escape from himself i s only flung 
23 
back on himself." Belief i n God i s yet another sign that man i s 
2k 
a responsible being. Man cannot exist apart from God, and any 
25 
ideas of such independence are simply deceptive. On the other 
hand, man's personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y before God involves d i g n i t y 
and p o t e n t i a l i t y ; " I t expects of the man of f a i t h t h a t , even -with 
the most f r i g h t f u l destiny, God believes man capable of something 
26 
grand and wants to make him completely free and noble." 
b) Measure of Faith 
As a private i n d i v i d u a l , each believer has his own measure 
of f a i t h which makes both f o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of f a i t h and po t e n t i a l 
progress of personal f a i t h . Like Kierkegaard, who saw the 
individual's progress i n f a i t h i n terms of "becoming a Christian", 
Bultmann uses e x i s t e n t i a l i s t phrases to describe the measures 
27 
of f a i t h spoken of by Saint Paul. God recognises the i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
of each believer by the measure of f a i t h each has been given by 
28 
his S p i r i t . . Furthermore, there are degrees of f a i t h : weakness, 
strength, lack, greatness, progress, increase; and associated with 
t h i s i s the "weak conscience" and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
29 
ethics as a working through of the measure of one's f a i t h . 
Another aspect of the measure of f a i t h i s the consciousness and 
30 
s t r i v i n g by the individual believer. Thus Bultmann shows that 
the New Testament i n fact contains references t o these e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
themes i n f a i t h , and t o e f f o r t and development and perseverance i n 
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f a i t h as w e l l . 
The individual must respond personally, that i s subjectively, 
to the objective acts of God: "Faith cannot generate i t s e l f i n man; 
i t can only arise as man's answer t o the Word of God i n which God's 
32 
judgement and God's grace are preached t o him" On the other hand, 
"... i f a man w i l l speak of God, he must evidently speak t o himself." 
Bultmann's respect for the place of s u b j e c t i v i t y i n f a i t h c l e a r l y 
r e f l e c t s his e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a t t i t u d e when he argues that "... i f we 
wish t o speak of God, evidently we cannot begin by speaking of our 
experiences and our inner l i f e , f o r both of these lose t h e i r 
31* 
e x i s t e n t i a l character as soon as we o b j e c t i f y them." Rather, 
"Faith ... i s something that we are t o re a l i s e precisely i n our 
35 
experience and action as obedience t o our Lord." And t h i s i s the 
measure of our f a i t h . 
* * # 
Inasmuch as the individual believer should personally assert 
Christ w i t h i n himself against society, Bultmann agrees with the 
views of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. A l l four emphasise 
the resultant importance of authenticity and ethics. Bultmann 
uses e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terminology when he speaks of encounter, 
loneliness, personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , self-assertion, and the 
decisions of f a i t h . Furthermore, a l l these ideas are to be found 
i n the New Testament. 
Kierkegaard's emphasis on "becoming a Christian" rather than 
regarding oneself as a Christian i s paralleled by Bultmann i n his 
emphasis on s t r i v i n g i n the f a i t h , that l i f e i n the S p i r i t i s to be 
l a i d hold of continuously, and that f a i t h i s both a q u a l i t y and a 
quantity. Thus the ind i v i d u a l believer, according to both 
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Kierkegaard and Bultmann, must s t r i v e personally t o improve his 
standing i n the f a i t h - and t h i s i s cl e a r l y an instance of a 
fa m i l i a r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme. 
2. Self-Surrender 
At f i r s t s i ght, self-surrender may appear to be the cantithesis 
of the self-assertive aspect of the in d i v i d u a l as developed by the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s and Bultmann. However, t h i s self-surrender i s a 
conscious and deliberate act by the i n d i v i d u a l , who i s s t i l l i n 
f u l l control of the s i t u a t i o n . There are two types of self-surrender; 
the f i r s t i s a surrendering of one's se l f t o the inner or whole 
s e l f , i n psychological terms the overcoming of s p l i t motives and 
intentions, or even the overcoming of a s p l i t personality i n t o a 
un i f i e d person; the second type i s a surrendering of oneself t o 
another, or, i n terms of f a i t h , a surrendering of oneself t o the 
object of b e l i e f which claims the i n d i v i d u a l . 
Bultmann refers t o both types of self-surrender, but, as 
we sha l l see, argues that i t i s by the self-surrender of the s e l f 
t o the s e l f that the ind i v i d u a l i n fact surrenders himself t o God; 
pa r t l y because t h i s i s a response to God, and p a r t l y because i t i s 
in the s e l f that God i s t o be found. Faith i s the turning of an 
individual towards a divine source or being, when he surrenders 
himself t o God i n an act of obedience, confession of f a i t h , and 
36 
confidence i n God rather than of personal pride and boasting. 
Faith, then, means the abandonment by the in d i v i d u a l of his 
37 
pretensions t o autonomy i n favour of the ru l e of God: "This 
simple surrender t o God's grace i n renunciation of the desire for 
recognition i s f a i t h . " Bultmann then asks the question "How can 
f a i t h be at the same time both self-surrender and obedience?" and 
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he answers "Faith i s obedience, because i n i t man's pride i s 
.,39 broken. 
The self-surrender of f a i t h i s l i m i t l e s s , and involves "one's 
se] 
kl 
kO 
whole existence... one's whole l i f e . . . " and such u t t e r s e l f -
surrender i s called "radical self-surrender" by Bultmann. 
For example, "... the man of f a i t h u t t e r l y surrenders t o God's 
care and power, waiving a l l care and power of his own and a l l 
security that might be at his disposal." Such i s the nature of 
radi c a l self-surrender by the believer; a r e j e c t i o n of the sin of 
unbelief with i t s attendant anxiety and i l l u s i o n of autonomy. 
That Bultmann regards t h i s self-surrender aspect of f a i t h as 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t may be seen when he says "Belief i n the almighty God 
i s genuine only when i t actually takes place i n my very existence, 
and I surrender myself to the power of God who overwhelms me here 
kk 
and now." I t i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t because, f i r s t , self-surrender 
i s s t i l l a deliberate act of the individual i n his own r i g h t , and, 
secondly, self-surrender i s an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t experience as such of 
the act and l i f e of f a i t h . Thus Bultmann can speak of f a i t h 
both as the "renunciation of both fear and se l f - r e l i a n c e " and as 
"a response t o God's act ... by which a man hands himself over 
completely."^ Bultmann sums up: " I t i s j u s t t h i s , the renunciation 
of the world; i . e . , a man's renunciation of himself, which i s the 
basic meaning of f a i t h . I t i s a man's self-surrender, his turning 
to the i n v i s i b l e , t o that over which he has no c o n t r o l . " 
That t h i s self-surrender i s to affect the whole man i s 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n character i t s e l f , f o r we have seen already that 
existentialism i s based on the experiences and feelings of the 
individual at the depths of his existence. As a r e s u l t , f a i t h 
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i s "... to be understood as the a t t i t u d e which through and through 
1+8 
governs the l i f e of the r e l i g i o u s man." Through his f a i t h 
i n God, "... a man hands himself over completely. I t i s an act i n 
UP 
which the whole man i s himself involved..." 
# * * 
The element of self-surrender i n f a i t h demonstrates the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme of the f i n i t u d e of man, that there are powers 
beyond his own which he may surrender t o i n the form of a r e l i g i o u s 
f a i t h . Bultmann's "self-surrender" of f a i t h has s i m i l a r i t i e s with 
Kierkegaard's idea of " i n f i n i t e resignation" i n f a i t h , as well as his 
idea of the act of renunciation i n f a i t h . Furthermore, Nietzsche, 
the arch-proponent of self-assertion amongst the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s could 
also conceive of amor f a t i - a resignation and embracing of l i f e as 
f a t e . Bultmann's view of self-surrender i n f a i t h i s more positive of 
course, since the believer surrenders himself t o God, but Nietzsche's 
amor f a t i i s s t i l l a r e l i g i o u s resignation i n the context of 
3>ebensphilosophie when l i f e i s held t o be sacred and t o be submitted 
t o absolutely. 
3. Self-Understanding 
For Bultmann, the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme of self-understanding 
i s useful f o r describing f a i t h because through i t the i n d i v i d u a l 
perceives the nature of his relationship with the world, God, and 
himself, and the necessary inter-relationships between the three. 
Bultmann variously describes f a i t h as understanding, and at one point 
we shall see that he argues that self-understanding as such can lead 
t o f a i t h . 
Faith i n response to the preaching of the Gospel i s r e a l l y 
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an understanding of what was announced, and t h i s i n t u r n involves 
a pre-understanding of the message.^ Furthermore, "Understanding 
the Word i s therefore not an apprehension of content; i t i s f a i t h . 
I n other words, f a i t h i s not j u s t understanding; true understanding 
i s f a i t h . How i s t h i s possible? 
The fact that the Christian proclamation can be understood 
by a man when he i s confronted with i t , shows that he 
has a pre-understanding of i t . For to understand 
something means t o understand i t i n r e l a t i o n t o one's „ 
s e l f , and means to understand one's s e l f with i t or i n i t . 
Faith as understanding i s an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of one's 
si t u a t i o n i n terms of the divine rather than the secular causal 
53 
interpretations of l i f e . 
So we come t o f a i t h as self-understanding. The proclamation 
of the Gospel, Bultmann says, "opens our eyes t o ourselves" to 
see the p o s s i b i l i t y of f a i t h . Thus "... f a i t h i s a way of l i f e . 
F aith, therefore, does not understand the revelation as a new t h i n g ; 
f a i t h i s understood only when the man understands himself anew i n 
i t . " ' ' ' ' Exist e n t i a l l y , f a i t h i s self-under standing when the 
individual believer sees himself i n r e l a t i o n t o his God, when he 
sees that what God has done for him makes him understand himself 
56 
i n a new l i g h t . Faith questions man's understanding of himself 
57 
and God, and thereby produces au t h e n t i c i t y , f o r f a i t h i s "the 
il l u m i n a t i o n of existence i n that authentic self-understanding that 
CO 
knows God." This knowledge of God through f a i t h i s seen i n terms 
of e x i s t e n t i a l self-understanding i n that f a i t h i n God illuminates 
59 
our understanding of ourselves. Therefore, the self-understanding 
of f a i t h i s that 
... i n which man understands himself anew under the 
word of encounter.... so too the self-understanding 
granted by f a i t h never becomes a possession, but i s 
kept pure only as a response to the repeated encounter 
of the Word of God...60 
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According t o Bultmann, there are two possible views that 
may be taken by the self-understanding: t o see oneself as 
autonomous and independent of God, or t o see oneself as being a 
c h i l d of God and the object of his love and mercy; i . e . , the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a secular or of a re l i g i o u s understanding of oneself. 
I t i s important t o notice again, however, that e x i s t e n t i a l l y one's 
understanding of God and self-understanding are one and the same 
thing i n f a i t h : "Faith as man's r e l a t i o n t o God also determines 
man's r e l a t i o n t o himself, f o r human existence, as we have seen, 
i s an existence i n which man has a rel a t i o n s h i p t o h i m s e l f . " ^ 
The f i n a l aspect of f a i t h as self-understanding i s i t s 
novelty f o r the believer, f o r Bultmann often speaks of f a i t h as 
62 
a "new self-understanding". The novelty of t h i s new s e l f -
understanding which i s f a i t h i s that i t i s theocentric, not 
anthropocentric. Yet there i s a paradox i n t h i s , f o r the interest 
of the believer i s s t i l l there, but i t i s secondary; and the 
believer must be prepared t o surrender his previous understanding 
go 
of himself i n favour of a new theocentric self-understanding. 
New self-understanding produces a new understanding of God; f o r 
f a i t h i s the "... growing out of that new understanding of God, 
the world, and man which i s conferred i n and by f a i t h - or, as i t 
6k 
can also be phrased: out of one's new self-understanding" and 
the novelty of new self-understanding i s the novelty of a new 
understanding of God, and t h i s novelty i s found i n the l i f e of 
f a i t h . I t i s not j u s t that i n f a i t h , man understands himself anew, 
but that his new understanding undergoes constant renewal: "For my 
new self-understanding, by i t s very nature, must be renewed every 
day, so that I understand the imperative s e l f which i s included i n i t . 1 
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Self-understanding i s both a r e l i g i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
f a i t h and a s p e c i f i c a l l y e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . 
As a r e l i g i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Bultmann says that when one understands 
the proclamation of the Gospel one has f a i t h . Another r e l i g i o u s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n given by him i s that one understands oneself i n f a i t h 
i n r e l a t i o n to God. The f i r s t idea i s Lutheran, the second i s from 
Kierkegaard (where man stands i n humility before God). 
As an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Bultmann adopts the 
Heideggerian idea of understanding and pre-understanding. He accepts 
Heidegger's view that understanding i s an e x i s t e n t i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n the facts which are known, and that understanding, therefore, 
also appreciates e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y . Thus i n order t o understand 
anything, one must f i r s t understand oneself, and understand oneself 
i n r e l a t i o n t o others. Self-understanding becomes f a i t h i n that 
one understands oneself e x i s t e n t i a l l y , i . e . with personal involvement, 
i n r e l a t i o n t o the object of f a i t h (the Gospel). Indeed, s e l f -
understanding i s necessary before f a i t h i s possible, i n that one 
has to understand one's own condition before r e a l i s i n g what God has 
done about i t i n Christ. One must have a pre^understanding of 
oneself and the Gospel, says Bultmann, taking up the terminology of 
Heidegger, before one can accept the word and believe ( i . e . have 
f a i t h ) . 
k. Freedom 
Bultmann accepts the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t assumption of the ideal 
of freedom, and uses i t t o int e r p r e t f a i t h . Freedom i s given by 
God and should be seized p o s i t i v e l y by the believer. Freedom i s 
from those things which separate one from God, e.g. angst, the cares 
of the world, and oneself. With t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t freedom, the 
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individual i s to maintain his independence and i n t e g r i t y amongst 
others, and so be free f o r God.^ 
67 
Through f a i t h "Man becomes free from himself" and t h i s i s 
68 
a mark of authentic existence. Such freedom i s invigorating; 
i t i s also s a t i s f y i n g when i t frees one f o r God - as Bultmann says, 
"But t h i s f a i t h ... i s also confidence because i t i s freedom from 
69 
s e l f and communion with him on whom he believes." This freedom 
i s from many things, including s i n , wickedness, law, men, social 
70 
conventions and standards, death, and, above a l l , from the old s e l f . 
P o s i t i v e l y , "The man of f a i t h i s free f o r the tasks of the day ... 71 72 i s free f o r love." There i s also freedom f o r the future (which 
we shall examine l a t e r ) , and freedom from the past, and from 
73 
i l l u s i o n , i n order to be our r e a l selves. I n short, the freedom 
of f a i t h i s freedom to l i v e as an authentic i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t e n t i a l l y , 
f u l l y aware of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , decisions, and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and 
7U 
the holding of such f a i t h and freedom i s a mark of maturity. 
There are three aspects which are t y p i c a l l y e x i s t e n t i a l i s t which 
Bultmann develops: besides freedom from oneself (which we have 
already noted), there i s freedom from the world, freedom from Angst, 
and freedom f o r decision. 
We shall look at these aspects l a t e r i n t h i s chapter, but here 
we should note that the freedom from the world i s possible because 
of the freedom of f a i t h : " i t i s i n t h i s a t t i t u d e of 'as i f not' 
that Christian freedom from the world consists ... I t i s a freedom 
75 
that has the r i g h t t o dispose of everything i n the world..." 
What we wish t o emphasise here i s the power and authority which such 
freedom of f a i t h bestows - and i t i s t h i s power and authority which 
makes f o r the place of the individual f o r the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t . The 
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freedom of f a i t h as freedom from angst was taken from Kierkegaard. 
Thus Bultmann using similar terminology says that the man of f a i t h 
" i s free from dread".^ And why? He replies "The man of f a i t h i s 
free from anxiety because he fears God, and f o r the r e s t , fears 
77 
nothing i n the world." 
Faith, and i t s freedom, i s a g i f t of God conferred on the 
in d i v i d u a l , giving the benefits of freedom from the s e l f , the world, 
and from e x i s t e n t i a l Angst. But with t h i s freedom are presented 
choices, decisions, and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . We shall look l a t e r at the 
aspect of decision as an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme of f a i t h , but f o r now 
we must see that t h i s too i s a product of the freedom of f a i t h . 
Faith i s a decision given by man i n and because of his freedom, f o r 
78 
f a i t h i s "a free act of decision." For Bultmann, not only i s the 
content of the Christian f a i t h freedom, but the decisive act of f a i t h 
79 
i t s e l f i s a mark of freedom. 
* * * 
Freedom may be an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme, but there are s t i l l 
many d i f f e r e n t interpretations that have been placed on the whole 
concept of freedom by e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . Clearly, Bultmann does not 
follow Nietzsche's freedom which arises with the death of God, nor 
does he follow Jaspers' freedom which arises by v i r t u e of the 
d i s t a n t i a l i t y of God, rather his view i s more akin t o that of 
Kierkegaard (which i s also found i n the Bible) that freedom i s the 
g i f t of God which gives man personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
The things from which the freedom of f a i t h sets the believer 
free are similar t o those things renounced by the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s : 
Angst, threats t o one's personal existence and a u t h e n t i c i t y , and 
temptation. Bultmann i s following Paul, Augustine and Luther, as 
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well as Heidegger, when he says that freedom i s a t t r a c t i v e but 
ult i m a t e l y deceptive. Freedom i s a positive opening t o various 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r the good, and i s f o r Bultmann an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . 
5. Detachment from the World 
Bultmann r e f l e c t s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t c r i t i c i s m s of society and 
the world when he interprets f a i t h as r e j e c t i o n of the world. God 
and the world are d i f f e r e n t spheres e n t i r e l y , but f a i t h can convert 
80 
the world t o God. The t r a n s i t i o n i s necessary because a gulf 
separates them at present and i t i s f o r t h i s reason that the world 
i s t o rejected by the f a i t h f u l . The believer should be aware of 
the snares of the world, i t s false values and deceptions, and 
8 l 
aware also of the nothingness of the world and himself. 
When the understanding of f a i t h realises the sinfulness of 
the world an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has been made, and by f a i t h the world 
i s r e j e c t e d . ^ Thus 
... there i s also given to f a i t h through revelation 
and the Gospel a d e f i n i t i v e ' c l a r i f i c a t i o n ' of 
profane existence that i s not v i s i b l e t o philosophy. 
I t i s a ' c l a r i f i c a t i o n ' , namely, that does indeed 
permit 'profane' existence to appear as 'always 
already graced'.83 
The world i s s t i l l therefore the theatre of God's a c t i v i t y ; i t i s 
a matter of f a i t h both to see and t o exercise that f a c t , f o r 
8k 
f a i t h " i s a fundamental a t t i t u d e t o l i f e " . But t h i s a t t i t u d e 
brings about a r e j e c t i o n of the world: "... t o l i v e beyond the world, 
1185 
to have passed from death t o l i f e . 
According to Bultmann, f a i t h ' s r e j e c t i o n of the world may 
take two forms: one i s withdrawal from i t , the other i s to gain 
v i c t o r y over i t . Bultmann also uses another phrase t o describe t h i s 
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r e j e c t i o n of the v o r l d ; desecularisation. Indeed, "Faith i s 
86 
desecularisation, t r a n s i t i o n into eschatological existence." 
Rejection of the world i s a process of f a i t h , because " f a i t h as the 
fi7 
act of believing constantly brings about t h i s desecularisation." 
Rejection of the world may take the form of the believer 
88 89 withdrawing from the world i n order t o serve God. Withdrawal 
90 
from the world i s described as eschatological existence so that 
the place of the individual i n f a i t h ' s r e j e c t i o n of the world i s 
91 
s t i l l s t r i c t l y under and before God. I t i s clear, then, that 
92 
Bultmann sees f a i t h as renunciation of the world. Although t h i s 
included a renunciation of oneself, t h i s wordly renunciation i s more; 
i t i s "a miracle", and we may "... describe f a i t h i t s e l f as the act 
93 
of removal out of t h i s world." This act of f a i t h i n r e j e c t i n g 
the world i s not a once-for-all act, but a continuous act of 
removing oneself from the power of the world. 
The other way of r e j e c t i n g the world i s t o overcome i t by 
renouncing e v i l , and to improve the c r i t e r i a of the world's judgements. 
"Outwardly everything remains as before, but inwardly his r e l a t i o n t o 
the world has been r a d i c a l l y changed, "the world has no further 
96 
claim on him, f o r f a i t h i s the v i c t o r y which overcometh the world." 
Again, t h i s overcoming of the world i s a continuous process, not 
97 
a unique act. Bultmann finds the New Testament c r i t i c i s m of the 
world the same as that of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , but as he says, "This 
does not mean that f a i t h has a negative r e l a t i o n t o the world, but 
rather that the positive r e l a t i o n that i t has to i t and t o i t s 
ordinances i s a c r i t i c a l one."^ 
* * * 
Bultmann sympathises with the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ' c r i t i c i s m of 
95 
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society and the world i n sociological terms as i n h i b i t i n g the 
individual's a u t h e n t i c i t y and i n i t i a t i v e , i n e t h i c a l terms as 
lowering personal standards, and i n psychological terms with 
reference to the concept of Angst. This shows that man i s not at 
home i n the world, whilst Jaspers' concept of "transcendence" directs 
us t o look beyond our own small world. Furthermore, we have seen 
that Jaspers e x p l i c i t l y advocated detachment from the world by the 
i n d i v i d u a l . But Bultmann's c r i t i c i s m of the world i s j u s t as much 
indebted to John (and the rest of the New Testament), whilst his 
emphasis on the transcendence of God and the corresponding implications 
about the nature of man were taken from Kierkegaard and Barth before 
Jaspers had developed his concept of Transcendence. He does not 
develop Heidegger's ideas on the threat to Dasein, nor his concept 
of Das Man, although B i b l i c a l precedents such as Satan and temptation 
could have been referred t o i n t h i s context. Suffice i t to say 
that Bultmann found existentialism a useful source i n i n t e r p r e t i n g 
f a i t h as r e j e c t i o n of the world. 
6. "The Man of Faith" 
"The Man of Faith" i s Bultmann's term t o describe the epitome 
of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t believer, and we s h a l l see i n t h i s i n d i v i d u a l 
the various e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes of f a i t h we have examined and w i l l 
examine shortly. The Man of Faith stands out i n true e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
s t y l e as the one who " i s i n the world but not of the world", one who 
retains his independence because his l i f e rests i n t h i s f a i t h i n God 
and not on the cares of the world. We shall therefore f i r s t examine 
the status of the Man of Faith, and then t u r n t o examine his conduct. 
The d i s t i n c t status of the Man of Faith, Bultmann says, i s 
bestowed by God: "The man who has f a i t h i s therefore the man whom 
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God has transformed, the man whom God has put t o death and made 
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a l i v e again; he i s never the natural man." Nevertheless, the 
Man of Faith i s s t i l l i n the natural world: 
Even the man of f a i t h remains i n existence; he does 
not have a new structure of existence created f o r him.... 
As a human being, the man of f a i t h always comes out 
of unbelief; he always remains i n the paradox of ' I 
believe, Lord help my u n b e l i e f 1 . 
The Man of Faith has a peculiar detachment from the world"*"^ so his 
conduct should be determined by f a i t h through "walking by the S p i r i t 
In other words, the man of f a i t h l i v e s i n the fear of the Lord, f o r 
he i s always conscious that his whole l i f e depends on the grace of 
God. 1 0 3 
Various e x i s t e n t i a l i s t implications follow from t h i s status 
of the Man of Faith. For example, he has e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
i n his h i s t o r i c a l l i f e . ^ * There i s tension and paradox i n his 
l i f e , mostly because of the provisional character of the world 
(usually seen by Bultmann with reference t o I Cor 7:29-31).^'' 
For the Man of l a i t h , therefore, "dying also has become f o r him a 
•dying as though he did not die*" because of the character of his 
f a i t h . L i k e the true e x i s t e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l , the Man of Faith 
107 
has personal freedom. I n f a c t , the Man of Faith has what i s 
known as e x i s t e n t i a l ethics:-
Hence there are no special practices designated f o r 
the man of f a i t h . . . ' but f a i t h working through love' 
(Gal. 5:6). Accordingly, ' f a i t h ' both as to degree 
and to kind realises i t s e l f i n concrete l i v i n g ; i n 
the individual acts of the man of faith.108 
# * # 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to notice that i n personifying the Man of 
Faith, Bultmann was following the example of his e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
predecessors. How does the Man of Faith compare with Kierkegaard's 
"Knight of Faith", with Nietzsche's "Apollo-Dionysius" and "Superman 
- 100 -
and with Heidegger's "Dasein"? 
Like Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, Bultmann's Man of Faith 
i s an ordinary person, but who by v i r t u e of his f a i t h i n God i s able -
and does - conduct himself d i s t i n c t i v e l y i n the world. Both 
characters are appropriately humble before God; j u s t as the Knight 
of Faith l i v e s i n the realms of " i n f i n i t y " , giving up the world t o 
lay hold of i t by God's strength, so the Man of Faith's l i f e i s 
"provisional", but here Bultmann s t i l l quotes the New Testament to 
confirm t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme. But Bultmann does not reproduce 
the extreme individualism of Kierkegaard's Knight, f o r the Man of 
Faith has s t i l l t o weep with those who weep, e . t . c , and again 
Bultmann finds B i b l i c a l support f o r a moderate e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . 
Bultmann's description of God's expectations of the Man of 
Faith - that he i s capable of something good, t o be completely free 
and noble - i s s t r i k i n g l y similar t o that ideal of Nietzsche's 
Apollo-Dionysius ( l a t e r the hybrid Dionysius who appears as the 
A n t i c h r i s t ) : the r e b i r t h of v i t a l i t y and reaffirmation of l i f e , w i t h 
the passions decently sublimated. The r e a l i t y of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
analysis of the human s i t u a t i o n by both Nietzsche and Bultmann 
could not see the o r i g i n a l Apollo alone as the i d e a l , the Man of 
Faith has a certain tension and ruggedness i n his character, a 
maturity which i s moulded by the demands of l i f e . . . and of God. 
The basic a t t i t u d e of Heidegger's Dasein includes being 
towards death, which i s paralleled by openness to the future adopted 
by Bultmann's Man of Faith. The very i n d i v i d u a l i t y of these two 
characters i s evidence of t h e i r e x i s t e n t i a l significance. Bultmann's 
indebtedness to Heidegger becomes e x p l i c i t when he refers repeatedly 
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t o Being and Time as he analyses the Man of Faith under the a l t e r n a t i v e 
t i t l e "The Man of Love":- "Thus the determination that the man of 
love acquires from the thou i s exactly analagous t o the threefold 
determination of man by death, which i s made v i s i b l e by e x i s t e n t i a l 
a n a l y s i s . " ^ ^ Bultmann quotes Heidegger^^ (as he has been doing 
throughout t h i s p a r t i c u l a r essay of his) to show that there i s a 
"not yet" always i n f r o n t of the Man of Faith; existence does not 
r e a l l y belong t o him, f o r each man has his own i n d i v i d u a l personality. 
7. "Authentic Existence" 
Bultmann adopts the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t concept of authenticity when 
112 
he sees i t as the ideal t o be achieved, the goal of salvation. 
But i t i s also a state of l i v i n g t o be practised here and now i n that 
each individual should assert himself i n the power of his f a i t h . 
For example, "Authentic freedom can only be freedom to do what one 
ought. But t h i s freedom i s authentic freedom because i n i t man does 
113 
what he r e a l l y wants to do, namely, t o achieve his a u t h e n t i c i t y . " 
Here we see the etymological import i n the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t concept of 
existence - that authentic existence i s the asserting of oneself 
here and now, and consciously r e a l i s i n g i t : "For existence i n the 
moment i s his authentic being." 
But Bultmann also describes a pe c u l i a r l y Christian e x i s t e n t i a l 
authentic existence, when one's l i f e i s completely under the control 
of God, and the individual seeks to do the w i l l of God f o r him.^^ 
In other words, authenticity f o r the Christian i s not gained by 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t self-assertion but by l i v i n g i n that authentic way 
which God has set out. Authenticity i n f a i t h i s not egocentric 
self-assertiveness as such; that i s s i n . Rather, au t h e n t i c i t y i n 
f a i t h i s a matter of being true t o God i n one's own l i f e , so that 
111 
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"... the authentic I i s set over against the factual one"11*' - i n 
as much as I am ruled by my f a i t h . Authentic existence, then, i s 
the true l i f e of f a i t h , and i t i s here that we see the et h i c a l 
significance of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ' authentic existence f o r Bultmann 
the individual's a u t h e n t i c i t y i s measured not so much by the s e l f , 
but by God. 
What are the marks of f a i t h as authentic existence, according 
to Bultmann? One such feature i s the decisiveness of the believer as 
an i n d i v i d u a l , f o r i t s enaction tests his a u t h e n t i c i t y . Thus " I t 
i s rather that i n each individual concrete case a true decision of 
love now takes place and i t alone proves whether that decision of 
;e] 
.,,118 
117 
f a i t h , p r i o r i n time, was authentic." This a u t h e n t i c i t y i t s e l f 
i s tested by i t s constancy i n l i f e ; what Bultmann c a l l s "abiding" 
119 
as opposed t o "provisional, unauthentic f a i t h " . The authentic 
l i f e i s the l i f e of f a i t h , the l i f e of f a i t h i s authentic existence: 
"This i s what the New Testament means by ' l i f e a f t e r the S p i r i t * or 
• l i f e i n f a i t h ' . " 1 2 0 
Bultmann argues that according t o e x i s t e n t i a l analysis, f a i t h 
121 
as freedom f o r the future i s a mark of authentic Being. He 
takes t h i s view d i r e c t l y from Heidegger, who i s quoted l a t e r by 
Bultmann i n his exposition, which again demonstrates that authentic 
existence i s an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme he employs t o inter p r e t f a i t h . 
* * * 
Although the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t background t o the concept of 
authentic existence i s extensive, as we have seen i n our f i r s t 
chapter, Bultmann admits that he took the term Authentic Existence 
d i r e c t from Heidegger. We may thus see t o what extent Bultmann 
uses Heidegger t o inter p r e t f a i t h i n t h i s way. 
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For Heidegger, authenticity i s a simple reference t o one's 
conscience, a being true t o oneself. The non-religious type of 
authenticity i s l i a b l e t o become self-centred, though doubtless 
Heidegger would wish t o avoid that p i t f a l l . Certainly Bultmann 
saw t h i s p o tential danger, f o r he described authenticity as being 
authentic towards God rather than towards men. The individual i s 
authentic not when he i s true t o himself per se, but when he i s true 
to God and to what He believes God intends himself t o be. On the 
one hand Bultmann adopted the Heideggerian, e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , term and 
theme of authentic existence, but so adapted i t that i t l o s t i t s 
o r i g i n a l egocentric meaning. On the other hand, i t could be said 
that Bultmann adopted the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t term, but idealised i t i n 
his adaptation of i t , so that man could be true t o himself only i n 
that he should be true t o the genuine, authentic man God intends him 
to be. I n the l a s t r e s o r t , Bultmann drops the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
tendency t o anthropocentricity i n favour of Christian t h e o c e n t r i c i t y . 
Once again we see Bultmann happily -.adopting an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
theme and term, but not f u l l y developing the idea t o any extreme, 
only making i t serve his purpose of int e r p r e t i n g f a i t h . 
EXISTENTIALIA 
1. Decision 
122 
Decision i s a basic characteristic of f a i t h , but Bultmann 
also expounds on the decision of f a i t h i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terms. 
Decisions, he says, have t o be made i n "the moment" (the r i g h t t ime), 
with awareness of the " p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r the future" which l i e ahead, 
and which " p o s s i b i l i t i e s " require a "decision" f o r which f u l l 
123 
" r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " must be taken. The e x i s t e n t i a l import can be 
seen cl e a r l y here, but Bultmann makes t h i s existentialism pointed 
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by his reference t o the "either-or" nature of the decision of 
f a i t h . 
Bultmann introduces other e x i s t e n t i a l i s t motifs i n his 
int e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h as decision; f o r example "Faith i s only 
f a i t h i n so far as i t i s a decision, and decision i s only decision 
125 
when i t i s free." The decision of f a i t h i s therefore described 
as "... a new understanding of myself as free from myself by the 
126 
grace of God." The decision of f a i t h i s u t t e r l y personal and 
i s therefore a way of coming t o self-understanding, which, as we have 
127 
already seen, i s another e x i s t e n t i a l i s t facet of f a i t h , especially 
128 
i n the face of "nothingness". Furthermore, the decision of f a i t h 
129 
rejects the world, as well as the safety of empirical evidence:-
"... i t i s only when there i s no such objective guarantee that f a i t h 
130 
acquires meaning and strength, f o r only then i s i t authentic decision." 
This e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the decision of f a i t h i s seen 
i n terms of authenticity through self-understanding:- "... the word 
which claims to be the revelation must place each man before a 
decision - the decision as to how he wants t o understand himself: 
as one who wins his l i f e and authenticity by his own resources, 
131 
reason, and actions, or by the grace of God." 
More important f o r our study i s Bultmann's indebtedness t o 
Heidegger's concept of "resolve" or "resolution" t o inter p r e t f a i t h 
as decision. To be sure, i n an essay published i n the same year 
as Being and Time, Bultmann does i n fact refer t o "resolution" i n a 
manner very much unlike Heidegger, saying that "... f a i t h does not 
depend on a resolution about which I can deliberate. Faith i s 
132 
immediate decision..." Thereafter, however, Bultmann's use of 
"resolution" i n connection with f a i t h i s consistently Heideggerian; 
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for example he says "... f a i t h i s t r u l y the seizing of his 
p o t e n t i a l i t y of being, the antici p a t i n g of his future beforehand 
133 
i n resoluteness." Faith may be seen as response to revel a t i o n , 
131* 
as an act of decision. Thus "The new l i f e i s a h i s t o r i c a l 
p o s s i b i l i t y created by the saving event and i t i s a r e a l i t y wherever 
i t i s grasped i n the resolve t o act.... Precisely t h i s resolve i s 
135 
f a i t h , the f a i t h which believes..." 
Bultmann speaks of f a i t h as resolve with dir e c t reference t o 
Heidegger i n a positive way:- "According t o Heidegger, man f r e e l y 
chooses his p o s s i b i l i t y of existing authentically.... the man who 
i s t o resolve necessarily exists... t o resolve i n his actual being-
1^6 
there." Resolution i s the r e a l i s a t i o n of one's personal f i n i t u d e 
and i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and Bultmann regards t h i s as an act of f a i t h . 
Faith i s from the outset an ontological p o s s i b i l i t y 
of man that appears i n the resolve of despair. I t 
i s t h i s that makes i t possible f o r man t o understand 
when he i s encountered by the kerygma. For i n 
w i l l i n g t o resolve man w i l l s t o believe and t o love.... 
theology i s able on the basis of e x i s t e n t i a l analysis 
to i n t e r p r e t f a i t h and love i n t h e i r formal ontological 
essence as resolution.137 
* w * 
Bultmann has various e x i s t e n t i a l i s t ideas i n mind when he 
interprets f a i t h as decision. Kierkegaard characterised the 
decisive nature of following two ways of l i f e (the aesthetic and 
the th e o r e t i c a l ) i n terms of "either-or"; decisions have further 
implications which may not be discerned immediately, so that 
decisions always affec t the whole of one's l i f e . Bultmann says that 
the Christian always faces the decision of "either-or", and he 
emphasised the p o s s i b i l i t y of a completely new l i f e which a decision 
for Christ could mean. Kierkegaard's "dread" and Jaspers' 
"boundary situations" are also e x i s t e n t i a l challenges to the 
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individual t o make a decision which i s basically a r e l i g i o u s one 
of f a i t h , and Bultmann has t h i s i n mind when describing f a i t h as 
decision. Jaspers sees choice and decision i n the context of 
freedom, and Bultmann e x p l i c i t l y shares t h i s view, as we have seen. 
More s i g n i f i c a n t , however, i s t o compare and contrast the 
"decision" of Bultmann with the "resolution" of Heidegger. For 
Heidegger, resolution comes i n a si t u a t i o n of disclosedness, when 
one's conscience gives a decision or value-judgment on one's 
feelings and conduct. I t s self-searching guarantees the authenticity 
of resolution and decisive character. For Heidegger, then, 
resolution i s a decision of the conscience concerning matters of 
ethics. Bultmann also sees decision as r e f e r r i n g t o oneself, 
indeed, f a i t h i s a decision t o be authentic, that i s , true t o 
oneself. We have already seen that Bultmann e x p l i c i t l y r e i t e r a t e s 
Heidegger's views on "resolution" when he discusses the decision 
of f a i t h . But the anthropocentricity i n "resolution" may we l l 
misrepresent the essential character of f a i t h , which i s theocentric. 
Bultmann guards against the danger by seeing decision i n terms of 
a response t o and a resolution for God. This i s the nature of 
f a i t h . Resolution, according t o Bultmann, i s not j u s t an instance 
of Heideggerian s e l f - a u t h e n t i c i t y , but i s also the r e a l i s a t i o n by 
man of his personal f i n i t u d e and l i m i t a t i o n s before God, and so i s 
an aspect, indeed an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , of f a i t h . 
2. Openness t o the Future 
Faith i s forward-looking and i s open to the new things the 
future holds;"...it constantly stands before him and he becomes 
139 
himself only i n constant openness for what he encounters... 
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Bultmann comments "Now such openness and readiness i s believing 
lUo 
f a i t h . . . . and places him i n a rad i c a l loneliness before God." 
The openness of f a i t h i s that a t t i t u d e which allows f o r renewal 
ikl lU2 based on dependence on God. I t includes openness t o death 
1U3 
f o r with f a i t h one can have "hopeful t r u s t " i n God. In other 
words, "... i t means being determined by the f u t u r e . S u c h an 
outlook holds steadfastly to f a i t h , but i s prepared t o question 
everything. This openness of f a i t h requires a degree of 
personal boldness, "For f a i t h i s t r u l y the seizing of his p o t e n t i a l i t y 
1U6 
of being, the an t i c i p a t i n g of the future beforehand i n resoluteness." 
ikl 
Indeed, f a i t h anticipates every possible future; but i n f a i t h , 
lU8 
not foreknowledge. I n short, "This i s what i s meant by ' f a i t h 1 : 
lUQ 
to open ourselves f r e e l y t o the futur e . " S i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
Bultmann points out that "Certainly e x i s t e n t i a l analysis may 
assert that freedom f o r the future i s a mark of authentic Being.... 
that i f we want to a t t a i n authentic existence we must be free f o r 
the f u t u r e . " 1 5 0 
An example of t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l analysis may be seen i n 
Bultmann's description of the hope of f a i t h : "This 'hope' i s 
the freedom f o r the future and the openness toward i t which the 
man of f a i t h has because he has turned over his anxiety about 
himself and his future t o God i n obedience." 1 5 1 The believer can 
be open to the future because he has committed i t t o God i n f a i t h ; 
his l i f e of f a i t h must therefore be open to what God w i l l do t o him 
152 
and f o r him i n the future. Bultmann makes i t very clear that 
openness t o the future i s an e x i s t e n t i a l theme f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g 
153 f a i t h , because i t i s an essential characteristic of man himself. 
# * * 
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Bultmann adopts the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t analysis of man as being 
open to the future t o describe f a i t h which i s openness towards God. 
But how are these two ideas interrelated? 
Nietzsche's openness to the fu t u r e , the Eternal Recurrence, 
i s r e a l l y a form of fatalism, w i t h , of course, the alleged absence 
of God. But Bultmann can also speak of the believer allowing himself 
t o be determined by the future, and accept i t . Like Nietzsche, 
Bultmann sees t h i s openness by the individual t o be a very personal, 
lonely a t t i t u d e , but whereas Nietzsche sees the individual t o be 
alone before a great nothingness, Bultmann sees the indi v i d u a l 
facing God. For Bultmann, openness to the future means openness t o 
God, and that i s f a i t h . 
This same r e l i g i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s given by Bultmann to 
Heidegger's concepts of "Being-towards" and a n t i c i p a t i o n ; the 
believer i s one who faces God i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of him, i n openness 
to the future wherein God i s to be found. Bultmann also interprets 
the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t openness to the future as freedom from a l l those 
things i n the future which so agonise e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s : anxiety and 
nothingness. This a t t i t u d e of openness t o the future i s the 
positive act of confidence i n God which i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . 
3. P o s s i b i l i t y and Venture 
Bultmann does not so much argue that f a i t h opens up p o s s i b i l i t i e s , 
but that f a i t h i t s e l f i s a p o s s i b i l i t y . As such, f a i t h i s i n fact 
coupled with unbelief, and each i s a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y . As a 
r e s u l t , f a i t h i t s e l f i s the only authentic e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y 
f o r the individual i f he i s to be an authentic being. 
As we have seen, f o r the believer "... f a i t h i s t r u l y the 
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seizing of his p o t e n t i a l i t y of being..." Bultmann explains 
i t s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t character i n these terms:- "This i s true because 
f a i t h as p o s s i b i l i t y of existence can be understood even by 
the believer as a p o s s i b i l i t y of existing and understanding. 
Theologically and p r a c t i c a l l y , f a i t h i s a p o s s i b i l i t y which must be 
seized constantly anew."*"^  The believer exists only "by seizing 
f a i t h as he does his other e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , j u s t as 
f a i t h i s the p o s s i b i l i t y which i s necessary i n order t o hg (e x i s t ) 
157 
at a l l i n the face of despair. Either way, f a i t h i s a very 
real p o s s i b i l i t y f o r the i n d i v i d u a l : -
As new p o s s i b i l i t y f a i t h i s the newly opened way of 
salvation.... the concrete r e a l i s a t i o n of the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of f a i t h i n the individual's decision 
of f a i t h i s i t s e l f eschatological occurrence... the 
believer experiences the p o s s i b i l i t y of the f a i t h -
decision as grace... 
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Thus f a i t h i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of new l i f e with God. Faith of f e r s 
the individual the two p o s s i b i l i t i e s of his self-understanding: 
recognition of his need f o r salvation and acceptance of i t as 
offered by God through Christ.^® 
P o s s i b i l i t y , of course, i s temporal, and Bultmann followed 
the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s i n discussing i t i n the context of time and 
h i s t o r y . F a i t h i s h i s t o r i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y , not only i n that 
God has done something f o r man through Christ, but also that man's 
l62 
response and reaction i s also seen i n the temporal act of f a i t h . 
As a r e s u l t , we are conscious of our own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
because f a i t h i s not a general p o s s i b i l i t y but an 
h i s t o r i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . . . . Faith i s i n r e a l i t y directed 
towards something which does not l i e w i t h i n those 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of l i f e under my con t r o l . 
In l a t e r w r i t i n g s , Bultmann emphasised the eschatological element 
i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of f a i t h , because f a i t h i s a present p o s s i b i l i t y . 
But the whole of the l i f e of f a i t h i s eschatological, as we sha l l see:-
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"... every instant l i e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of being an eschatological 
instant, and i n the Christian f a i t h t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s realised. 
This challenge l i e s behind Bultmann's in t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h 
as "bold v e n t u r e " 1 ^ and his equating eschatological existence 
167 
with the new venture of f a i t h . I n a small a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d 
"Faith as Venture", Bultmann discusses the v a l i d i t y of t h i s 
l68 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The venture of f a i t h , he agrees, i s not a b l i n d 
and r i s k y groping i n the dark (although i t may be a leap i n the 
dark), because such t a l k "... contradicts Christian f a i t h ' s 
peculiar c e r t a i n t y . Therefore, t a l k of f a i t h as venture i s 
legitimate only when what i s meant by i t i s that f a i t h 'ventures 
l69 
something'. 'Not to venture f a i t h i t s e l f , but to venture i n f a i t h ' . " 
But Bultmann, having said t h i s , i s not s a t i s f i e d , and what he i n 
fact produces i s an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t reaction; a reaction which i s 
possible only because the debater i s actually p a r t i c i p a t i n g f u l l y 
i n the subject i t s e l f - venture i n f a i t h . Bultmann therefore 
asks: "For i f I venture something i n f a i t h , do I not at the same 
time venture f a i t h i t s e l f ? Do I not at the same time and f o r the 
170 
f i r s t time venture t o believe?" The a n t i t h e s i s , then, i s 
fals e . The person who ventures i n f a i t h and who makes what he 
171 
does a venture of f a i t h i s i n fact doing the same th i n g . 
Faith, then i s an a c t i v i t y , not a s t a t i c state of being; i t 
i s an a c t i v i t y of p o s s i b i l i t y and venture which i s an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
theme of f a i t h : "To believe means not t o have apprehended but t o 
have been apprehended. I t means always t o be t r a v e l l i n g along the 
road between the 'already' and the 'not yet', always to be pursuing 
a g o a l . " 1 7 2 
- I l l -
Bultmann follows Kierkegaard i n saying that p o s s i b i l i t y i s 
the re s u l t of freedom. For Kierkegaard, the dread which p o s s i b i l i t y 
produces can be overcome only by f a i t h ; s i m i l a r l y Bultmann sees 
f a i t h as a very r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y i n these circumstances. Adopting 
t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme, he says that f a i t h i s a p o s s i b i l i t y i n 
l i f e , and that f a i t h also provides a way through the problem brought 
about by e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
For Heidegger and Bultmann, p o s s i b i l i t y (and projection) i s 
one of the main characteristics of existence. Human l i f e has 
p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r existence or Being, according t o Heidegger; 
s i m i l a r l y , Bultmann says that f a i t h i s the taking hold of t h i s 
p o t e n t i a l . This p o s s i b i l i t y includes that of salvation, which i s 
both a present and a future p o s s i b i l i t y according t o Bultmann. 
k. Abandonment of Security 
Bultmann says that f a i t h involves the abandonment of security 
because of the existence of doubt, r i s k and Angst. Not only does 
e x i s t e n t i a l analysis expose these fa c t o r s , f a i t h i n fact presupposes 
them, fo r f a i t h i s the Christian answer to these problems... although 
insecurity remains. Indeed, Bultmann never r e a l l y succeeds i n 
balancing t h i s idea with that of the assurance of f a i t h . 
The key to Bultmann's understanding of f a i t h i n terms of 
the abandonment of security l i e s i n his remark that "Faith would be 
cheated of i t s purpose i f the believer were t o consider himself 
insured by i t . " One believes because of - and i n spite of - the 
absence of insurance and security: "Faith i s the abandonment of 
man's own security and a readiness t o f i n d security only i n the 
17U 
unseen beyond, i n God." Man i s not s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t as natural 
science would claim. Faith i s the abandonment of such pretensions 
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and false senses of security. There are no ce r t a i n t i e s i n 
f a i t h , there are no secure possessions, the assurance of f a i t h i s 
given only t o the believer who realises that his whole existence 
i s provisional on God. 1^ 
The authentic l i f e . . . would be a l i f e based on unseen, 
intangible r e a l i t i e s . Such a l i f e means the 
abandonment of a l l self-contrived security. This i s 
what the New Testament means by ' l i f e a f t e r the S p i r i t ' 
or ' l i f e i n f a i t h ' .... The old quest for security, 
the hankering a f t e r tangible r e a l i t i e s , and the 
clinging t o t r a n s i t o r y objects, i s s i n . . . f o r f a i t h 
means turning our backs on self and abandoning a l l 
security. I t means giving up every attempt t o carve 
out a niche i n l i f e for ourselves, surrendering a l l o u r 1 7 _ 
self-confidence, and resolving t o t r u s t i n God alone... 
There can be no security i n face of the necessary uncertainties 
i n the content of f a i t h either. The object of f a i t h cannot, by 
d e f i n i t i o n , be succeptible t o proof, or else God and the realm of 
the divine would be brought down t o the l e v e l and comprehension of 
man. Faith cannot be l o g i c a l l y proven: 
For f a i t h i s always i n danger, exposed t o doubt; 
i t has i t s c e r t a i n t y only as the positive c o r r e l a t i v e 
t o uncertainty. But t h i s c e r t a i n t y , as authentic 
c e r t a i n t y , requires uncertainty as i t s c o r r e l a t i v e . 
I t i s certainty only as f a i t h beset by attack and 
doubt, and yet maintained. 
Everything must be subject t o doubt, both the object of b e l i e f and 
the a b i l i t y t o believe, as well as the confidence of the believer 
himself. Authentic f a i t h exists when man has no security i n 
himself and no certain t y i n God, for then f a i t h w i l l mean what i t 
says, and i t s true character w i l l be realised. Doubt i s overcome 
l 8 l 
only through f a i t h . 
I n abandoning a l l security, there i s the r i s k of f a i t h , which 
182 
may be seen i n terms of pexjiexity and darkness and i n terms of our 
183 
facing ontological nothingness. The whole existence of the 
believer i s therefore at r i s k : - "... we r e a l l y abandon ourselves t o 
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God by existing for him and giving him the glory." The r i s k 
of f a i t h , then, i s not foolhardy, but a supreme reliance on God. 
This reliance on God should be a d i r e c t personal matter (as would 
be expected by any e x i s t e n t i a l i s t ) ; i n d i r e c t b e l i e f i s not authentic 
For example, one cannot believe i n the resurrection on the basis 
of the f i r s t d i sciples' f a i t h , but only believe on the basis of 
l86 
the story i t s e l f . The individual's standing i n the f a i t h "... i 
not a s t a t i c condition, but... takes place amidst the vicissitudes 
of each man's l i f e . . . " ^ ^ 
Our t h i r d aspect of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme of the 
abandonment of security used by Bultmann to i n t e r p r e t f a i t h i s 
Angst. The f i n i t u d e of man as exposed by e x i s t e n t i a l analysis i s 
adopted by Bultraann t o explain how the gospel message speaks to 
man's condition. According to Bultmann, the Christian f a i t h 
affirms the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t view that man has no earthly security:-
... affirms that man i s not at home i n the world, 
that here he has 'no l a s t i n g c i t y ' . I t affirms that 
he i s under an i l l u s i o n when he imagines that he 
can dispose of himself and can outwardly and 
inwardly secure his l i f e . I t points out t o him that 
he has not brought himself i n t o existence and does 
not dispose of his end. I t reminds him that human 
l i f e stands under the shadow of death.1^8 
Bultmann proclaims that the Christian gospel - indeed f a i t h 
i t s e l f - i s the answer to angst and the f i n i t u d e of man, "For 
such f a i t h knows that nothing i n the world can u l t i m a t e l y claim me 
and also that nothing i n the world can destroy me. The man of 
f a i t h i s free from anxiety because he fears God, and f o r the 
189 
r e s t , fears nothing i n the world." 
Faith s t i l l involves "fear of God"1^0 and i s s t i l l "readiness 
191 
for dread" but a l l t h i s i s t o be surrendered to God. Thus 
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the man of f a i t h turns over his anxiety about himself and his 
future t o God: "The man of f a i t h i s relieved of t h i s fear because 
192 
i n f a i t h he has l e t anxiety about himself go." On the other 
hand, fear " i s an indispensable c o n s t i t u t i v e element i n ' f a i t h 1 , 
inasmuch as i t guarantees the centering of the believer's a t t e n t i o n 
193 
upon God's 'grace'." Faith i s violated i f i t i s regarded as 
insurance, f o r f a i t h comes with the abandonment of security. 
* * * 
Existentialism i s by nature very suspicious of security and 
of people's claims fo r i t and of i t , and t h i s i s exemplified i n 
Kierkegaard's r e j e c t i o n of Hegel's system. Whilst there i s l i t t l e 
evidence for Bultmann adopting the idea of the "leap" from 
Kierkegaard, he c e r t a i n l y followed him i n including r i s k i n his 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . This r i s k i s not of the t r i v i a l foolhardy 
type of act, but i s a mode of l i v i n g which exists when there i s no 
security or knowledge at hand. For both Kierkegaard and Bultmann, 
the r i s k of f a i t h i s that which exists when man abandons his s e l f -
security and his own strength, and r e l i e s instead e n t i r e l y i n the 
power of God. 
In his concept of the boundary s i t u a t i o n , Jaspers pinpointed 
those circumstances where man's f i n i t u d e and l i m i t a t i o n s are most 
pressing on the i n d i v i d u a l , where there i s no security f o r man 
at a l l . Bultmann also scorns security i n the t r a n s i t o r y world, 
and says that man should look to ultimate situations and concerns. 
Furthermore, Bultmann agrees wi t h Jaspers that even the ultimate, 
the boundary, has no security i n i t s e l f , and i t i s here that f a i t h 
begins. Jaspers' concept of foundering i s paralleled by Bultmann's 
view that man must despair i n his doubt about himself (a view also 
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previously stated by Kierkegaard), and abandon a l l yearnings f o r 
security. 
Heidegger's concept of "thrownness" also i l l u s t r a t e s the 
predicament of man without security i n t h i s l i f e , but here again 
we f i n d that Bultmann, having accepted t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t analysis, 
proceeds to use i t to inte r p r e t f a i t h as a response t o that 
s i t u a t i o n : f a i t h i s turbulent i n i t s e l f . With Heidegger's concept 
of " f a l l i n g " (often compared with the Christian concept of s i n ) , 
Bultmann again borrows t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme of the loss of 
security, but adapts i t when i n t e r p r e t i n g f a i t h t o show that f a i t h 
i s a matter of inward movement (a movement away from s i n , perhaps, 
which, following Luther, i s i t s e l f lack of f a i t h ) . Faith means 
the abandonment of human security, and the embracing of the fact 
of human uncertainty, which now develops as one l i v e s i n t o t a l and 
u t t e r reliance on God. 
5. Problems and Paradox 
Problems i n the l i f e and act of f a i t h were highlighted by 
19U 
Bultmann which he says amounts to "Crisis i n Belief". The c r i s i s 
i s both i n the c r e d i b i l i t y of the content of f a i t h and also i n the 
very act of believing. However, t h i s c r i s i s may well provide a 
good corrective t o a s u p e r f i c i a l f a i t h which asks no questions i n 
i t s false security, and so faces no e x i s t e n t i a l problems which f a i t h 
should raise. I n other words, the challenge has gone out of f a i t h 
because i t s object has l o s t i t s very i n c r e d i b i l i t y . Bultmann thus 
emphasised that the re a l c r i s i s of b e l i e f i s a continual one, a 
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rumbling, pressing problem - i t i s the assault on the autonomy 
of man physically, mentally, and s p i r i t u a l l y i n the face of God who 
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who challenges these attitudes i n man, for "... man's b e l i e f i n 
196 
himself always means a c r i s i s f o r b e l i e f i n God." 
Bultmann sees the problems of f a i t h include temptations and 
lifelessness which e x i s t e n t i a l analysis expose:- "Faith i s the 
t r u s t i n God that arises precisely when to the eyes of man there i s 
Lem 1 
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nothing but darkness and death." There i s also the problem that 
f a i t h i s not susceptible t o proof; that one can only believe. 
The problem as Bultmann sees i t i s the challenge of the content of 
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f a i t h - the overcoming of the offence of the gospel. Another 
problem of f a i t h i s , as we have mentioned before, one of conduct 
i n the world - How does one remain unstained, i n the world but not 
of the world? This i s not j u s t a problem f o r C h r i s t i a n i t y but one 
for any r e l i g i o n . ^ 0 0 Faith faces many problems e x i s t e n t i a l l y i n 
a world which i s out of touch with transcendence. 
The paradox of f a i t h b a s ically i s t h a t the world of f a i t h has 
no correspondence with the world of ordinary everyday man. Despite 
201 
the claims of f a i t h , l i t t l e appears to v e r i f y i t i n the world. 
"Faith i s the supremely paradoxical cry: ' I believe, Lord help my 
202 
u n b e l i e f " . I t i s the paradox of being i n the s i t u a t i o n between 
203 
the "no longer" and the "not yet". I n the meanwhile, we are 
20^ 
l e f t with what Paul c a l l s "the paradox of the inte r i m " which 
includes the paradoxical nature of freedom, the paradox that f a i t h 
205 
i s both a motion of the w i l l and a negation of the w i l l , the 
20 6 
paradox of rel a t i o n s between the f a i t h f u l and the world, and 
207 
the simple need j u s t t o endure paradox. Bultmann i s fond of 
203 
quoting I I Corinthians chapters kt 6, 12, i n t h i s connection, 
f o r there Paul portrays the e x i s t e n t i a l paradox of the l i f e of 
f a i t h , when the world belies a l l that f a i t h stands f o r . As Bultmann 
- 117 -
says, "Faith stresses the paradoxical i d e n t i t y of an h i s t o r i c a l 
209 
event and the eschatological event..." 
Addenda 
- I Cor. 7:29-31 
This aspect of f a i t h Bultmann called "a peculiar detachment 
210 
from the world". As such, i t i s part of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
theme of " r e j e c t i o n from the world", but i t also represented f o r 
Bultmann a B i b l i c a l example of the paradox of f a i t h , f o r "The 
r e l a t i o n of the believer t o the world i s a d i a l e c t i c a l one, that 
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•having as i f I had not' of which Paul speaks ( I Cor. 7: 29-31)." 
Faith "... acquires a peculiar r e l a t i o n of distance to the world -
the r e l a t i o n , namely, t o which Paul refers by the peculiar phrase 
^ j u r j . . . ( I Cor. 7: 29-31)", and which thereby takes a c r i t i c a l 
view of the world through the eyes of f a i t h . Bultmann elsewhere 
213 
c a l l s i t "that peculiar distance from l i f e of which Paul speaks" 
but his commentary i n fact shows that his in t e r e s t i s rather i n 
the paradox of f a i t h f u l l i v i n g than i n the r e j e c t i o n of the world 
which gave r i s e t o the e x i s t e n t i a l paradox. As usual with Bultmann, 
we f i n d him quoting the Bible t o reinforce the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h which he has adopted:-
... t h a t , f o r the man of f a i t h , everything wordly 
once again acquires the character of being provisional; 
he knows that 'the form of t h i s world i s passing away' 
( I Cor. 7:31; c f . I Jn. 2:17), and his having i s a ^ 
'having as though he did not have' ( I Cor. 7: 29-31). 
For Bultmann, "as though not" describes the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a t t i t u d e 
of the believer; that although the world belies God, f a i t h persists 
i n spite of t h i s paradox:- " I t means preserving a distance from 
c 
the world and dealing with i t i n a s p i r i t of 'as i f not' ( ^ 5 * yuy , 
215 
I Cor. 7: 29-31)". I t means:- t h i s i s how t o endure the paradox 
of f a i t h . 
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"Nevertheless" - Ps. 73:23 
Bultmann occasionally speaks of the element of "nevertheless" 
which describes the paradox of f a i t h with a B i b l i c a l term: 
This i s the paradox of f a i t h , that f a i t h 'nevertheless' 
understands as God's action here and now an event 
which i s completely i n t e l l i g i b l e i n the natural or 
h i s t o r i c a l connection of events. This 'nevertheless' 
(the German dennoch of Ps. 73:23; and Paul T i l l i c h ' s 
i n spite o f ) i s inseparable from faith.216 
The b e l i e f i n "nevertheless" provides the assurance of f a i t h i n face 
of the problems and paradoxes that f a i t h brings: "Belief i n God 
i s the courage which gives utterance t o t h i s 'nevertheless!' -
'nevertheless I am continually with thee: thou hast holden me by 
217 
thy r i g h t hand'". This assurance i s v i t a l ; "Faith cannot 
2l8 
dispense w i t h i t s 'nevertheless'." I t i s the mark of true 
f a i t h , f o r " f a i t h can become r e a l only i n i t s 'nevertheless' against 
the w o r l d . " 2 1 9 
# * # 
Like Kierkegaard, Bultmann d e f i n i t e l y sees the place of 
paradox i n f a i t h , as wel l as the absurd, and the necessity of 
struggle i n f a i t h . For Kierkegaard, f a i t h embraces the paradoxical, 
for t h i s i s the nature of believing that with God a l l things are 
possible; i t i s believing the absurd. Bultmann takes a similar 
viewpoint as we have seen. Just as Jaspers and Heidegger had 
terminology - "foundering" and "care" respectively - t o describe 
the problems of l i f e , so Bultmann uses the concepts of " c r i s i s " and 
paradox from St John and St Paul respectively. For Bultmann, 
these B i b l i c a l ideas r e f l e c t those of his e x i s t e n t i a l i s t sources, 
and so he does not f i n d i t embarrassing t o say that the paradox of 
f a i t h means that f a i t h does run counter t o human knowledge and 
expectations. This he i l l u s t r a t e s by using the two B i b l i c a l phrases 
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<*>S jJLiy and "Nevertheless" to show that the B i b l i c a l and the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t understanding of the nature of f a i t h are i d e n t i c a l . 
6. Imperative and Renewal 
Bultmann i s very concerned, as would be any e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , 
t o emphasise the personal significance of imperative and renewal of 
f a i t h f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . One cannot simply emulate the f a i t h of 
former believers: " I can never base my f a i t h i n God upon the f a i t h 
220 
which someone else has." Faith i s not the reproduction of another 1 
ideas; rather, t o be genuine, f a i t h has to work, a "transformation 
221 
of the hearer's own existence." Therefore, f a i t h i s neither a 
once for a l l act nor a s t a t i c experience, but something which has 
222 
and gives imperative and renewal t o the l i f e of the believer. 
Bultmann i s aware of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t problem that the 
demands of God on man amount t o compulsion i n f a i t h , but says "We 
can only believe i n f a i t h that the must i s a r e a l i t y . . . . This 
and nothing else i s the meaning of f a i t h . But b e l i e f i n the must 
223 
does not exhaust the meaning of f a i t h . " Clearly, "... f a i t h 
22U 
must also be a free act..." i n order t o preserve the e x i s t e n t i a l 
freedom of the individual believer. Faith r e a l l y i s an imperative: 
a state i n which one must e x i s t , and also a state towards which one 
must e x i s t . Thus the whole of the l i f e of f a i t h "... constantly 
stands under the imperative... and must constantly be l a i d hold of 
H225 
anew... 
The bridging point between the imperative and the act of 
226 
renewal i s the moment, f o r " f a i t h i s always won i n the moment." 
Faith i s not able t o be held without constant renewal; i t cannot 
be simply retained f o r a period of time, but must always be realised 
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anew i n every moment and si t u a t i o n of l i f e : -
Real b e l i e f i n God i s not a proposition which one 
can have ready t o hand i n order t o evade the 
challenge of the 'moment'. On the contrary, i t 
must actually be grasped and confirmed i n the 
•moment'... 
I t i s the "moment" which both inspires and produces f a i t h , because 
i t i s the "moment" that f a i t h i s required; thus the need f o r renewal 
223 
i s also discovered i n the "moment". 
Renewal of f a i t h i s always necessary - and i s a necessary part 
of f a i t h - because f a i t h i s not s t a t i c but a l i v e , unless, of course, 
i t dies through lack of renewal: "Even f o r ourselves, our own f a i t h 
can never be a standing ground on which we can establish ourselves. 
229 
Faith i s continually a fresh act, a new obedience." E x i s t e n t i a l l y , 
the believer "... can only believe again and again - he may always 230 
believe again and again. For l i f e i s exactly t h a t . " For 
Bultmann and the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of l i f e 
necessitate constant renewal of f a i t h : "Theologically expressed, 
f a i t h i s not a new qua l i t y that inheres i n the believer, but rather 
231 
a p o s s i b i l i t y of man that must constantly be l a i d hold of anew..." 
As a r e s u l t , "The decision of f a i t h i s never f i n a l , i t needs constant 
232 
renewal i n every fresh s i t u a t i o n . " An example Bultmann uses i s 
that overcoming the world i s a constant b a t t l e , a constant renewal 
233 23^ + of f a i t h , carried out with courage and hope. But the underlying 
philosophy of Bultmann i n stressing the renewal of f a i t h i s 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t - theory and platitudes have no place i n f a i t h , 
f o r they are s t u l t i f y i n g : - "Faith must always be won afresh i n the 
235 
b a t t l e against the working conceptions which would corrupt i t . " 
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Addendum 
"No longer... not y e t " - P h i l . 3:12-lU 
There i s a paradox i n the theme o f imperative and renewal i n 
f a i t h , i t i s "... the being i n between past and f u t u r e , the 
s i m u l t a n e i t y o f 'already' and 'not y e t ' - i n t h e exemplary way i n 
which Paul expresses i t i n P h i l . 3:12-lU". I n other words, i t i s 
"... always t o be t r a v e l l i n g along the road between t h e 'already' and 
237 
t h e 'not y e t ' , always t o be pursuing a g o a l . " ,•' .; Bultmann c l e a r l y 
f i n d s t h i s t e x t important f o r i t recurs f r e q u e n t l y : -
For C h r i s t i a n existence i n "JTi or i s i s the paradoxical 
existence w i t h i n t h e h i s t o r i c a l l i f e on e a r t h , an 
existence i n t h e 'no longe r ' and t h e 'not y e t * a t t h e 
same t i m e , as i t i s described mostly i n P h i l . 3:12-lU. 
'No l o n g e r ' , f o r t h e d e c i s i o n o f f a i t h has cast aside 
the past o f s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e and s e l f - p r a i s e . . . 'Not y e t ' , 
t o t h e extent t h a t t h e surrender o f t h e o l d existence i s 
j u s t t h e surrender o f t h e s e l f - s e c u r i t y which supposes 
t h a t i t can c o n t r o l i t s own existence. 
For Bultmann, by h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h i s t e x t , f a i t h 
i s t h a t mode o f existence which e x i s t s i n between, i n t e n s i o n , the 
past and t h e f u t u r e work o f God i n p e r f e c t i n g t h e f a i t h o f t h e 
b e l i e v e r . Hence t h e r e i s always scope and need f o r imperative and 
renewal o f f a i t h . 
* * * 
Kierkegaard found t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme o f imperative 
and renewal necessary i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e nature o f f a i t h (and o f the 
C h r i s t i a n f a i t h i n p a r t i c u l a r ) , e s p e c i a l l y i n terms o f "becoming a 
C h r i s t i a n " . For Bultmann s i m i l a r l y , f a i t h i s not a possession but 
a p o s s i b i l i t y t o be seized a t a l l times w i t h imperative and renewal. 
One never has f a i t h , one always has t o be reaching out f o r i t . 
Nietzsche's m o t i f o f "the w i l l t o power" has t h i s same idea o f 
imperative and renewal, the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t sense o f urgency and 
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m o t i v a t i o n , which gives v i t a l i t y t o l i f e and t o f a i t h . 
I t i s , however, the temporal aspect o f t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
theme which shows Bultmann's indebtedness t o Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger when i n t e r p r e t i n g f a i t h as imperative and renewal. Both 
philosophers, and Bultmann, saw t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e i n s t a n t or 
moment i n temporal terms as t h e r e a l i s a t i o n o f i d e a l s which are 
u l t i m a t e and e t e r n a l . As we r e c a l l Heidegger's concepts o f "Being-
towards", a n t i c i p a t i o n , and p r o j e c t i o n , we f i n d Bultmann d e s c r i b i n g 
the imperative and renewal of f a i t h which c o n s t a n t l y looks forward 
t o the f u t u r e because f a i t h i s a d r i v i n g f o r c e i n i t s e l f . 
7. E s c h a t o l o g i c a l Existence 
For Bultmann, e s c h a t o l o g i c a l existence i s not j u s t a n t i c i p a t i o n 
o f t h e end, but a detachment from t h e world and t h e r e a l i s a t i o n 
o f "the moment". I n a l l t h i s , we discover t h a t e s c h a t o l o g i c a l 
existence i s l i f e before God, i n God's gracious t i m e , r a t h e r than 
secular h i s t o r i c i t y . I t i s the climax o f t h e l i f e o f f a i t h : -
For t h e man who b e l i e v e s i s indeed t h e l i v i n g man 
whose now i s never a f l e e t i n g moment, f o r h i s now 
has l i f e , has f u t u r e . . . For f a i t h i s t r u l y t h e 
s e i z i n g o f h i s p o t e n t i a l i t y o f being, t h e „ Q 
a n t i c i p a t i n g o f h i s f u t u r e beforehand i n resoluteness. 
Here we see Bultmann's use o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terms t o describe f a i t h 
as e s c h a t o l o g i c a l existence. S i m i l a r l y , t h e present p o s s i b i l i t y 
2U0 
o f t h e righteousness of f a i t h i s e s c h a t o l o g i c a l . I n f a c t , 
"The concept o f f a i t h i s t h e r e f o r e defined e s c h a t o l o g i c a l l y , - t h a t 
i s , f a i t h does not denote a human a t t i t u d e which could be t i m e l e s s 
and could be assumed a t w i l l . . . " Yet f a i t h i s s t i l l w i t h i n 
human bounds since i t "stresses t h e paradoxical i d e n t i t y o f an 
h i s t o r i c a l event and t h e e s c h a t o l o g i c a l event..." But t h e 
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paradox i s s u p e r f i c i a l o n l y , f o r i t i s resolved when e s c h a t o l o g i c a l 
existence i s understood as l i v i n g h i s t o r i c a l l y i n t h e face o f 
death i n t h e assurance o f f a i t h . Obedience and surrender are 
2I4.3 
p a r t o f the e s c h a t o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e o f the b e l i e v e r , f o r 
es c h a t o l o g i c a l existence i s l i v e d out i n h i s t o r i c a l existence. 
Nevertheless, t h e r e i s t e n s i o n between r e l i g i o u s e s c h a t o l o g i c a l 
existence i n f a i t h and secular existence i n t h e w o r l d . This t e n s i o n 
2kk 
i s described, as we have seen b e f o r e , as detachment from t h e w o r l d , 
f o r " F a i t h i s d e s e c u l a r i s a t i o n , t r a n s i t i o n i n t o e s c h a t o l o g i c a l 
existence." But t o l i v e t h e f a i t h o f e s c h a t o l o g i c a l existence 
i s a challenge which few are able t o meet because o f t h e e x i s t e n t i a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d : - "... every i n s t a n t has t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
being the e s c h a t o l o g i c a l i n s t a n t and i n t h e C h r i s t i a n f a i t h t h i s 
2k6 
p o s s i b i l i t y i s r e a l i s e d . " Bultmann thus presents the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
challenge o f f a i t h t o each one o f us:- " I n every moment slumbers 
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f being the e s c h a t o l o g i c a l moment. You must 
awaken i t . 
* * * 
There are e s c h a t o l o g i c a l elements i n Kierkegaard's Fear 
and Trembling and Sickness unto Death, i n Jaspers' view t h a t death 
i s a boundary s i t u a t i o n , and i n Heidegger's d o c t r i n e o f Being-
towards-death. For Kierkegaard, t h e r e i s both t h e process and 
the moment o f r e a l i s a t i o n i n f a i t h , o f r e a l i s i n g C h r i s t i n one's l i f e , 
o f being contemporaneous w i t h C h r i s t . S i m i l a r l y , Bultmann 
emphasises t h e present moment, t h e Now, t h a t t h e f i n a l i t y o f C h r i s t 
i m p l i e s t h e eschaton f o r t h e b e l i e v e r , who now l i v e s an e s c h a t o l o g i c a l 
existence. 
Heidegger, by speaking o f "Being-towards-death" i s i n f a c t 
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d e s c r i b i n g a form o f e s c h a t o l o g i c a l existence. This basic 
a t t i t u d e t o l i f e Heidegger regarded not o n l y as r e a l i s t i c but a l s o 
a u t h e n t i c ; i t maintains t h e e x i s t e n t i a l t e n s i o n o f l i v i n g on t h e 
b r i n k o f u l t i m a t e p o s s i b i l i t y . This s t a t e o f a n t i c i p a t i o n i s 
adopted by Bultmann t o describe t h e way f a i t h i s t h e s e i z i n g o f 
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , the a n t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e f u t u r e beforehand w i t h 
resoluteness which i s a t t h e heart o f e s c h a t o l o g i c a l existence. 
This i s seen again when Bultmann speaks o f t h e Now j u s t as Heidegger 
speaks o f "the moment o f v i s i o n " ; each phrase i l l u m i n a t e s t h e other 
as Bultmann gives h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f a i t h as 
es c h a t o l o g i c a l existence. ' This phrase n e a t l y summarises Bultmann's 
p o s i t i o n f o r i n i t we recognise other e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes we 
have noted b e f o r e : - temporal doubt, imperative and renewal, 
a n t i c i p a t i o n , and p o s s i b i l i t y . E s c h a t o l o g i c a l existence p o i n t s 
man t o beyond h i m s e l f a t every moment - and t h i s i s what Bultmann 
understands t h a t f a i t h r e a l l y means e x i s t e n t i a l l y . 
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Chapter Four 
TILLICH'S EXISTENTIALIST INTERPRETATION OF FAITH 
INTRODUCTION 
T i l l i c h sees f a i t h more i n e x i s t e n t i a l terms than i n 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terms, w h i l s t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes are couched 
more i n general terms than i n s p e c i f i c d o c t r i n e s . This may be seen 
i n T i l l i c h ' s comment t h a t c o g n i t i o n i n f a i t h i s "completely 
e x i s t e n t i a l , s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g and s e l f - s u r r e n d e r i n g " i n character.^" 
L i k e Bultmann, T i l l i c h also employs the general e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
themes of t h e r e j e c t i o n o f t h e a b s t r a c t and t h e aspect o f f a i t h as 
s u b j e c t i v e experience when i n t e r p r e t i n g f a i t h , but i n a d d i t i o n 
T i l l i c h speaks o f f a i t h e x i s t e n t i a l l y as the centred act o f the 
2 
whole p e r s o n a l i t y . F a i t h i s not a d i s i n t e r e s t e d a t t i t u d e , but a 
very r e a l experience o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , and so n e c e s s a r i l y 
s u b j e c t i v e . I t i s t h i s r e j e c t i o n o f t h e a b s t r a c t which T i l l i c h sees 
t o be a t t h e heart o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m ; the c o n t r a s t i s made when 
he says "... we are p o i n t i n g t o an e x i s t e n t i a l , not a t h e o r e t i c a l , 
3 
understanding o f r e l i g i o n . " The nature o f t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l view 
i s both involvement and commitment, f o r one must be determined 
by one's f a i t h . F a i t h i s not v u l n e r a b l e t o e m p i r i c a l t e s t i n g , 
because by i t s very nature i t cannot be proved.^ As T i l l i c h says, 
" F a i t h i s not a t h e o r e t i c a l a f f i r m a t i o n o f something u n c e r t a i n ; i t 
i s t h e e x i s t e n t i a l acceptance o f something transcending o r d i n a r y 
experience. F a i t h i s not an o p i n i o n but a s t a t e . " ^ 
For the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , f a i t h i s a matter f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
t o formulate and express h i m s e l f ; i n f a c t i t i s a form o f s e l f -
expression:- F a i t h "... i s an act o f t h e t o t a l p e r s o n a l i t y , i n c l u d i n g 
7 
p r a c t i c a l , t h e o r e t i c a l , and emotional elements." That t h i s i s . an 
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e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme f o r T i l l i c h can be seen when he says "The 
r i s k o f f a i t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l ; i t concerns t h e t o t a l i t y o f our 
g 
being..." F a i t h i s p a r t o f t h e whole o f a man's char a c t e r , 
being "... a movement i n , w i t h , and under other s t a t e s o f t h e mind." 
This movement, expressed i n r e l i g i o u s terms, i s the way the b e l i e v e r 
f e e l s "consumed i n the presence o f the d i v i n e " ^ f o r t h i s i s p a r t 
o f any r e a l act of f a i t h . Because o f t h i s , T i l l i c h sought t o move 
from the s u b j e c t i v e meaning of f a i t h as a centred act o f the whole 
p e r s o n a l i t y t o the o b j e c t i v e meaning o f f a i t h ; t o what i s meant 
by p l a c i n g one's f a i t h i n the U n c o n d i t i o n a l . ^ " Whatever c r i t i c i s m s 
have been l e v e l l e d a t h i s a c t u a l e x p o s i t i o n , t h i s a t l e a s t was 
T i l l i c h ' s i n t e n t i o n - a balanced view o f f a i t h . 
THE PLACE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
T i l l i c h ' s view o f the place o f the i n d i v i d u a l i s also c a r e f u l l y 
balanced, w h i l s t everybody i s an i n d i v i d u a l i n h i s own r i g h t , he i s 
12 
not independent o f the s o c i e t y i n which he l i v e s . We s h a l l 
t h e r e f o r e see a balance between the independent i n d i v i d u a l and t h e 
p a r t i c i p a n t i n d i v i d u a l , and t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l conclusions T i l l i c h 
draws from t h i s s i t u a t i o n . 
1. The Independent I n d i v i d u a l 
a) S e l f - A f f i r m a t i o n 
S e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n i s seen by T i l l i c h t o a c e r t a i n extent i n 
psych o l o g i c a l terms, and t h i s may also be found i n h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
sources ( e s p e c i a l l y N ietzsche), though o f course wit h o u t the 
t e c h n i c a l i t i e s o f t w e n t i e t h century psychology. On t h e other hand, 
T i l l i c h i s aware o f the danger i n regarding f a i t h as s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n 
13 
i n t h a t i t s tendency towards a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c i t y i s s i n f u l . 
Rather, what he has i n mind i s a s e l f - a s s e r t i o n which l i v e s up t o 
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t h a t i d e a l o f human d i g n i t y bestowed on man by God a t c r e a t i o n , so 
t h a t separation and d e c i s i o n are e x i s t e n t i a l elements i n t h e s e l f -
a f f i r m a t i o n and a s s e r t i o n which i s f a i t h . Thus, "Where t h e r e i s 
f a i t h t h e r e i s t e n s i o n between p a r t i c i p a t i o n and sep a r a t i o n , between 
Ik 
t h e f a i t h f u l one and h i s u l t i m a t e concern." By p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
T i l l i c h means involvement i n order t o b e l i e v e i n t h e o b j e c t o f f a i t h ; 
by s e p a r a t i o n , he d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e b e l i e v e r from h i s God, and 
r e f u t e s the idea of possessing t h e d e i t y . For T i l l i c h , "... t h e r e 
i s a n a t u r a l s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n i n a person which should not prevent 
the a f f i r m a t i o n o f oth e r s . . . S e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n . . . i s t h e basis o f 
l i f e . " ^ As such, t h i s n a t u r a l s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n i s a form o f 
f a i t h i n response t o God. 
T i l l i c h thus advocates a dynamic concept o f f a i t h , and t h i s 
u n d e r l i e s the message o f h i s book Dynamics o f F a i t h . I n h i s question 
" i s not t h e dynamic idea of f a i t h an expression o f Pr o t e s t a n t 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m and humanistic autonomy?"^ (a question T i l l i c h i n 
f a c t never answers h e r e ) , i s the i m p l i c a t i o n ( a l s o found i n what 
he says l a t e r ) t h a t t h e answer i s 'Yes 1, and furthermore, t h a t t h i s 
i s r i g h t l y so. We n o t i c e again here t h a t T i l l i c h sees i n d i v i d u a l i s m 
j u s t as much i n Protestantism as i n E x i s t e n t i a l i s m . As we s h a l l 
see, t h i s dynamic concept of f a i t h s t i l l allows f o r " r e s t f u l 
IT 18 a f f i r m a t i v e confidence" as w e l l as courageous s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n . 
# # # 
S e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n , as we saw i n Chapter One, i s a general 
f e a t u r e o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , and was developed by our f o u r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s 
i n Chapter Two. When T i l l i c h speaks o f s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n however, 
he i s always c a r e f u l t o present i t i n terms o f t h e b e l i e v e r before 
God. The moral element, developed by Kierkegaard, i s seen by 
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T i l l i c h as obedience t o God, which i s what f a i t h i s about. The 
s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n of f a i t h i s n o t , t h e r e f o r e , independence as such, 
but dependence on God, an a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t t h e s e l f i s i n communion 
w i t h God. As such, T i l l i c h evolves an orthodox p o s i t i o n using an 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t term. Furthermore, he maintains a balanced p o s i t i o n 
by saying t h a t s e l f - a s s e r t i o n should not be a t the expense and 
p r o h i b i t i o n o f t h e a s s e r t i o n o f o t h e r s . Here T i l l i c h repudiates 
the more extreme d o c t r i n e s o f Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
Nevertheless, T i l l i c h i s indebted t o Nietzsche when he 
i n t e r p r e t s f a i t h as s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n , although he also acknowledges 
i n s p i r a t i o n from t h e Protestant reformers. T i l l i c h notes t h a t 
"Nietzsche's w i l l t o power... designates the s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n o f 
19 
l i f e as l i f e . . . " I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t i c e , however, t h a t 
w h i l s t T i l l i c h sees Nietzsche as the "forerunner o f t h e E x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
20 
courage t o be as oneself" he also says t h a t " I n t h e courage o f 
the Reformers the courage t o be as oneself i s both a f f i r m e d and 
transcended... This r a d i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e personalism o f t h e 
Reformation from a l l the l a t e r forms of i n d i v i d u a l i s m and e x i s t e n t i a l i 
T i l l i c h t h e Lutheran t h e r e f o r e says "The Reformation pronounces... 
one can become co n f i d e n t about one's own existence o n l y a f t e r 
22 
ceasing t o base one's confidence on o n e s e l f . " This P r o t e s t a n t 
s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n i s the one found i n Kierkegaard and Jaspers, but i s 
missing i n Nietzsche and Heidegger. T i l l i c h never r e a l l y decides 
f o r t h e former, however, because h i s sympathies are w i t h Nietzsche, 
as any reading of The Courage To Be shows. 
There are many fe a t u r e s o f Nietzsche's thought which are 
r e f l e c t e d i n T i l l i c h , but t h r e e e s p e c i a l l y present themselves here. 
F i r s t , t h e r e i s T i l l i c h ' s admitted acknowledgement t o Nietzsche's 
d o c t r i n e o f t h e w i l l - a d o c t r i n e more extreme than t h a t o f 
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23 Schopenhauer, which T i l l i c h a l s o knew o f . Secondly, T i l l i c h 
a l s o learned t h e challenge o f s e l f - a s s e r t i o n from Nietzsche, and 
th e r e l i g i o u s s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e Nietzschean concept of s e l f -
2k 25 
subli m a t i o n and v i r t u e . T h i r d l y , Nietzsche's concept o f t h e 
autonomy o f man, where he asserts h i m s e l f i n t r a n s v a l u i n g h i s values 
i n the face o f t h e death o f God, i s adopted by T i l l i c h i n terms o f 
autonomy and s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n , and i s adapted t o take account o f 
man's standing before God. 
b) S u b j e c t i v i t y 
Although f a i t h i n volves acceptance, " i t i s not t h e E x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
26 
courage t o be as oneself..." r a t h e r , i t i s acceptance by God. 
Immediately, then, we see t h a t T i l l i c h guards h i m s e l f against 
a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c i t y as such. Such a c t i v i t y i s f o r him o n l y one 
27 
side o f f a i t h . M a i n t a i n i n g h i s balanced view, T i l l i c h again 
c r i t i c i s e s s u b j e c t i v i t y i n f a i t h when he says " F a i t h as t h e s t a t e 
o f u l t i m a t e concern claims t h e whole man and cannot be r e s t r i c t e d 
28 
t o the s u b j e c t i v i t y of mere f e e l i n g . " 
Yet s u b j e c t i v i s m i s an aspect o f t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme 
whereby T i l l i c h i n t e r p r e t s f a i t h . When he speaks o f " . . . p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
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i n t h e i n f i n i t e . . . i n a sacred s t r u c t u r e o f r e a l i t y " he i s 
speaking o f f a i t h , "For f a i t h i s t h e f a i t h o f man. I t does not 
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come from man, but i t i s e f f e c t i v e i n man." The nature o f 
f a i t h , t h e n, i s discovered by l o o k i n g w i t h i n o n e s e l f , not away from 
oneself; i t i s deeply personal i n t h a t "... being moved by the S p i r i t 
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i s the p r i u s of f a i t h . . . " I t i s t h i s o b j e c t i v e side o f a 
s u b j e c t i v e experience which T i l l i c h emphasises and so avoids t h e 
charge o f s u b j e c t i v i s m . Subjective f a c t o r s o f f a i t h are inadequate 
t o describe f a i t h , so T i l l i c h i s s t i l l concerned t o show t h a t f a i t h 
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i n v o l v e s an outside f o r c e on man - U l t i m a t e Concern; t h e Un c o n d i t i o n a l . 
T i l l i c h had indeed much t o say about the s u b j e c t i v e side o f 
f a i t h . Having noted t h a t "The s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e o f the f a i t h f u l 
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changes i n c o r r e l a t i o n t o the change o f the symbols o f f a i t h " 
T i l l i c h goes on t o say t h a t both t h e t r u t h o f f a i t h and t h e t r u t h 
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o f h i s t o r y imply " t o t a l involvement". Here we are t o n o t i c e 
not j u s t the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t plea f o r " t o t a l involvement", but t h e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i v e r o l e o f such a c t i v i t y i n f a i t h . Involvement i n t h e 
S p i r i t u a l Presence r e q u i r e s the obedience o f f a i t h , which "... i s t h e 
act o f keeping ourselves open t o t h e S p i r i t u a l Presence which has 
grasped us and opened us. I t i s obedience by p a r t i c i p a t i o n and 
not by submission (as i n l o v e r e l a t i o n s ) . " ^ This S p i r i t u a l 
Presence, although experienced s u b j e c t i v e l y , i s also regarded 
o b j e c t i v e l y by T i l l i c h : - "Although created by the S p i r i t u a l Presence, 
f a i t h occurs w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e , f u n c t i o n s , and dynamics o f man's 
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s p i r i t . C e r t a i n l y , i t i s not from man, but i t i s ^ n man." 
F a i t h , t h e n , i s s t i l l a s u b j e c t i v e experience, according t o 
T i l l i c h , and so s t i l l w i t h i n t h e realm o f the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme 
of s u b j e c t i v i t y , even though i t i s not e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s u b j e c t i v i t y 
as such t h a t T i l l i c h a c t u a l l y propounds. 
* * * 
Although T i l l i c h i s not keen t o expound t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f 
f a i t h i n e x i s t e n t i a l terms, h i s attempt t o ma i n t a i n a balanced 
view was already preceded by Jaspers' d i s t i n c t i o n and union o f 
t r u t h - s u b j e c t and t r u t h - o b j e c t . Furthermore, w h i l s t T i l l i c h could 
not share Kierkegaard's view on the primacy o f s u b j e c t i v i t y i n 
f a i t h , he does share w i t h him some o f h i s ideas on the place o f 
self-understanding i n f a i t h , as w e l l as t h e importance o f s e l f -
a p p r o p r i a t i o n i n r e a l i s i n g one's personal f a i t h . 
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2. The P a r t i c i p a n t I n d i v i d u a l 
a) The Courage To Be 
We s h a l l now discuss p a r t s o f T i l l i c h ' s book The Courage To Be 
t o see how the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t i n d i v i d u a l 
i s used t o i n t e r p r e t f a i t h . We are not d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h 
•courage 1 as such here r a t h e r than w i t h t h e s o c i a l and ps y c h o l o g i c a l 
bearings t h i s a t t i t u d e has on t h e b e l i e v e r . 
T i l l i c h sees p a r t i c i p a t i o n as an e s s e n t i a l theme o f 
ex i s t ent i a l i sm: -
The e x i s t e n t i a l a t t i t u d e i s one o f involvement i n 
c o n t r a s t t o a merely t h e o r e t i c a l or detached 
a t t i t u d e . ' E x i s t e n t i a l ' i n t h i s sense can be 
defined as p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a s i t u a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y 
a c o g n i t i v e s i t u a t i o n , w i t h t h e whole o f one's 
existence.3° 
O n t o l o g i c a l l y , e v e r y t h i n g p a r t i c i p a t e s i n b e i n g - i t s e l f , "and everybody 
has some awareness o f t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e moments 
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i n which he experiences t h e t h r e a t o f non-being." 
More important f o r our present study i s t o see what T i l l i c h 
says i n h i s f o u r t h chapter "Courage and P a r t i c i p a t i o n " ("The courage 
t o be as a p a r t " ) , where he speaks o f "the i n d i v i d u a l s e l f which 
p a r t i c i p a t e s i n t h e w o r l d " :- "For t h i s i s j u s t what p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
means: being a p a r t o f something from which one i s , at t h e same 
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t i m e , separated". Nowhere i n t h i s chapter does T i l l i c h mention 
Nietzsche, Jaspers, or Heidegger, but at one p o i n t he i s c l e a r l y 
indebted t o Buber: "Only i n the continuous encounter w i t h other 
persons does the person become and remain a person. The place o f 
t h i s encounter i s the community."^ As T i l l i c h says, " P a r t i c i p a t i o n 
Ul 
i s p a r t i a l i d e n t i t y , p a r t i a l n o n - i d e n t i t y . " To t h a t e x t e n t , t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e community w i l l be a t home yet also w i l l be 
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p e r s o n a l l y f r u s t r a t e d a t the same ti m e . Inasmuch as one f e e l s 
a t home i n the community, p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n i t , one r e q u i r e s "the 
»*3 
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Courage t o Be as Oneself", inasmuch as one f e e l s p e r s o n a l l y 
f r u s t r a t e d i n s o c i e t y , one needs "The courage t o he as a p a r t . ' 
* * * 
We see, t h en, t h a t courage i s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
t o be able t o p a r t i c i p a t e w i t h o t h e r s . I t i s also an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
theme i n t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l , w h i l s t r e t a i n i n g h i s i n t e g r i t y , 
should also p a r t i c i p a t e i n so c i e t y t o r e a l i s e h i s f u l l p o t e n t i a l as 
a p r i v a t e person. The courage t h i s r e q u i r e s , though, t o put 
oneself at r i s k i n t h i s way, i s an act o f f a i t h . This i s what 
T i l l i c h i s r e a l l y t a l k i n g about: "The courage t o be i s an expression 
of f a i t h and what ' f a i t h ' means must be understood through t h e 
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courage t o be." This e x i s t e n t i a l i s t understanding o f f a i t h by 
« 
T i l l i c h t h e r e f o r e includes 'the courage t o be a p a r t ' , t h a t i s , t h e 
f a i t h o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t i n d i v i d u a l . I n a l l t h i s , we n o t i c e h i s 
indebtedness t o Nietzsche's a n a l y s i s o f courage i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o f f a i t h as the courage t o be. 
b) Community and P a r t i c i p a t i o n 
The p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f f a i t h i s t w o - f o l d ; p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the 
b e l i e v e r i n t h e d i v i n e , and p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e b e l i e v e r i n the 
community. I n T i l l i c h ' s e x p o s i t i o n t h e r e i s a l so t h e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
emphasis o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the t o t a l s e l f i n t h e subject a t hand. 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n by the i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e v e r i n the community o f 
the f a i t h r e q u i r e s a common language o f f a i t h t o p a r t i c i p a t e w i t h 
and i n , f o r "... f a i t h cannot remain a l i v e w i t h o u t expressions o f 
1+6 
f a i t h and the personal p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n them." Whilst i t may be 
questionable whether acts o f f a i t h are dependent on language, we 
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can see t h a t f o r T i l l i c h the community has some i n f l u e n c e and 
power over the i n d i v i d u a l i n matters o f f a i t h , e s p e c i a l l y as 
i l l u s t r a t e d "by the f o r m u l a t i o n and r e c i t a t i o n o f creeds and i n t h e 
manner o f corporate worship. T i l l i c h repeats a l l t h i s i n h i s 
discussion on "The Community o f F a i t h and i t s expressions" when he 
says t h a t "... f a i t h i s r e a l i n t h e community o f f a i t h , or more 
1+7 
p r e c i s e l y , i n the communion o f a language o f f a i t h . " Furthermore, 
kQ 
"the c o n d i t i o n o f i t s c o n t i n u a t i o n i s t h e v i t a l i t y o f i t s f a i t h . " 
I n the S p i r i t u a l Community t h e r e are tensions o f f a i t h 
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between t h e i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e v e r and t h e r e s t o f the membership, 
and t o T i l l i c h 1 s mind, community f a i t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l l y i n f e r i o r 
t o personal f a i t h . ^ This i s because t h e r e i s a l a c k o f t h e 
element o f authentic personal f a i t h o f t h i s i n d i v i d u a l , which i s 
r e s t r a i n e d by the demands o f t h e community as a whole. On the 
other hand, T i l l i c h recognises the s t a b i l i s i n g , constant nature o f 
the community's f a i t h : "The f a i t h which c o n s t i t u t e s t h e S p i r i t u a l 
Community i s a r e a l i t y which precedes t h e ever-becoming, ever 
changing, ever disappearing, and ever re-appearing acts o f personal 
f a i t h . " 5 1 
This t h e n , i s t h e t e n s i o n - t h a t both i n d i v i d u a l and community 
have t h e i r b e n e f i t s and t h e i r drawbacks. This t e n s i o n i s one t h e 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s have discussed a great d e a l , u s u a l l y f a v o u r i n g t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l as against s o c i e t y . T i l l i c h refuses t o make a judgment, 
but h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e tensions o f f a i t h i n terms o f i n d i v i d u a l 
and community i s c e r t a i n l y e x i s t e n t i a l i s t as we have seen. 
# * # 
C l e a r l y T i l l i c h has l i t t l e sympathy w i t h t h e more extreme 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c views o f Nietzsche and Heidegger, nevertheless he 
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has views compatible w i t h and s i m i l a r t o those o f Heidegger on 
"Being-in-the-World". Here we see some r e a l i s m expressed about 
the n e c e s s i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o accept the world and s o c i e t y , 
and the personal need t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n them t o develop one's own 
character and i n d i v i d u a l i t y i t s e l f . T i l l i c h i s much more p o s i t i v e 
about t h e advantages o f t h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n than i s Heidegger, though 
he does not d i s g u i s e the f a c t t h a t being w i t h other C h r i s t i a n s can 
have i t s own tensions simply "because o f th e p o l a r i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n 
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and p a r t i c i p a t i o n " . But as t h i s i s T i l l i c h ' s o v e r a l l view o f t h e 
community o f f a i t h , t h e inescapable conclusion i s t h a t Heidegger may 
not be so f a r i n t h e background a f t e r a l l , thus i n f l u e n c i n g T i l l i c h 
i n t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f a i t h . 
3. "Unambiguous L i f e " 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n we s h a l l be l o o k i n g a t t h e e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t u s 
o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n h i s l i f e o f f a i t h . This s e c t i o n may be regarded 
as an addendum t o the previous two s e c t i o n s , as i t expounds the 
answer T i l l i c h gave t o t h e problems o f t e n s i o n r a i s e d between the 
independent i n d i v i d u a l and t h e p a r t i c i p a n t i n d i v i d u a l . I n t h i s 
s e c t i o n also may be seen most c l e a r l y t h e m y s t i c a l s t r a i n i n T i l l i c h ' s 
concept o f f a i t h . 
a) C r i t i c i s m o f "Unbelief" 
T i l l i c h ' s c r i t i c i s m o f u n b e l i e f f o l l o w s Luther and Kierkegaard. 
A l l t h r e e saw u n b e l i e f as s i n , yet a l l s t i l l allowed f o r doubt and 
r i s k as necessary c o n s t i t u e n t s o f f a i t h , as we s h a l l see. Thus 
when T i l l i c h says " I n autonomous c u l t u r e , b e l i e f - f u l a c t i v i t y i s 
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replaced by u n b e l i e f - f u l a c t i v i t y bound t o form" what he means i s 
t h a t b e l i e f - f u l a c t i v i t y i s found i n t h e o - c e n t r i c c u l t u r e , whereas 
u n b e l i e f - f u l a c t i v i t y i s found i n a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c , 
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autonomous c u l t u r e , where i t i s governed by outward forms as opposed 
t o inward f e r v o u r - something which was h i n t e d a t i n h i s c r i t i c i s m 
o f f a i t h as found i n the churches, which we noted above. R e l i g i o u s l y 
speaking then, "Man's u n b e l i e f i s h i s estrangement from God i n t h e 
centre o f h i s being". 
On the other hand, T i l l i c h does speak o f u n b e l i e f i n 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terms as w e l l : " F a i t h i s an e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
man, and t h e r e f o r e i t s existence i s necessary and u n i v e r s a l " . ^ 
C l e a r l y t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l statement i s not e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
the r e l i g i o u s a s s e r t i o n s we have j u s t noted:- e x i s t e n t i a l l y , f a i t h 
must always e x i s t i n some form, r e l i g i o u s l y i t i s au t h e n t i c o n l y 
when i t i s t h e o - c e n t r i c . Unbelief i s when man t u r n s i n on h i s 
e x i s t e n t i a l s e l f and does not r e a l i s e h i s e s s e n t i a l s e l f i n r e l a t i o n t o 
God, t h e ground o f h i s being; t h e r e i s a d i s r u p t i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
w i t h God and a separation o f w i l l s . ^ 
# * * 
I n i t s e l f , a c r i t i c i s m of u n b e l i e f would not normally be 
regarded as an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme, but T i l l i c h allows i t t o become 
one by saying t h a t both f a i t h and u n b e l i e f are e x i s t e n t i a l movements 
of man.' S i m i l a r l y Jaspers' defence o f u n b e l i e f , however, 
should not lea d us t o suppose t h a t T i l l i c h i s d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed 
t o him; i n f a c t we have here two d i f f e r e n t concepts o f u n b e l i e f . 
For T i l l i c h i t i s s i n f u l a n t h r o p o c e n t r i c i t y i n t h e face o f God, i t 
i s separation from God. For Jaspers, however, u n b e l i e f i s t h a t 
u n d e r l y i n g doubt which makes f a i t h what i t i s , and not c e r t a i n 
knowledge; u n b e l i e f provides t h e necessary t e n s i o n which makes f a i t h 
so meaningful t o the existence o f each i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e v e r . But 
i n f a c t Jaspers a l s o pleads f o r man t o be i n communion w i t h God, 
w h i l s t T i l l i c h , as we s h a l l see below, a l s o emphasises t h e place 
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o f doubt, r i s k , and t e n s i o n w i t h i n f a i t h . By using d i f f e r e n t terms, 
T i l l i c h and Jaspers appear t o be at variance w i t h one another, but 
on i n v e s t i g a t i o n they are both found t o be saying t h e same t h i n g , 
and saying i t i n terms o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . 
Both T i l l i c h and Jaspers c o n t r a d i c t Nietzsche's condemnation 
o f f a i t h as a screen f o r man's n a t u r a l i n s t i n c t s and as a d e f i c i e n c y 
o f mind or j u s t immaturity. On the other hand t h e y would want, l i k e 
Nietzsche, t o a t t a c k immaturity and l a c k o f reason i n f a i t h , and they 
would agree w i t h Nietzsche t h a t f a i t h must be the outcome o f an 
e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u g g l e or else i t becomes simply decadence. Here 
we see a common f e a t u r e o f Nietzsche's i n f l u e n c e on T i l l i c h ; h i s 
j u s t c r i t i c i s m s , parodies, and d i s t o r t i o n s o f f a i t h and C h r i s t i a n i t y 
are r e a d i l y taken and cor r e c t e d by T i l l i c h i n h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f a i t h . 
b) "Transcendental Union" 
T i l l i c h o f t e n speaks o f f a i t h i n terms o f "transcending" or 
"transcendental union", and f i n a l l y he c a l l s t h i s "transcendental 
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union" "Unambiguous L i f e " . There are var i o u s modes o f "transcending" 
i n f a i t h , according t o T i l l i c h . One type i s t h a t "... t h e i n t e n t i o n 
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o f f a i t h always transcends t h e ob j e c t o f f a i t h . " This transcendent 
movement o f f a i t h i s embodied i n one o f T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n s o f 
f a i t h : - " F a i t h , f o r m a l l y or g e n e r a l l y d e f i n e d , i s the s t a t e o f being 
grasped by t h a t toward which transcendence a s p i r e s , t h e u l t i m a t e i n 
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being and meaning". Another form o f t h e transcending nature o f 
f a i t h i s t h a t o f t h e secular transcended and the d i v i n e r e a c h e d . ^ 
Thus f o r t h e b e l i e v e r , " F a i t h i s not an act o f any o f h i s r a t i o n a l 
f u n c t i o n s , as i t i s not an act o f the unconscious, but i t i s an act 
i n which both t h e r a t i o n a l and the n o n - r a t i o n a l elements o f h i s 
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"being are transcended".°^ T i l l i c h would go even f u r t h e r : -
"Absolute f a i t h and i t s consequents... transcends t h e t h e i s t i c 
idea o f God." 
There seems t o be no l i m i t t o the v e r t i c a l transcendence o f 
f a i t h , according t o T i l l i c h ; an idea, we have seen, which i s a l s o 
shared by Jaspers. On what might be c a l l e d t h e h o r i z o n t a l l e v e l , 
T i l l i c h could also speak of t h e transcending o f t h e d i f f e r e n t 
emphases i n the courage t o be, e i t h e r o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n or o f 
i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n : "... i f both poles are accepted and transcended 
go 
the r e l a t i o n t o being i t s e l f has t h e character o f f a i t h . " I n 
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f a c t , " F a i t h transcends every conceivable r e a l i t y " and can overcome 
. . . 6 5 sxn by reunion. 
T i l l i c h expresses t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between "transcendental 
union" and "unambiguous l i f e " i n t h i s way:-
I n t h e reunion o f e s s e n t i a l and e x i s t e n t i a l being, 
ambiguous l i f e i s r a i s e d above i t s e l f t o a transcendence 
t h a t i t could not achieve by i t s own power.... The 
'transcendent u n i o n 1 answers t h e general question 
i m p l i e d i n a l l a m b i g u i t i e s o f l i f e . I t appears 
w i t h i n the human s p i r i t as t h e e c s t a t i c movement which 
from one p o i n t o f view i s c a l l e d ' f a i t h ' , and from 
another 'love' .... f a i t h i s the s t a t e o f being 
grasped by t h e transcendent u n i t y o f unambiguous 
l i f e - i t embodies l o v e as the s t a t e o f being taken 
i n t o t h a t transcendent u n i t y . " 0 
T i l l i c h a l s o gives another " m a t e r i a l d e f i n i t i o n and concept 
o f f a i t h " : - " F a i t h i s t h e s t a t e o f being grasped by t h e S p i r i t u a l 
Presence and opened t o t h e transcendent u n i t y o f unambiguous l i f e . " 
T i l l i c h goes on t o e x p l a i n t h a t t h i s "... i s a d e s c r i p t i o n which i s 
68 
u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d , d e s p i t e i t s p a r t i c u l a r C h r i s t i a n background." 
(Elsewhere s i m i l a r l y he speaks o f t h e "... basic d e f i n i t i o n o f f a i t h 
as t h e s t a t e o f being grasped by t h e S p i r i t u a l Presence and 
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through i t by t h e transcendent union o f unambiguous l i f e . " ) We 
must remember, however, t h a t t h i s transcendent movement i s a 
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process, and unambiguous l i f e i t s e l f i s a goal t o be aimed and 
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s t r i v e n f o r continuously. There i s , t h e r e f o r e , an emotional 
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element i n f a i t h , described by T i l l i c h as " o s c i l l a t i o n " . We can 
see, then, t h a t transcendental union and unambiguous l i f e are 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes used by T i l l i c h t o i n t e r p r e t f a i t h , e s p e c i a l l y 
i n terms o f t h e e x i s t e n t i a l movement o f f a i t h i n t h e b e l i e v e r . 
There i s c l e a r l y a s i m i l a r i t y i n terminology between Jaspers* 
"transcendence" and T i l l i c h ' s "Transcendental Union". Both Jaspers 
and T i l l i c h r e t a i n the paradox o f transcendence above and beyond 
immanence, together w i t h transcendence meeting immanence, when i n 
t h i s l i f e we can know and experience (though here Jaspers would 
probably r a t h e r say "recognise") transcendence as a d i v i n e 
p r o t e c t i v e presence. For both Jaspers and T i l l i c h , transcendence 
i s on t h e boundary, reached by a r u p t u r e w i t h immanence, and each 
share t h e important idea o f t h i s transcending movement. For Jaspers, 
transcending i s t h e basic p r i n c i p l e o f l i f e , by i t we become 
independent o f t h e world and f r e e f o r ourselves. S i m i l a r l y f o r 
T i l l i c h , transcending i s e q u a l l y important and s i g n i f i c a n t ; i t i s 
t h e act o f f a i t h . Nevertheless,for T i l l i c h , transcending i s an 
act (a v e r b ) , whereas f o r Jaspers, Transcendence i s t h e sphere 
o f t h e d i v i n e (a noun). 
This movement towards transcendence i s the r e l i g i o u s a n t i t h e s i s 
t o Heidegger's idea o f " f a l l i n g " . But a l l t h i s s t i l l remains an 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme as a l l t h r e e are concerned about the s p i r i t u a l 
l i f e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n terms o f experiences and f e e l i n g s . The 
meeting and co-existence o f transcendence and immanence o f which 
both Jaspers and T i l l i c h spoke i s c a l l e d "transcendental Union" by 
our t h e o l o g i a n . 
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His equation o f "Transcendental Union" w i t h "Unambiguous 
L i f e " i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n character as Unambiguous L i f e has 
s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h Heidegger's d e s c r i p t i o n o f A u t h e n t i c i t y . According 
t o Heidegger, a u t h e n t i c i t y i s about r e a l i t y (compare T i l l i c h ' s term 
"unambiguous"), and i s t o do w i t h s e l f - a s s e r t i o n (compare T i l l i c h ' s 
e x p o s i t i o n on the ways immanence meets transcendence). Just as 
Heidegger's a u t h e n t i c existence describes t h e i n d i v i d u a l l i v i n g as 
a s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g i n d i v i d u a l , independent o f t h e pressures o f t h e 
wo r l d , so T i l l i c h ' s Transcendental Union and Unambiguous L i f e 
describe l i f e which i s transcended above t h e immanent and ambiguous; 
i t i s t h e l i f e o f f a i t h and l o v e which has broken t h e great 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t estrangement o f man from t h e ground o f h i s being. 
F i n a l l y , both Heidegger's a u t h e n t i c existence and T i l l i c h ' s 
Transcendental Union and Unambiguous L i f e are not st a t e s o f s e r e n i t y 
which can be achieved and h e l d , but are goals towards which man can 
on l y c o n t i n u o u s l y s t r i v e t o grasp. F a i t h i s such a movement o f 
transcendence, according t o T i l l i c h , and i s a l i f e o f personal 
a u t h e n t i c i t y , where ambiguity i s banished i n favour o f an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
s t r i v i n g f o r Transcendental Union. 
EXISTENTIALIA 
According t o T i l l i c h , t h e r e are i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e S p i r i t u a l 
Presence t h r e e elements o f f a i t h : f i r s t , openness and passive 
r e c e p t i o n ; secondly, paradox, courage, and acceptance; and t h i r d l y , 
a n t i c i p a t i o n , hope, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n . "These t h r e e elements", he 
says, "express t h e human s i t u a t i o n and the s i t u a t i o n o f l i f e i n 
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general i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e u l t i m a t e i n being and meaning." 
These elements also serve t o p o i n t us t o t h e " e x i s t e n t i a l i a " by 
which T i l l i c h i n t e r p r e t s f a i t h , and we now t u r n t o examine them. 
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1 . U l t i m a t e Concern - The U n c o n d i t i o n a l 
I t was i n h i s e a r l y w r i t i n g s mostly t h a t T i l l i c h spoke o f 
t h e Unconditional and o f f a i t h as "Directedness toward the 
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U n c o n d i t i o n a l " . " I t i s d i r e c t e d immediately toward a h o l y o b j e c t 
.... F a i t h reaches beyond the immediacy of a l l t h i n g s t o t h e ground 
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and abyss upon which they depend." Thus God i s r e f e r r e d t o as 
t h e U n c o n d i t i o n a l , and "... f a i t h i s determined by i t s directedness 
toward the U n c o n d i t i o n a l . . . t h e act o f grasping t h e U n c o n d i t i o n a l 
i s an act o f f a i t h ; w i t h o u t f a i t h t h e Unconditional i s not 
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apprehen s i b l e . " 
The U n c o n d i t i o n a l , God, has i t s a n t i t h e s i s i n t h e c o n d i t i o n e d 
which i s lower than t h e d i v i n e ; however, man can know t h e Unconditional 
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o n l y i n such a c o n d i t i o n e d form. Thus i t i s t h a t " F a i t h i s 
always based on r e v e l a t i o n , f o r i t i s an apprehension o f t h e 
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u n c o n d i t i o n a l import through c o n d i t i o n e d forms." I n f a i t h , t h e n , 
t h e r e i s devotion t o t h e unconditioned k e r n e l , but some a t t e n t i o n i s 
a l s o given t o t h e c o n d i t i o n e d symbols i n which the Unconditional i s 
7fl 
found. The c e r t a i n t y of f a i t h i s o f fundamentals o n l y ; t h e r e 
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i s c e r t a i n t y i n the U n c o n d i t i o n a l , but not i n i t s outward forms, 
so t h a t "... f a i t h means being grasped by t h e power o f t h e 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l . " ^ 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e u l t i m a t e f o r T i l l i c h i s h i g h l i g h t e d 
8 l 
i n h i s saying "What concerns one u l t i m a t e l y becomes h o l j t . " 
U l t i m a t e concern i s i n t h e sphere o f t h e d i v i n e because f i n i t u d e 
has been transcended thereby. I t i s i m p o r t a n t , t h e r e f o r e , f o r 
f a i t h t o recognise t h e p o s i t i o n o f symbol, and g i v e t h e status o f 
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u l t i m a c y t o God. The e x i s t e n t i a l perspective o f t h e u l t i m a t e i s 
shown i n th e f o l l o w i n g way by T i l l i c h : -
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Man's f a i t h i s inadequate i f h i s whole existence i s 
determined by something t h a t i s l e s s than u l t i m a t e . 
Therefore, he must always t r y t o break through t h e 
l i m i t s o f h i s f i n i t u d e and reach what can never be 
reached, the u l t i m a t e i t s e l f . . . . F a i t h must u n i t e t h e 
t o l e r a n c e based on i t s r e l a t i v i t y w i t h t h e c e r t a i n t y 
based on the u l t i m a c y o f i t s concern."3 
I t t h e r e f o r e f o l l o w s t h a t "The c r i t e r i o n o f every f a i t h i s t h e 
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u l t i m a c y which i t t r i e s t o express." T i l l i c h i s not advocating 
f a i t h as being grasped by an u l t i m a t e (or being u l t i m a t e l y concerned) 
as a d o c t r i n e , (as he has been accused o f , so p r e s e n t i n g an inadequat 
d o c t r i n e o f f a i t h ) , but he i s d e s c r i b i n g i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terms the 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t experience and p r a c t i c e o f f a i t h . ^ 
Discussing the r e l a t i o n between philosophy and r e l i g i o n w i t h 
regard t o the concept o f u l t i m a c y and u l t i m a t e concern, T i l l i c h says 
" P h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h i s t r u t h about the s t r u c t u r e o f being; the 
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t r u t h o f f a i t h i s t r u t h about one's u l t i m a t e concern." Also 
... t h e r e i s a p o i n t o f i d e n t i t y between the u l t i m a t e 
o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l question and t h e u l t i m a t e o f t h e 
r e l i g i o u s concern. I n both cases u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y i s 
sought and expressed - con c e p t u a l l y i n philosophy, 
s y m b o l i c a l l y i n r e l i g i o n . ^ 
These d i f f e r e n t forms of expression, says T i l l i c h , b e t r a y t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e o f r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e u l t i m a t e . The r e l i g i o u s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i n f a c t e x i s t e n t i a l , as i t i s involved and concerned, 
whereas the p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i s detached and d i s i n t e r e s t e d . 
T i l l i c h , however, sees a basic u n i t y i n philosophy and r e l i g i o n , and 
i t i s found i n t h e term " u l t i m a t e concern":- "Where t h e r e i s 
philosophy t h e r e i s expression o f an u l t i m a t e concern; t h e r e i s an 
element o f f a i t h , however hidden t h i s may be by t h e passion o f t h e 
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h i s t o r i a n f o r pure f a c t s . " Speaking o f the union o f philosophy 
and f a i t h which has been c a l l e d " P h i l o s o p h i c a l F a i t h " by Jaspers, 
T i l l i c h , w h i l s t presumably i n sympathy w i t h t h e aims o f Jaspers, 
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c r i t i c i s e s h i s term as "misleading" f i r s t because i t confuses the 
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two elements o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h and r e l i g i o u s t r u t h , secondly 
because the term i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e i s and can be o n l y one such 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l f a i t h . 
" U ltimate Concern" i s a key concept f o r T i l l i c h , f o r as he 
once sai d i n a dialogue "... r e l i g i o n i s d e f ined as a s t a t e o f 'being 
grasped by an u l t i m a t e concern 1 - v h i c h i s my d e f i n i t i o n o f f a i t h -
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..." By t h i s , T i l l i c h means "... we are p o i n t i n g t o an e x i s t e n t i a l , 
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not a t h e o r e t i c a l , understanding o f r e l i g i o n " . This e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f a i t h was expounded mostly i n Dynamics o f F a i t h , 
where we s h a l l now f o l l o w T i l l i c h ' s d i s c u s s i o n . 
The u n c o n d i t i o n a l concern which i s f a i t h i s t h e concern 
about t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l . The i n f i n i t e passion, as f a i t h 
has been described, i s the passion f o r t h e i n f i n i t e . Or, 
t o use our f i r s t term, the u l t i m a t e concern i s concern 
about what i s experienced as ultimate.93 
The e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a l l u s i o n s i n these statements w i l l be elaborated 
l a t e r , but we may note here t h a t f o r T i l l i c h t h e term U l t i m a t e 
Concern represents both t h e s u b j e c t i v e act o f f a i t h and t h e 
9k 
o b j e c t i v e goal o f f a i t h . 
One o f t h e ways i n which u l t i m a t e concern i s u l t i m a t e l y 
s u b j e c t i v e l y experienced i s "The f e e l i n g of being consumed i n t h e 
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presence o f t h e d i v i n e . . . " The u l t i m a t e i t s e l f i s thus an 
e x i s t e n t i a l experience, which may be one o f t e n s i o n : "Where t h e r e 
i s f a i t h t h e r e i s t e n s i o n between p a r t i c i p a t i o n and s e p a r a t i o n , 
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between the f a i t h f u l one and h i s u l t i m a t e concern." However, 
according t o t h e m y s t i c s , w i t h whom T i l l i c h has some a f f i n i t i e s and 
sympathy, the u l t i m a t e i s present i n t h i s f i n i t e w o r l d i n t h e s o u l . 
Self-surrender i s t h e r e f o r e necessary: " F a i t h , w i t h i n t h i s movement 
o f t h e s o u l , i s i n a s t a t e o f o s c i l l a t i o n between having and not 
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having t h e content o f u l t i m a t e concern." I t t h e r e f o r e f o l l o w s 
t h a t " E x i s t e n t i a l doubt and f a i t h are poles o f t h e same r e a l i t y , t h e 
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s t a t e o f u l t i m a t e concern.... But serious doubt i s t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n 
o f f a i t h . I t i n d i c a t e s t h e seriousness o f t h e concern, i t s 
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u n c o n d i t i o n a l character." Reunion o f t h e s e l f and t h e ground o f 
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being i s an e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y i n the f a i t h o f u l t i m a t e concern, 
so t h a t f a i t h "... i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the subject o f one's u l t i m a t e 
concern w i t h one's whole being. " ^ ^ 
More s i g n i f i c a n t f o r our purpose o f s e l e c t i n g those themes 
and ideas o f T i l l i c h which r e v e a l h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s m are h i s "two 
formal c r i t e r i a f o r every theology" as each has a s p e c i a l prominent 
place f o r " u l t i m a t e concern" as an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme f o r 
i n t e r p r e t i n g f a i t h . L a t e r T i l l i c h explains 
I n a short formula, one can say t h a t f a i t h i s t h e 
s t a t e o f being grasped by an u l t i m a t e concern. The 
term ' u l t i m a t e concern' u n i t e s a s u b j e c t i v e and an 
o b j e c t i v e meaning: somebody i s concerned about something 
he considers o f concern. I n t h i s formal sense o f f a i t h 
as u l t i m a t e concern, every human being has f a i t h . 1 0 2 
Even granted t h a t what T i l l i c h r e a l l y meant was "somebody i s u l t i m a t e l y 
concerned about something he considers t o be o f u l t i m a t e concern" ( i . e . 
t h e emphasis i s on t h e u l t i m a c y of the concern), h i s formula has 
a t t r a c t e d c r i t i c i s m f o r i t s u n q u a l i f i e d breadth and extensive 
a p p l i c a t i o n . We should n o t i c e t h i s p o i n t because both terms have 
e x i s t e n t i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f a i t h . I t 
i s t h i s u l t i m a c y which c o n s t i t u t e s the essence o f " u l t i m a t e concern" 
as an e x i s t e n t i a l e i n T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f a i t h . 
For T i l l i c h , "The fundamental symbol o f our u l t i m a t e concern i s 
God".^"^ Symbols o f God have been placed i n and taken from s t o r i e s 
about God. However, T i l l i c h stresses t h a t " F a i t h i s not t h e b e l i e f 
i n such s t o r i e s , but i t i s t h e acceptance o f symbols t h a t express our 
10^ 
u l t i m a t e concern i n terms o f d i v i n e a c t i o n s . " This view i s 
r e l a t e d t o Bultmann's p r i n c i p l e o f de-mythologising. As T i l l i c h 
says:-
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This i s the world o f the myth, great and strange, 
always changing but fundamentally the same: man's 
u l t i m a t e concern symbolised i n d i v i n e f i g u r e s and 
a c t i o n s . Myths are symbols o f f a i t h combined i n 
s t o r i e s about divine-human encounters.^5 
Because o f t h i s , "The c o n f l i c t between r e l i g i o n s i s not a c o n f l i c t 
between forms o f b e l i e f , but i t i s a c o n f l i c t between expressions o f 
our u l t i m a t e concern."^"^ Thus we f i n d T i l l i c h remarks t h a t the 
Enlightenment philosophers, modern humanists, e t c . , have a type o f 
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moral f a i t h w i t h t h e i r own u l t i m a t e concern. According t o 
T i l l i c h , t h e n, f o r a l l r e l i g i o n s t h e essence o f t h e i r f a i t h by which 
they b e l i e v e i s the u l t i m a c y o f t h e i r concern. The d i f f e r e n c e s 
between the f a i t h s i n which people b e l i e v e are the v a r y i n g natures 
o f t h e i r u l t i m a t e concerns. 
* * * 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n we have noted many fe a t u r e s o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m 
which appear i n T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f a i t h as u l t i m a t e concern. 
There are a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g a l l u s i o n s t o c e r t a i n d o c t r i n e s 
propounded by t h r e e o f our e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s i n Chapter Two, and we 
s h a l l now lo o k a t these e x i s t e n t i a l i s t ideas i n t u r n . 
The theme o f t h e Unconditional and U l t i m a t e Concern are 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t o n ly by i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e r a t h e r than by d i r e c t 
borrowing from p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , although they do have 
some idea o f the Unconditional as t h a t which faces t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
i n h i s f i n i t u d e . This p a r t i c u l a r l y evident i n Jaspers' and Heidegger' 
concept o f Transcendence, which stands over and against t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
(Jaspers' "Existenz" and Heidegger's "Dasein"), and which i s t h e 
obj e c t o f man's concern. S i m i l a r l y , Jaspers' concept o f t h e 
Boundary S i t u a t i o n and Transcendence being on t h e boundary provides 
an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t p a r a l l e l w i t h T i l l i c h ' s concept o f u l t i m a c y , but 
the p a r a l l e l i s not too c l o s e , e s p e c i a l l y as T i l l i c h a l s o had h i s own 
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concept o f the boundary and boundary s i t u a t i o n s which do not 
f e a t u r e d i r e c t l y i n h i s concept o f u l t i m a c y . 
Just as T i l l i c h r e f e r r e d t o God as "the symbol o f t h e 
Unc o n d i t i o n a l " we f i n d t h a t Jaspers regards God as "a cipher o f 
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Transcendence." I n t h i s instance o f common form o f r e l i g i o u s 
language, we f i n d t h a t both T i l l i c h and Jaspers s t r e s s t h a t f a i t h i s 
a matter o f being s t r e t c h e d e x i s t e n t i a l l y t o one's very l i m i t s , t h a t 
f a i t h i s t o a f f i r m the U n c o n d i t i o n a l , t o pursue the u l t i m a t e concern, 
t o experience t h e U l t i m a t e . 
With h i s concept of Ult i m a t e Concern, T i l l i c h i s emphasising 
t h a t aspect of f a i t h which i s not j u s t emotional concern, but also 
t h a t concern about the U l t i m a t e ( t h e U n c o n d i t i o n a l ) . As f a r as t h e 
need f o r emotional concern i s i n v o l v e d i n f a i t h , we may n o t i c e t h a t 
t h i s view i s also shared by Kierkegaard and h i s i n s i s t a n c e t h a t f a i t h 
i s passion - a view which T i l l i c h s p e c i f i c a l l y e n d o r s e s , t h o u g h 
guarding hi m s e l f against t h e h i n t o f i n d i v i d u a l i s m i m p l i c i t i n 
Kierkegaard's statement. Indeed, Kierkegaard't term " i n f i n i t e 
passion" i s d i r e c t l y p a r a l l e l e d by T i l l i c h ' s term "Ultimate Concern". 
This aspect o f "Concern" i s also found i n Heidegger, w i t h h i s concept 
of "Care"; j u s t as Heidegger i n t e r p r e t s l i f e i n terms o f Care, so 
T i l l i c h sees i t i n terms o f Concern. But whereas Heidegger's Care 
(Concern) i s centred on man ( f a c t i c i t y , p o s s i b i l i t y , and f a l l i n g ) , 
T i l l i c h ' s Concern i s d i r e c t e d a t the U l t i m a t e , God. 
With Jaspers' concepts o f Transcendence and Encompassing 
we f i n d t h e same elevated l i n e o f thought as T i l l i c h ' s U l t i m a t e 
Concern and the U n c o n d i t i o n a l . According t o them b o t h , the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i f e has a d i v i n e p e r s p e c t i v e , and the experience and 
acknowledgement of t h i s i s known e x i s t e n t i a l l y as f a i t h . Jaspers' 
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concept o f t h e Boundary S i t u a t i o n i s also t o be found i n T i l l i c h ' s 
concept o f U l t i m a t e Concern, since the Jasperian idea o f the i n d i v i d u a l 
e x p l o r i n g t h e l i m i t s o f h i s f i n i t u d e i s t o be found i n T i l l i c h ' s 
concern f o r the i n d i v i d u a l t o come t o terms w i t h t h e U l t i m a t e which 
governs h i s l i f e , although f o r T i l l i c h "the boundary" i s a metaphor, 
whereas Jaspers understands i t l i t e r a l l y . 
2. Ecstasy and Mysticism 
For T i l l i c h , ecstasy i s a q u a l i t y both o f t h e Holy and o f t h e 
b e l i e v e r . 1 1 1 For t h e b e l i e v e r , t h e self-transcendent aspect o f 
f a i t h i s enacted by r a t i o n a l prayer or n o n - r a t i o n a l ecstasy. F a i t h 
i s the e c s t a t i c experience which i s t h e v i s i b l e ground o f s e l f -
112 
transcending r e a l i s m . As such, "True ecstasy i s u n i t e d w i t h 
f a i t h , and f a i t h transcends what seems t o be r e a l , because i t i s t h e 
113 
presence o f t h e r e a l l y , t h e u l t i m a t e l y , r e a l . " I n other words, 
f a i t h "... i s the e x i s t e n t i a l acceptance o f something transcending 
„llU 
o r d i n a r y experience. 
F a i t h i s " e c s t a t i c " i n t h a t i t i s t h e "centred act of t h e 
p e r s o n a l i t y " ; t h a t i s , o f the au t h e n t i c i n d i v i d u a l . 1 1 This personal 
element i s s i g n i f i c a n t e x i s t e n t i a l l y : -
I n t h e ecstasy o f f a i t h t h e r e i s an awareness o f t r u t h 
and e t h i c a l values; t h e r e are also past loves and hates, 
c o n f l i c t s and reunions, i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e 
i n f l u e n c e s . 'Ecstasy* means 'standing outside o f o n e s e l f -
wi t h o u t ceasing t o be oneself - w i t h a l l t h e elements 
which are u n i t e d i n t h e personal center. 
T i l l i c h i s c a r e f u l t o show t h a t ecstasy i n f a i t h i s not i r r a t i o n a l 
(an accusation sometimes l e v e l l e d a l so a t e x i s t e n t i a l i s m ) : " F a i t h 
as t h e s t a t e o f u l t i m a t e concern i s reason in-ecsjbasy' . On t h e 
other hand, as we have already seen, ecstasy i s a movement o f f a i t h 
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working f o r Transcendental Union or Unambiguous L i f e . 
T i l l i c h has great sympathies w i t h and leanings towards 
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mysticism, "but found i t d i f f i c u l t t o accommodate w i t h e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . 
Nevertheless, " I n every m y s t i c a l experience an act o f s e l f -
transcendence or f a i t h i s i m p l i c i t . " ^ ^ Discussing f a i t h and 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n , T i l l i c h says t h a t mysticism and personalism are the 
two characters o f t h e r e l a t i o n t o b e i n g - i t s e l f which, i f they are 
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both accepted and transcended, the r e s u l t i s f a i t h . Thus " F a i t h 
121 
embraces both m y s t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and personal confidence." 
On t h e other hand, T i l l i c h a l s o had some r e s e r v a t i o n s about t h e 
place o f mysticism i n f a i t h , and i n f a c t he says "... I do not t h i n k 
e i t h e r m y s t i c a l union or personal encounter f u l f i l l s t h e idea o f 
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f a i t h . " Rather, f a i t h "... transcends both t h e m y s t i c a l 
experience and t h e divine-human encounter.... Absolute f a i t h 
i ncludes an element o f scepticism which one cannot f i n d i n t h e 
m y s t i c a l experience."^"^ 
T i l l i c h ' s r e a l p o s i t i o n regarding the place o f mysticism 
i n f a i t h may be found i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n on the Protestant problem 
o f t h e r e l a t i o n of mysticism t o f a i t h when he says 
They are compatible only i f t h e one i s an element of t h e 
other....As an e c s t a t i c experience, f a i t h i s m y s t i c a l , 
although i t does not produce mysticism as a r e l i g i o u s 
t y p e.... There i s f a i t h i n m y s t i c a l experience.... But 
the m y s t i c a l experience i s not i d e n t i c a l w i t h f a i t h . 
For T i l l i c h t h e n, ecstasy and mysticism are v a l i d e x i s t e n t i a l 
expressions o f f a i t h so l o n g as they are kept i n balance w i t h 
other f a c t o r s i n f a i t h . But given such q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , as T i l l i c h 
does, ecstasy and mysticism remain f o r him a v a l i d e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
theme by which t o i n t e r p r e t f a i t h . 
* * # 
T i l l i c h ' s e x p o s i t i o n o f f a i t h as ecstasy and mysticism i s 
thoroughly e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , e s p e c i a l l y as we see t h a t he r e t a i n s the 
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e x i s t e n t i a l i s t etymological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e word "ecstasy". As 
an E n g l i s h word derive d from t h e same L a t i n r o o t as " e x i s t " , ecstasy 
has a t e c h n i c a l meaning i n e x i s t e n t i a l i s m ; t h e a c t and experience o f 
standing outside o f oneself both r a t i o n a l l y and n o n - r a t i o n a l l y . 
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Heidegger spoke o f t h e "ecstases" o f t e m p o r a l i t y i n terms o f t h e 
f u t u r e existence of the i n d i v i d u a l . The d e s c r i p t i o n T i l l i c h gives 
o f the movement of ecstasy i s couched i n Jasperian language:- "Whenever 
we transcend t h e l i m i t s o f our own being, moving toward union w i t h 
another one, something l i k e ecstasy ('standing o u t s i d e o n e s e l f 1 ) 
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occurs." Also Jasperian i s T i l l i c h ' s defence o f ecstasy and 
mysticism against t h e charge o f i r r a t i o n a l i t y . This defence may have 
been made w i t h t h e c r i t i c i s m o f Nietzsche i n mind, t h a t f a i t h i s a 
mark o f a d e f i c i e n c y of t h e mental f a c u l t i e s . I f t h i s i s so, T i l l i c h 
c l e a r l y respected t h i s c r i t i c i s m o f f a i t h , and sought t o answer i t 
wit h o u t a t t a c k i n g t h e source o f t h e c r i t i c i s m . 
I n t h e ecstasy o f f a i t h t h e r e i s also t h e e x i s t e n t i a l i s t element 
o f passion and complete involvement by t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n ecstasy and 
also mysticism. I n a l l t h i s t h e r e are p a r a l l e l s i n t h e thought o f 
Kierkegaard w i t h t h e e c s t a t i c passion o f f a i t h , and t h e elements o f 
s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n and s e l f - a s s e r t i o n i n t h e e c s t a t i c i n d i v i d u a l . 
3. Acceptance and C e r t a i n t y 
Acceptance o f e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n s i s t h e basis o f t h e 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme used by T i l l i c h t o i n t e r p r e t f a i t h . Thus " F a i t h i s 
not a t h e o r e t i c a l a f f i r m a t i o n o f something u n c e r t a i n , i t i s t h e 
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e x i s t e n t i a l acceptance o f something transcending o r d i n a r y experience." 
Another example o f such e x i s t e n t i a l acceptance i s "... t h a t t h e 
acceptance o f despair i s i n i t s e l f f a i t h and on the boundary l i n e o f 
t h e courage t o be." T i l l i c h e x plains t h a t "The f a i t h which makes 
the courage of despair p o s s i b l e i s t h e acceptance o f t h e power of 
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129 being, even i n t h e g r i p o f non-being." 
T i l l i c h a l s o speaks o f what we may describe as " r e l i g i o u s " 
acceptance: " I n every act o f f a i t h t h e r e i s c o g n i t i v e a f f i r m a t i o n , not 
as the r e s u l t of an independent process o f enquiry but as an inseparable 
,,130 
element i n a t o t a l a ct o f acceptance and surrender. S i m i l a r l y , t h e 
131 
acceptance o f r e v e l a t i o n i s also f a i t h , because "The acceptance o f 
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the a f f i r m a t i v e w i t h t h e whole of one's being i s c a l l e d f a i t h . . . " 
As a r e s u l t , t h e demands o f acceptance i n f a i t h a l s o extend t o church 
d i s c i p l i n e ; i f one accepts the f a i t h , one also accepts t h e moral 
133 
a f f i r m a t i o n s o f t h e f a i t h . 
F a i t h i s t h e experience o f t h e power o f s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n , "But i t 
i s an experience which has a paradoxical c h a r a c t e r ; t h e character o f 
131* 
accepting acceptance." For T i l l i c h , t h e acceptance o f being 
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accepted i s an "element i n absolute f a i t h " ; i t i s "... t h e courage t o 
accept t h a t one i s accepted i n s p i t e o f s i n , estrangement, and despair"."^^ 
Furthermore, t h e b e l i e v e r "... must accept j u s t t h i s . He must accept 
137 
t h a t he i s accepted; he must accept acceptance." The acceptance and 
c e r t a i n t y i n f a i t h by t h e i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e v e r i s described by T i l l i c h 
as " r e s t f u l , a f f i r m a t i v e confidence." The c e r t a i n t y o f f a i t h i s 
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also found i n t h e b e l i e v e r p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the community o f t h e f a i t h . 
For T i l l i c h , "The c e r t i t u d e of f a i t h i s ' e x i s t e n t i a l 1 , meaning t h a t t h e 
lUO 
whole existence o f man i s i n v o l v e d . " But he makes i t c l e a r t h a t 
" I t s c e r t i t u d e i s not t h e u n c e r t a i n c e r t i t u d e o f a t h e o r e t i c a l 
ikl 
judgement." I n f a c t T i l l i c h says t h a t t h e cert a i n t y . / o f f a i t h 
l i e s i n the u l t i m a t e concern, f o r t h e l i f e o f f a i t h i t s e l f i s r e a l l y 
one o f r e l a t i v i t y , doubt, and t e n s i o n . 
I t i s important t o n o t i c e , t h e n , t h a t t h i s c e r t a i n t y i s l i m i t e d 
t o a c e r t a i n t y o f f a i t h about fundamentals o n l y . There i s c e r t a i n t y i n 
the Unconditional but not i n i t s forms; t h e o b j e c t o f f a i t h i s c e r t a i n , 
lU3 
the l i f e o f f a i t h i s u n c e r t a i n . T i l l i c h t h e r e f o r e r a i s e s t h e 
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question "Exactly what can f a i t h guarantee? And t h e i n e v i t a b l e answer 
i s t h a t f a i t h can guarantee o n l y i t s own f o u n d a t i o n , namely, the 
lUU 
appearance o f t h a t r e a l i t y which has created t h a t f a i t h . " This 
experience i s h i s only c e r t a i n t y , a n d even t h i s i s not unquestionable^"* 4 
as we s h a l l s h o r t l y see. 
* * * 
As an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme, acceptance and c e r t a i n t y i s t o be 
seen i n the personal views of t h e p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s we s t u d i e d 
i n Chapter Two, and these views can be compared d i r e c t l y w i t h those o f 
T i l l i c h . 
For Kierkegaard, " i n f i n i t e r e s i g n a t i o n " i s t h e act o f f a i t h which 
accepts whole-heartedly t h e supreme w i l l o f God, T i l l i c h also sees f a i t h 
as t h e acceptance, e s p e c i a l l y when he says "The acceptance o f the 
a f f i r m a t i v e w i t h t h e whole o f one's being i s c a l l e d f a i t h . " Nietzsche' 
p o s i t i v e w i l l i n g n e s s t o come t o terras w i t h l i f e and f a t e i s p a r a l l e l e d 
by T i l l i c h ' s d o c t r i n e o f "accepting acceptance". I t i s w i t h i n t h i s 
Nietzschean and T i l l i c h i a n understanding o f acceptance t h a t t h e c e r t a i n t y 
o f f a i t h i s p o s s i b l e . Because o f t h i s , i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t o see t h a t 
the r e l i g i o u s s e r e n i t y o f Jaspers' P h i l o s o p h i c a l F a i t h , tempered by 
s t r u g g l e and t e n s i o n i n l i f e , i s a l s o s i m i l a r t o T i l l i c h ; f o r each 
w r i t e r , c e r t a i n t y l i e s i n the U l t i m a t e , t h e Transcendent,^whilst 
acceptance l i e s i n a d m i t t i n g the supreme s t a t u s o f God. We may a l s o note 
t h a t t h e acceptance o f T i l l i c h has the same character as t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n 
o f Heidegger i n t h a t each d e l i b e r a t e l y faced up t o t h e r e a l i t i e s o f l i f e 
and death i n t h e same p h i l o s o p h i c a l way. 
U. Doubt and Risk 
Alongside t h e acceptance and c e r t a i n t y o f f a i t h t h e r e i s the 
e x i s t e n t i a l doubt and r i s k i n f a i t h - a theme which T i l l i c h develops 
more f u l l y . As he says, " I n every act o f f a i t h , t h e r e i s r i s k , and t h e 
courage t o take t h i s r i s k , and t h e necessary doubt which d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
- 163 -
lU8 
f a i t h from mathematical or e m p i r i c a l evidence." This idea occurs 
again as the t h i r d o f T i l l i c h ' s t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s o f "Protestant form-
lU9 
c r e a t i o n " . Doubt i s not opposed t o f a i t h , but i s a c o n s t i t u t i v e 
p a r t o f i t : - " L i v i n g f a i t h includes t h e doubt about i t s e l f , t h e 
courage t o take t h i s doubt i n t o i t s e l f , and t h e r i s k o f c o u r a g e . " 1 ^ 
This marriage o f doubt w i t h f a i t h i s very e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i n character 
as i t r e f e r s t o t h e experience o f f a i t h and doubt by t h e i n d i v i d u a l : -
"... doubt i s not t h e opposite o f f a i t h ; i t i s an element o f f a i t h . 
Therefore, t h e r e i s no f a i t h w i t h o u t r i s k . . . " 1 ^ 1 
T i l l i c h a l s o argues t h a t doubt i s not j u s t p a r t o f f a i t h , but 
t h a t f a i t h should f u n c t i o n as a v o i c e o f doubt. E x i s t e n t i a l i s m i s a 
product o f t h e a n x i e t y o f today, w i t h doubt and meaninglessness 
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c h a l l e n g i n g t h e whole v a l i d i t y o f f a i t h . 
How i s the f a i t h through which j u s t i f i c a t i o n comes t o 
us r e l a t e d t o t h e s i t u a t i o n o f r a d i c a l doubt? Radical 
doubt i s e x i s t e n t i a l doubt concerning t h e meaning o f l i f e 
i t s e l f ; i t may i n c l u d e not o n l y the r e j e c t i o n o f e v e r y t h i n g 
r e l i g i o u s i n t h e narrow sense o f t h e word but also t h e 
u l t i m a t e concern which c o n s t i t u t e s r e l i g i o n i n t h e l a r g e r 
sense.... I t i s t h e way i n which t h e people o f our time can 
be t o l d t h a t they are accepted w i t h respect t o t h e u l t i m a t e 
meaning o f t h e i r l i v e s , although unacceptable i n view o f 
t h e doubt and t h e meaninglessness which has taken hold o f 
them. I n t h e seriousness o f t h e i r e x i s t e n t i a l d e s p a i r , God 
i s present t o them. To accept t h i s paradoxical acceptance 
i s t h e courage o f t h e i r faith.^-53 
I n other words, f o r T i l l i c h , e x i s t e n t i a l doubt i s p a r t o f f a i t h , and 
accepting t h i s i s an act o f f a i t h i t s e l f . I t i s i m p o r t a n t , t h e r e f o r e 
f o r theology t o " s t a t e t h e necessity o f doubt which f o l l o w s from man' 
15U 
f i n i t u d e under t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement." This 
e x i s t e n t i a l dimension o f doubt and f a i t h i s e q u a l l y a f e a t u r e o f t h e 
t h e o l o g i c a l e n t e r p r i s e : - "Every t h e o l o g i a n i s committed and a l i e n a t e d 
he i s always i n f a i t h and i n doubt; he i s i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e 
t h e o l o g i c a l c i r c l e . 
T i l l i c h i s fond o f saying t h a t t h e r e i s f a i t h i n every serious 
doubt, f o r such doubt r e f l e c t s t h e f a i t h f u l yearning a f t e r t r u t h : -
- 16U -
"Absolute f a i t h includes an element o f scepticism.. He 
explains t h a t "The content o f absolute f a i t h i s t h e 'God above God'. 
Absolute f a i t h and i t s consequence, the courage t h a t takes the r a d i c a l 
doubt, the doubt about God, i n t o i t s e l f , transcends the t h e i s t i c idea 
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of God." F a i t h i n v o l v e s a t e n s i o n between c e r t a i n t y and doubt, 
between f a i t h and doubt; yet a l l these f a c t o r s are necessary f o r f a i t h 
•I rO 
i t s e l f . I t i s i n t h e e x i s t e n t i a l experience o f t h e l i f e o f f a i t h 
t h a t T i l l i c h can speak o f t h e i n t e r - c o n n e c t i o n o f doubt and f a i t h . 
T i l l i c h ' s argument i s , t h e n , t h a t doubt i n f a i t h r e q u i r e s courage, 
and courage w i t h i n f a i t h enables a h e a l t h y doubt t o s u b s i s t w i t h i n , 
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or even e x i s t alongside, f a i t h . 
Risk i n f a i t h i s the more p h y s i c a l side t o t h e e x i s t e n t i a l l i f e 
o f f a i t h , doubt being on t h e mental side o f f a i t h . As T i l l i c h says 
"The r i s k o f f a i t h i s based on t h e f a c t t h a t the u n c o n d i t i o n a l element 
can become a matter o f u l t i m a t e concern o n l y i f i t appears i n a 
concrete e m b o d i m e n t . B e s i d e s the r i s k t h a t f a i t h may be 
misplaced, t h e r e i s t h e e x i s t e n t i a l r i s k o f f a i t h i n which t h e whole 
l i f e o f t h e b e l i e v e r i s a t stake:- "The r i s k o f f a i t h i s not 
a r b i t r a r i n e s s , i t i s a u n i t y o f f a t e and d e c i s i o n . " ^ " ^ True 
Pro t e s t a n t f a i t h 
... i n v o l v e s d a r i n g and r i s k ; i t has no safe standards, 
no s p i r i t u a l guarantees.... i t cannot do other than 
venture and r i s k . . . . A d a r i n g act i s demanded, an act 
which penetrates t o t h e deepest l e v e l o f r e a l i t y , t o 
i t s transcendent ground.1°^ 
As w i t h doubt, T i l l i c h i s thus able t o say "Therefore, t h e r e i s no 
f a i t h w ithout r i s k . . . The r i s k o f f a i t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l ; i t concerns 
the t o t a l i t y o f our being..." Yet i n s p i t e o f h i s obvious 
indebtedness t o e x i s t e n t i a l i s m f o r t h e theme o f r i s k by which t o 
i n t e r p r e t f a i t h , T i l l i c h i s aware o f a danger i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
approach - t h a t o f "... u n d i r e c t e d w i l f u l n e s s , as we f i n d more i n 
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some Protestant and much E x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h i n k i n g . " 
F a i t h also contains r e l i g i o u s r i s k s , which are s t i l l e x i s t e n t i a l 
16*5 
because " F a i t h contains a contingent element and demands a r i s k . " 
There i s , f o r example, the r i s k o f a c t u a l l y r e c o g n i s i n g , or not 
re c o g n i s i n g , t h e genuineness o f t h e u l t i m a t e concern; i s i t r e a l l y 
166 
of u l t i m a t e concern? 
There i s a r i s k i f what was considered t o be a matter 
of u l t i m a t e concern proves t o be a matter o f p r e l i m i n a r y 
and t r a n s i t o r y concern.... The r i s k t o f a i t h i n one's 
u l t i m a t e concern i s indeed the gr e a t e s t r i s k man can r u n / 6 7 
Another example o f the r e l i g i o u s and e x i s t e n t i a l r i s k o f f a i t h i s 
t h a t o f the i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e v e r a s s e r t i n g h i s personal f a i t h w i t h i n 
l68 
t h e S p i r i t u a l Community. Again, even the contents o f f a i t h may 
in v o l v e r i s k , e s p e c i a l l y i n the problems o f expressing t h a t f a i t h i n 
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adequate symbols. Furthermore, "The C h r i s t i a n church takes t h e 
' r i s k o f f a i t h ' i n a f f i r m i n g p r a c t i c a l l y and t h e o r e t i c a l l y t h a t t h i s 
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r e v e l a t i o n cannot come t o an end..." I n other words, b e l i e v e r s 
take t h e r i s k o f cla i m i n g t h a t t h e i r d o c t r i n e s are t r u e a t a l l . Thus 
F a i t h dares t o assert i t s dependence on t h a t event 
which i s the c r i t e r i o n o f a l l r e v e l a t o r y events. F a i t h 
has t h e courage t o dare such an e x t r a o r d i n a r y a s s e r t i o n 
and i t takes the r i s k o f e r r o r . But w i t h o u t t h i s ^ „ 
courage and wi t h o u t the r i s k , i t would not be f a i t h . 
* # * 
Doubt and r i s k n a t u r a l l y a r i s e w i t h i n the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
i n t e r e s t i n t h e contingency of l i f e , and they are sometimes expressed 
o n t o l o g i c a l l y i n terms o f Angst. 
Kierkegaard spoke much on t h e place of doubt and r i s k i n f a i t h . 
This important element o f f a i t h gives power t o the emotional f e r v o u r 
of f a i t h , as f a i t h i s i n v i g o r a t e d by doubt and r i s k , and they s t i r 
i t t o do great t h i n g s . S i m i l a r l y , T i l l i c h says f a i t h must have 
courage and dar i n g because of the doubt and r i s k i t contains. Just 
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as Kierkegaard p o s i t e d f a i t h i n the "Absurd", so T i l l i c h warns o f 
the r i s k f a i t h takes i n recog n i s i n g the genuine U l t i m a t e Concern. 
For both, one be l i e v e s although i t may appear absurd, thereby t a k i n g 
the r i s k o f f a i t h . 
T i l l i c h ' s thoughts on doubt i n f a i t h are couched i n t h e 
same language t h a t Jaspers used e a r l i e r when d e s c r i b i n g t h e necessity 
o f u n b e l i e f i n b e l i e f . T i l l i c h says f a i t h must i n c l u d e scepticism 
and doubt. Jaspers used the term "foundering" t o describe t h e 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t doubt and r i s k i n l i f e and f a i t h , w h i l s t the same 
emphasis on t h e basic u n c e r t a i n t y i n f a i t h i s t o be found i n 
T i l l i c h ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of Absolute f a i t h . This e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme 
of doubt and r i s k i s also seen i n Heidegger's view t h a t Angst i s t h e 
o n t o l o g i c a l basis f o r Care (Concern), which i s t h e basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of existence. T i l l i c h sees f a i t h as t h e answer t o t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l 
depression, doubt, and meaningless, not by removing i t , but by 
t a k i n g i t i n t o himself i n f a i t h . I t i s p r e c i s e l y Heidegger's 
a n a l y s i s o f f a c t i c i t y , p o s s i b i l i t y , and f a l l i n g which c o n s t i t u t e i n 
a l l but name T i l l i c h ' s doubt and r i s k i n f a i t h . 
5. Tension, S t r u g g l e , and Paradox 
T i l l i c h saw t e n s i o n , s t r u g g l e , and paradox as an extended 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme by which t o i n t e r p r e t f a i t h : -
I n r a d i c a l theocracy t h e t e n s i o n a r i s e s between u n f a i t h 
i n face o f a l l f i n i t e forms and f a i t h i n t h e unconditioned 
form. A s t r u g g l e o f f a i t h develops which ends e i t h e r 
i n a compromise between f a i t h and u n f a i t h or i n f a i t h i n 
the paradox. F a i t h i n t h e paradox, which i n r e c o g n i t i o n 
of t h e unconditioned demand a f f i r m s the presence o f the 
unconditioned import i n a cond i t i o n e d form, i s t h e 
s o l u t i o n o f t h e inner antinomy o f f a i t h . 
Tensions between the secular and t h e sacred should d i s s o l v e because 
they c o e x i s t w i t h i n each o t h e r . S i m i l a r l y , f a i t h and r e a l i s m , 
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although o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y , belong t o g e t h e r , "For f a i t h i m p l i e s 
17^ 
an absolute t e n s i o n . " Other tensions o f f a i t h are those between 
the i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e v e r and the d o c t r i n e s o f t h e church, and those 
between the f i n i t u d e o f man and t h e i n f i n i t u d e o f h i s u l t i m a t e 
175 
concern. 
Out o f t h i s t e n s i o n t h e problem o f f a i t h and t o l e r a n c e 
a r i s e s . . . F a i t h must u n i t e the t o l e r a n c e based on i t s 
r e l a t i v i t y w i t h t h e c e r t a i n t y based on t h e u l t i m a c y o f 
i t s concern.... Here more than anywhere else t h e 
dynamics o f f a i t h become manifest and conscious; t h e 
i n f i n i t e t e n s i o n between t h e absoluteness o f i t s c l a i m 
and t h e r e l a t i v i t y o f i t s l i f e . 1 ' 6 
Tension between the i n d i v i d u a l and t h e community o f t h e f a i t h i n which 
he attempts t o p a r t i c i p a t e e x i s t s "... because o f t h e p o l a r i t y o f 
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i n d i v i d u a l i s a t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t i o n . " As a r e s u l t , i n s p i t e 
o f these t e n s i o n s , "The S p i r i t u a l Community contains an i n d e f i n i t e 
178 
v a r i e t y o f expressions o f f a i t h and does not exclude any o f them." 
How i s t e n s i o n experienced i n f a i t h ? T i l l i c h r e p l i e s " F a i t h , 
w i t h i n t h i s movement o f t h e s o u l , i s i n a s t a t e o f o s c i l l a t i o n 
179 
between having and not having t h e content o f u l t i m a t e concern." 
T i l l i c h a l s o uses the same phrase when speaking o f t h e emotional 
swaying i n f a i t h between a n x i e t y and courage. However, when 
speaking o f some type o f f a i t h , t h e p i c t u r e i s o f t e n s i o n which goes 
through and beyond o s c i l l a t i o n t o a s t r u g g l e o f f a i t h : - " I n t h e 
experience o f t h e h o l y , the o n t o l o g i c a l and t h e moral elements are 
e s s e n t i a l l y u n i t e d , w h i l e i n t h e l i f e o f f a i t h they diverge and are 
l 8 l 
d r i v e n t o c o n f l i c t s and mutual d e s t r u c t i o n . " 
Paradox i s t h e other way o f seeing and accepting t e n s i o n , 
e s p e c i a l l y t h e tensions o f f a i t h . F a i t h i s e s s e n t i a l l y paradoxical 
182 
i n c h aracter, both i n i t s content and i t s working out i n l i f e , 
e s p e c i a l l y as regards "the paradoxical symbolic character of 
r e v e l a t i o n . " Two other aspects o f f a i t h are c a l l e d paradoxical 
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by T i l l i c h - Providence, and t h e "New Being". Another aspect 
o f t h e paradox i n f a i t h i s t h a t of accepting acceptance, because 
... t o accept t h i s power o f acceptance consciously i s 
th e r e l i g i o u s answer o f absolute f a i t h , o f a f a i t h which 
has been deprived by doubt o f any concrete c o n t e n t , 
which nevertheless i s f a i t h and t h e source o f t h e most 
paradoxical m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f the courage t o be. 1-86 
T i l l i c h puts i t s u c c i n c t l y : - "To accept t h i s paradoxical acceptance 
-I Or* 
i s the courage o f t h e i r f a i t h . " 
Addendum 
" I n Spite Of" 
The element o f " i n s p i t e o f " i n f a i t h by T i l l i c h p a r a l l e l s 
t h e "nevertheless" o f Bultmann which we saw i n our l a s t chapter. 
Whereas Bultmann's "nevertheless" was derived from t h e Old Testament, 
T i l l i c h 1 s " i n s p i t e o f " i s from Luther:-
I n s p i t e o f a l l t h e n e g a t i v i t i e s he had experienced, 
i n s p i t e o f the a n x i e t y which dominated t h a t p e r i o d , 
he derived the power o f s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n from h i s 
unshakeable confidence i n God and from t h e personal 
encounter w i t h him.^°° 
Even f o r T i l l i c h , though, " i n s p i t e o f " i s e x i s t e n t i a l by n a t u r e , 
1 PtQ 
having been r e f e r r e d t o by Kierkegaard ("In s p i t e o f despair") 
and i s an instance o f the paradox i n the l i f e o f f a i t h . 
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F a i t h includes i n t r i n s i c a l l y t h e a t t i t u d e o f " i n s p i t e o f " . 
The " i n s p i t e o f " i s t h e e x i s t e n t i a l a t t i t u d e of t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
b e l i e v e r i n t h e face o f doubt; so t h a t " F a i t h accepts * i n s p i t e o f ; 
and out o f t h e ' i n s p i t e o f o f f a i t h t h e ' i n s p i t e o f o f courage 
i s b o r n . " 1 ^ 1 This " i n s p i t e o f " i s a f f i r m e d not only i n t h e face 
o f doubt, but also i n s p i t e o f t h e f i n i t e s t a t u s o f t h e b e l i e v e r i n 
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face o f the i n f i n i t u d e o f h i s u l t i m a t e concern. One be l i e v e s 
" i n s p i t e o f t h e darkness o f f a t e and o f t h e meaninglessness of 
193 
existence." Expressed e x i s t e n t i a l l y and r e l i g i o u s l y , T i l l i c h 
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says "In the concept of f a i t h an element of 'in spite o f i s 
implied, the courage to accept that one i s accepted i n spite of s i n , 
19U 
estrangement, and despair." I t i s clear that the e x i s t e n t i a l 
a t t i t u d e of " i n spite of" i s i n t r i n s i c to courage and the courage i n 
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f a i t h , and as such, i s an example of how a common phrase i s used 
by T i l l i c h t o describe the e x i s t e n t i a l a t t i t u d e of how tension, 
struggle, and paradox are t o he faced i n f a i t h . 
* * * 
The three e x i s t e n t i a l i a - tension, struggle, paradox - form 
an e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme which again arises from the contingencies 
and d i f f i c u l t i e s of l i f e and f a i t h . We shall now see how T i l l i c h 
i s influenced by p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . 
Kierkegaard spoke of tension, struggle, and paradox i n l i f e 
and f a i t h against systems, society, and the i n d i v i d u a l against 
himself. A l l t h i s was portrayed i n his description of "becoming 
a Christian", a journey of f a i t h which T i l l i c h also follows i n his 
e x i s t e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h i n terms of tension, struggle, 
and paradox. Both Kierkegaard and T i l l i c h stress the importance of 
paradox i n f a i t h ; f o r each there can be no f a i t h without i t . Both 
thinkers develop examples of paradoxes of f a i t h which show the inner 
tensions and struggles which go t o make up the f a i t h of the i n d i v i d u a l 
believer. 
Nietzsche's concept of resentment portrays e x i s t e n t i a l tension 
and struggle, whilst his idea of the w i l l t o power i s based on the 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y , indeed the necessity, of struggle - themes which 
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c l e a r l y influenced T i l l i c h . Just as Nietzsche sees a struggle by 
the individual against others, so T i l l i c h sees a tension and struggle 
by the individual believer against the community of f a i t h . 
Nietzsche said that f a i t h without struggle i s not r e a l f a i t h at a l l . 
- 170 -
Jaspers also spoke of tension, and he included "struggle" i n 
his l i s t of Boundary Situations, seeing t h i s as characteristic of 
the whole of l i f e i t s e l f . Jaspers also had his concept of Foundering 
which arises from the tensions, struggles and paradoxes of l i f e . 
This e x i s t e n t i a l i s t experience i s similar t o T i l l i c h ' s concept of 
" o s c i l l a t i o n " ; both ideas express "both the tensions i n the l i f e of 
f a i t h and the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t r i s k of f a i t h . 
6. Courage 
Perfect courage, as a g i f t of the Divine S p i r i t , "... means 
that i t i s united with the s p e c i f i c a l l y Christian v i r t u e s , f a i t h , 
hope, and love. Thus a development i s v i s i b l e i n which the ontological 
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side of courage i s taken in t o f a i t h . . . " With t h i s concept of 
courage, T i l l i c h says he seeks "... t o preserve the larger meaning 
(of courage) and inter p r e t f a i t h through analysis of courage... 
because I believe that ' f a i t h ' needs such a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n more 
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than any other r e l i g i o u s term." T i l l i c h therefore declares 
We have avoided the concept of f a i t h i n our description 
of the courage to be which i s based on the personal 
encounter with God.... Faith i s the state of being 
grasped by the power of b e i n g - i t s e l f . The courage t o 
be i s an expression of f a i t h and what ' f a i t h ' means 
must be understood through the courage t o be. We have 
defined courage as the se l f - a f f i r m a t i o n of being i n 
spite of non-being. The power of t h i s s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n 
i s the power of being which i s e f f e c t i v e i n every act 
of courage. Faith i s the experience of t h i s power.^99 
Nevertheless, T i l l i c h s t i l l makes i t clear that courage i s 
only one aspect of f a i t h ; furthermore, there are d i f f e r e n t types of 
courage. : .'. T i l l i c h praises Luther's concept of courage i n f a i t h , 
and points out that the courage i n f a i t h of Protestantism i s of a 
personal courage i n and before God, as compared with the autonomous 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c courage of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . ^ ^ I n fa c t we f i n d 
both types of courage i n T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . Faith 
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and courage are inseparable:- "... f a i t h as a t o t a l act must 
201 
a f f i r m i t s e l f through courage." Furthermore, "One cannot replace f a i t h 
202 
by courage, but neither can one describe f a i t h without courage." 
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Courage i s necessary i n order to witness to one's f a i t h , and t o 
submit to God:- "The courage to surrender one's own goodness t o God 
20k 
i s the central element i n the courage of f a i t h . " 
We shall now look at the more e x i s t e n t i a l aspects of the courage 
of f a i t h - doubt, r i s k , and Angst. T i l l i c h introduces the idea of 
doubt and r i s k i n f a i t h by r e f e r r i n g to the Thomist "discussion about 
the p r i o r i t y of i n t e l l e c t or w i l l i n the essence of being, and 
consequently, i n the human personality.... The difference between 
the two l i n e s of thought i s decisive f o r the valuation of 'venturing 
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courage' ( i n r e l i g i o u s terms, the 'risk of f a i t h ' ) " . T i l l i c h 
sees objections to each tendency, and points out that the danger 
of the p r i o r i t y of the w i l l (and "venturing courage" and the" r i s k of 
f a i t h " ) "... i s undirected wilfulness, as we f i n d more i n some 
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Protestant and much E x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h i n k i n g . " Nevertheless, f o r 
T i l l i c h , "Living f a i t h includes the doubt about i t s e l f , the courage 
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to take t h i s doubt in t o i t s e l f , and the r i s k of courage." 
Faith i s "A daring a c t " * ^ and a "daring s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n . " ^ ^ 
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This i s also described as "the daring courage of the Christian f a i t h . " 
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Simi l a r l y , the courage of f a i t h takes r i s k s . Courage takes up the 
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challenge of doubt i n f a i t h , and overcomes i t because "The 
courage t o be i s rooted i n the God who appears when God has disappeared 
i n the anxiety of d o u b t . " ^ T i l l i c h says that the doubt implied i n f a i t h 
accepts insecurity, 
... and takes i t into i t s e l f i n an act of courage. 
Faith includes courage. Therefore, i t can include 
the doubt about i t s e l f . Certainly f a i t h and courage 
are not i d e n t i c a l . Faith has other elements besides 
courage and courage has other functions beyond 
affirmi n g f a i t h . Nevertheless, an act i n which 
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courage accepts r i s k belongs to the dynamics 
of f a i t h . 211* 
Courage and doubt are i n t e r r e l a t e d , but i n f a i t h courage enfolds and 
overcomes doubt. 
Another aspect of the courage of f a i t h i s the despair which 
courage counters. This i s obviously an important e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
theme which we have met before:- "... the acceptance of despair i s 
2l6 
i n i t s e l f f a i t h and on the boundary l i n e of the courage to be." 
Ontologically t h i s means "the acceptance of the power of being, even 
217 
i n the g r i p of non-being." Psychologically t h i s means the accepting 
of doubt, despair, and meaninglessness i n u t t e r seriousness, and the; 
2l8 
courage t o accept that one i s accepted even i n t h i s nadir of l i f e . 
Faith envelops Angst:-
Faith i n almighty God i s the answer t o the quest f o r 
a courage which i s s u f f i c i e n t t o conquer the anxiety 
of f i n i t u d e . . . . When the invocation 'Almighty God1 i s 
seriously pronounced, a v i c t o r y over the threat of 
non-being i s experienced, and an ultimate, courageous 
affir m a t i o n of existence i s expressed. Neither f i n i t u d e 
nor anxiety disappears, but they are taken into i n f i n i t y 
and courage.219 
Nevertheless, i t does seem that T i l l i c h holds that courage banishes 
anxiety, f o r f a i t h "... i s the o s c i l l a t i o n between the anxiety of one's 
f i n i t u d e and estrangement and the ecstatic courage which overcomes the 
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anxiety by taking i t in t o i t s e l f . . . . " 
Another aspect of the courage of f a i t h i s that i t continues i n 
spite of various forms of opposition. This tenacity, as we have 
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noted, has been described by T i l l i c h i n the phrase " i n spite of" 
There i s the courage of e x i s t e n t i a l s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n : - "The courage 
to be i s the et h i c a l act i n which man affirms his own being i n spite of 
those elements of his existence which c o n f l i c t with his essential 
222 
aff i r m a t i o n . " Courage i s not only e t h i c a l , but i s also ontological 
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i n i t s stand against non-being. But above a l l i t i s e x i s t e n t i a l : -
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"one could say that the courage to he i s the courage to accept 
oneself as accepted i n spite of being unacceptable."^^ Courage 
i s the means by which acceptance i n f a i t h i s possible: "This element 
of uncertainty i n f a i t h cannot be removed; i t must be accepted. And ,( 
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the element which accepts t h i s i s courage." As T i l l i c h says of 
God's despairing people, "To accept t h i s paradoxical acceptance i s 
the courage of t h e i r f a i t h . " 
* * » 
Courage i s an a t t i t u d e of e x i s t e n t i a l self-assertion by which 
the individual i s courageous when he asserts himself against those 
forces which would swallow him. I n i t s general e x i s t e n t i a l i s t background, 
courage i s a form of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t ethic, and a mark of authentic 
existence. I n his book . The Courage To Be T i l l i c h refers t o three 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s f o r t h e i r concepts of courage. In spite of his 
discourse; on "The despair of w i l l i n g despairingly t o be oneself -
defiance" ^Heidegger receives more at t e n t i o n , not j u s t f o r his 
229 
idea of the courageous a n t i c i p a t i o n of death, but also f o r his 
230 
exposition of "the courage of despair." T i l l i c h notes that 
Heidegger describes certain e x i s t e n t i a l i a including "resolve", which 
i s when the individual acts alone according to his own conscious, and 
c l e a r l y sees the philosopher as influencing his view of the l i f e of 
f a i t h e x i s t e n t i a l l y : -
One of Heidegger's h i s t o r i c a l functions was t o carry 
through the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t analysis of the courage to be 
as oneself more f u l l y than anyone else and, h i s t o r i c a l l y 
speaking, more destructively. 
I t i s Nietzsche, however, who i s T i l l i c h ' s main i n s p i r a t i o n 
i n The Courage To Be and also i n his general e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
' 232 
int e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h as courage. T i l l i c h refers to the " w i l l 
233 23^ to power" and to lebensphilosophie which are both major 
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Nietzschean doctrines. T i l l i c h ' s s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n i s a form of 
235 w i l l t o power, j u s t as he equates courage and s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n . 
As self-mastery, T i l l i c h lauded the e t h i c a l aspects of Nietzschean 
courage as t h i s i s an i n t e g r a l part of f a i t h . Again, both shares 
the ontological view of courage which sees i t as the daring act of 
f a i t h and s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n , overcoming a l l forms of non-being. T i l l i c h 
does not, of course, r e i t e r a t e Nietzsche's negative comments about 
C h r i s t i a n i t y being the antithesis of courage, but he takes his 
positive comments on the courage of the individual t o show that t h i s 
courage should characterise the man of f a i t h . I n the face of the 
holy, nothing less than Nietzschean courage i s required i f f a i t h i s 
to survive, be strengthened, grow, and mature. 
- 175 -
Chapter Four 
FOOTNOTES 
1. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology p.6o. 
2. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith pp. U-8, 9-10. 
3. T i l l i c h Theology of Culture p.Uo c f . T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.66. 
U. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I p.26. 
5. T i l l i c h Theology of Culture p.28 
6. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l6^. 
7. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.51*. 
8. i b i d p.131*. c f . T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.31*, p.86. 
9. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.179 c f . T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.U. 
10. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.13. 
11. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith pp. 9-10. 
12. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I pp. U35~1+36. 
13. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.59. 
lU. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.99. 
15. T i l l i c h Ultimate Concern pp.205-206. 
16. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.23. 
17. i b i d p.21. 
18. i b i d p.21. 
19. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.25. 
20. i b i d p.112. 
21. i b i d p.151*. 
22. i b i d p.155. 
23. i b i d pp. 25, 31. 
2k. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I pp.2U6-7. 
25. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be pp.27-8. 
26. i b i d p.156. 
- 176 -
27. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.96. 
28. i b i d p.39. 
29. T i l l i c h The Protestant Era p.209. 
30. i b i d p.210. 
31. i b i d p.211. 
32. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.55. 
33. i b i d p.86. 
3U. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p . l U l . 
35. i b i d p.lUl. 
36. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.117. 
37. i b i d p.lU8. 
38. i b i d p.81. 
39. i b i d pp.82-83. 
UO. i b i d p.85. 
Ul. i b i d p.90. 
k2. i b i d p.107; c f . p.106. 
U3. i b i d Chapter IV pp.8l-106. 
1+U. i b i d p.163. 
1+5. i b i d p.32. c f . T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I p.238. 
U6. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.121; c f . pp.23-2U. 
.1+7. i b i d p.117. 
W. i b i d p.119. 
U9. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.l8U; c f . p.165. 
50. i b i d p.185. 
51. i b i d p.232. 
52. i b i d p.l8U. 
53. T i l l i c h What Is Religion? p.115. 
5l+. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.55. 
55. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.126. 
- 177 -
56. 
57. 
T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.51*. 
T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I Chapter XXIV; also see below. 
60. 
58. 
61. 
59. 
T i l l i c h What Is Religion? p.79 
T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.138. 
T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l6U. 
T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.6. 
62. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.172. 
63. i b i d p.lU8. 
6k. T i l l i c h The Protestant Era p.67; c f . p.67, p.80. 
65. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.53; c f . Systematic Theology I I I p.237. 
66. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.137. 
67. i b i d p.139. 
68. i b i d p.139. 
69. i b i d p.155. 
70. i b i d p.165. 
71. i b i d p . l Ul. 
72. i b i d p.lU2. 
73. T i l l i c h What Is Religion? p.76. 
7U. i b i d p.77. 
75. i b i d P«79; ' : • 
76. i b i d p.97. 
77. i b i d p.105; c f . p.110. 
78. i b i d p.109. 
79. i b i d p.109. 
80. T i l l i c h The Protestant Era p.210. 
81. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith pp.12-13; c f . pp.M+-U5. 
82. i b i d p.52. 
83. i b i d p.57. 
Qh. i b i d p.123. 
- 178 -
85. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.98 
86. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.90. 
87. i b i d pp.90-91. 
88. i b i d p.91. 
89. i b i d p.91*. 
90. i b i d p.9h. 
91. T i l l i c h Ultimate Concern p.k. 
92. T i l l i c h Theology of Culture p.1+0. 
93. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.9. 
9h. i b i d pp.9?:10. 
95. i b i d p.13. 
96. i b i d p.99. 
97. i h i d p.6l. 
98. i b i d p.22; c f . pp.100-101, 21. 
99. i b i d p.112. 
100. i b i d p.32. r 
101. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I p.15. 
i b i d p.17. 
102. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology H I pp.138-139. 
103. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.H5. 
10U. i b i d pp.U7-W. 
105. i b i d p.U9. 
106. i b i d p.66. 
107. i b i d p.69. 
108. T i l l i c h What Is Religion? p.79. 
109. Jaspers Philosophical Faith and Revelation pp.l36-lU8. 
110. T i l l i c h Theology of Culture p.90. 
Dynamics of Faith p.9. 
Systematic Theology I p.15. 
- 179 -
111. T i l l i c h What Is Religion?pp.82-83. 
112. T i l l i c h The Protestant Era p.78 
113. i b i d p.80. 
l l U . T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l6U. 
115. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.6. 
116. i b i d p.7. 
117. i b i d p.77. 
118. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.137. 
119. T i l l i c h The Protestant Era p.77. 
120. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.lU8. 
121. i b i d p.152. 
122. i b i d p.l63. 
123. i b i d p.l68. 
12U. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.257. 
125. Heidegger Being and Time G.Ed p..329TE.T. p.377. 
126. T i l l i c h The Protestant Era p.79. 
127. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l6U. 
128. i b i d p.l66; c f . p.l67. 
129. i b i d p.167. 
130. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.7. 
131. i b i d p.78. 
132. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.231*. 
133. i b i d p.169. 
13U. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l63. 
135. i b i d p.168; c f . p.176. 
136. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.55. 
137. i b i d p.206. 
138. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.21. 
139. i b i d p.100. 
- 180 -
lUo. i b i d p.71*. 
Ikl. i b i d p.35. 
lk2. i b i d p.57. 
ll+3. T i l l i c h What I s Religion? p.109. 
lUU. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.131. 
lU5. i b i d p.179. 
Ik6. T i l l i c h Theology of Culture p.155. 
1U7. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.231*. 
lU8. T i l l i c h Theology of Culture p.155. 
1U9. T i l l i c h The Protestant Era pp.21^-215. 
150. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.102. 
151. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.131*; c f . i b i d I I I p.25U. 
152. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l6U. 
i b i d p.165. 
153. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I pp.2Ul-2U3. 
15U. i b i d p.255. 
155. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I p.13. 
156. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l68. 
157. i*>id P.IT 2; c f . p.l80, T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.l6. 
158. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.100. 
159. i b i d p.20. 
160. T i l l i c h Theology of Culture p.28. 
161. i b i d p.28. 
162. T i l l i c h The Protestant Era p.215;cf. Systematic Theology I I I 
pp. 392, 393, hlk. 
163. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.131*. 
16k. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.7. 
165. T i l l i c h Theology of Culture p.27. 
- 181 -
166. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.35. 
167. i b i d p.17. 
168. i b i d p.29. 
169. i b i d p.U7. 
170. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I p.l60. 
171. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.389. 
172. T i l l i c h What Is Religion? pp.96-97. 
173. T i l l i c h Theology of Culture p.Ul. 
17U. T i l l i c h The Protestant Era pp.67-68. 
175. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.99. 
176. i b i d p.57. 
177. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.l8U. 
178. i b i d p.165. 
179. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.6l. 
180. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p . l U l . 
181. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.69. 
182. T i l l i c h What I s Religion? pp.97, 106, 109; 
The Protestant Era p.77« 
The Courage To Be pp.163,167. 
Systematic Theology p.1^2. 
183. T i l l i c h What Is Religion? p.106; c f . p.109. 
l8U. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I p.293. 
185. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I pp.2Ulf. 
186. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l68. 
187. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.2U3. 
188. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be pp.152-153. 
189. Kierkegaard The Sickness Unto Death p.109. 
190. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.155. 
Dynamics of Faith pp.21-22. 
- 182 -
191. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l66; c f . T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p. 
192. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.100. 
193. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I p.293. 
19k. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I p.55; c f . T i l l i c h The Courage 
To Be p.156. 
195. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.3. 
196. T i l l i c h Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century 
Protestent Theology pp.197-207. 
197. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.8. 
198. i b i d p.8. 
199. i b i d p.l63. 
200. i b i d pp.l52ff. 
201. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.103. 
202. i b i d p.103. 
203. i b i d p.lOl+. 
20U. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.2^1. 
205. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.7. 
206. i b i d p.7. 
207. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.101; c f . T i l l i c h Systematic Theology 
I I I pp.25U, 389, T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.1*7. 
208. T i l l i c h The Protestant Era p.215. 
209. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.17. 
210. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.392, c f . pp.393,UlU. 
211. T i l l i c h Theology of Culture p.155 
Systematic Theology I I I p.2U8. 
212. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.172. 
213. i b i d p.l80. 
2lU. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith pp.20-21. 
215. i b i d p.101. 
216. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l66. 
- 183 -
217. 
218. 
219. 
220. 
i b i d p.167. 
T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I pp.2U2-2U3. 
i b i d pp.303-30U; c f . p.307. 
T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p . l U l . 
221. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.l6U. 
222. i b i d p.3. 
223. i b i d p.l63. 
T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.17. 
22U. T i l l i c h The Courage To Be p.156; c f . Systematic Theology I I p.55. 
225. T i l l i c h Dynamics of Faith p.l6. 
226. T i l l i c h Systematic Theology I I I p.2U3. 
227. Kierkegaard The Sickness Unto Death pp.200-207. 
228. Tillich'The Courage To Be p.135. 
229. i b i d p.135. 
230. i b i d pp.lU0-lU3. 
231. i b i d p . l U l . 
232. i b i d pp.23-29. 
233. i b i d p.25. 
23U. i b i d p.26. 
235. i b i d p.27. 
- 18U -
Chapter Five 
EXISTENTIALISM AND FAITH 
1. Review of the Argument 
In our f i r s t chapter we discovered that the ideas embodied i n 
existentialism could be conveniently c l a s s i f i e d under two headings; 
the place of the i n d i v i d u a l , and e x i s t e n t i a l i a . Existentialism, we 
found, i s the mode of thought which analyses and describes the 
feelings and experiences of the individual i n the world from a stand-
point of involvement w i t h i n t h i s l i f e ( i . e . existence). I n our 
second chapter we found that Bultmann and T i l l i c h admitted that they 
had read - and were duly influenced by - the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s 
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger, although t h e i r 
indebtedness to each, by t h e i r own admission, varies considerably. 
We therefore b r i e f l y surveyed the thought of these e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , 
and noted t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r interpretations of f a i t h , and a l l t h i s 
served as a basis f o r the comparison with Bultmann and T i l l i c h i n 
the next two chapters. 
When we examined what Bultmann and T i l l i c h had to say about 
f a i t h , we found that i t was possible to analyse t h e i r thought on the 
subject under the two broad e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes discovered i n the 
f i r s t chapter. Furthermore, when we came t o introduce each idea 
of Bultmann and T i l l i c h on f a i t h we noticed that t h e i r theological 
ideas could be correlated with some of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes 
which we had discovered i n Chapter Two. These ideas were 
pinpointed at the end of each section, so that we were able to see 
that Bultmann and T i l l i c h either adopted and/or adapted these 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes to write t h e i r theologies, or had themes p a r a l l e l 
t o those of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . I n short, we were able t o show the 
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e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes i n Bultmann's and T i l l i c h * s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of f a i t h "both i n general terms of vocabulary and terminology as well 
as i n particular concepts and ideas. 
We w i l l now conclude the argument "by b r i e f l y comparing the 
views of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger, on f a i t h , 
with the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t interpretations of f a i t h held by Bultmann and 
T i l l i c h , and f i n a l l y conclude our thesis with an evaluation of our 
theologians' p a r t i c u l a r enterprise. 
Both Bultmann and T i l l i c h follow Kierkegaard closely i n t h e i r 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . Both Bultmann and Kierkegaard see f a i t h i n 
such e x i s t e n t i a l terms as self-understanding, personal self-surrender 
or i n f i n i t e resignation, loss of security i n the leap of f a i t h , the 
r i s k and venture i n the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of f a i t h , and the problems 
and paradox of f a i t h , and each characterises the believer with these 
q u a l i t i e s (the Knight or Man of F a i t h ) . T i l l i c h shares with 
Kierkegaard the view that f a i t h i s passion and ultimate ( i n f i n i t e ) 
concern, with i t s attendant ecstasy and mysticism, that f a i t h 
involves personal resignation and assurance, but that there i s also 
doubt, r i s k , and paradox i n f a i t h . 
Nietzsche i s generally c r i t i c a l of f a i t h , regarding i t as an 
a f f r o n t t o man's r a t i o n a l i t y , as a screen f o r his i n s t i c t s , that 
i f i t i s not won by struggle i t i s asserted with n a i v i t y , and i s 
therefore decadent. Both Bultmann and T i l l i c h would have known of 
these commonly held views when formulating t h e i r theology and 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . Nietzsche's c r i t i c i s m of C h r i s t i a n i t y as 
crude ecclesiastical mythology i s met by Bultmann's method of 
demythologisation. T i l l i c h answers Nietzsche's c r i t i c i s m of f a i t h 
by attacking the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c d i s t o r t i o n of f a i t h , showing that 
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f a i t h i s indeed the highest passion (or i n s t i n c t ) , and i s won 
by s t r i v i n g , not by passive assent. T i l l i c h attacks 'unbelief 1, 
but part of his attack i s couched i n the same form as Nietzsche's; 
an attack on externals. Otherwise, T i l l i c h corrects Nietzsche; 
f a i t h i s v a l i d because i t i s an e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y of man. 
Jaspers i s fond of his Kantian and Protestant heritage; to 
Kant he owes his moral sense, to Protestantism he owes his value of 
the r i g h t t o exercise freedom, both physical, mental, and s p i r i t u a l . 
For Jaspers, f a i t h consists i n transcending paradox, and coming t o 
terms with Transcendence - a dual idea which we have seen i s shared 
by T i l l i c h . Doubt and even 'unbelief are therefore part of f a i t h 
i t s e l f , as both Bultmann and T i l l i c h agree along with Jaspers. 
( T i l l i c h would also use the term "radical doubt" i n t h i s context, 
with which we may compare Jaspers' comment on "... doubt that might 
as well be resolved i n favour of u n b e l i e f . . . " ^ ) . T i l l i c h also shares 
Jaspers' view that there i s as a r e s u l t , tension w i t h i n f a i t h . 
I t i s clear that Bultmann's debt t o Heidegger i s greater 
than that owed by T i l l i c h ; v i r t u a l l y every e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theme we 
have noted of Heidegger has been used i n some way by Bultmann i n his 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o compare t h e i r 
respective d e f i n i t i o n s of theology:- Bultmann's d e f i n i t i o n , 
"Theology i s nothing other than r a t i o n a l r e f l e c t i o n about our own 
2 
existence as that existence i s determined by God", i s indebted to 
Heidegger's d e f i n i t i o n , that "Theology i s seeking a more primordial 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of man's Being toward God, prescribed by the meaning of 
f a i t h i t s e l f and remaining w i t h i n i t . " Both agree that only 
e x i s t e n t i a l terms can give any meaning t o theology or f a i t h , but 
T i l l i c h would not go that f a r . I t i s important to notice that 
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Bultmann i s indebted to Heidegger f o r his temporal perspective i n 
in t e r p r e t i n g f a i t h as openness to the fu t u r e , p o s s i b i l i t y , imperative 
and renewal, and eschatological existence. Both Bultmann and 
T i l l i c h agree with Heidegger that nothing can "be taken merely on 
k 
f a i t h " as nothing can be gained or known i n t h i s way. Heidegger's 
c r i t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s on the sphere of f a i t h , given i t s e x i s t e n t i a l 
v a l i d i t y , are thus seen t o be adopted by Bultmann and T i l l i c h . 
I t may be seen therefore, that the interpretations of f a i t h 
made by Bultmann and T i l l i c h are i n keeping with those views on 
f a i t h held by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger. I t 
should also be recognised, however, that both Bultmann and T i l l i c h 
are also indebted to his Lutheran heritage. Many Lutheran views on 
f a i t h appear i n i t i a l l y t o be similar to those e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes 
used by Bultmann and T i l l i c h . Lutherans (and our four e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s 
shared t h i s heritage, except, perhaps, Heidegger, who was a Roman 
Catholic) emphasise the response t o the hearing of the word, 
progress and growth i n f a i t h , the paradoxes as we l l as the inner 
assurances of f a i t h , the freedom of f a i t h , and, of course, i t s 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c aspect - pro me. Both Bultmann and T i l l i c h would 
have held these views before meeting existentialism, but our thesis 
w i l l have shown that both theologians, especially Bultmann, 
substantiated these Lutheran views with the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes 
we expounded i n Chapters Three and Four. Moreover, they refer t o 
these e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s when they discuss f a i t h rather than c i t e Luther 
or other Lutherans. 
2. Evaluation of the use of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes i n Bultmann's and 
T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . 
We now have to discuss the v a l i d i t y of i n t e r p r e t i n g f a i t h i n 
terms of these e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes we have examined i n Chapters Three 
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and Four. The question i s : To what extent are Bultmann and 
T i l l i c h adopting and adapting these e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes? Straight-
forward adoption of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes i s usually found only i n 
general terms. Thus Bultmann adopts broad e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes 
when describing f a i t h i n terms of self-assertion, freedom, detachment 
from the world, p o s s i b i l i t y , and a u t h e n t i c i t y , whilst T i l l i c h adopts 
broad e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes when describing f a i t h i n terms of s e l f -
a f f i r m a t i o n , s u b j e c t i v i t y , and ecstasy. There are also instances 
of Bultmann and T i l l i c h adopting pa r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes 
as w e l l ; f o r example Bultmann re i t e r a t e s Kierkegaard's theme of 
"self-understanding", and Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's theme of 
" p o s s i b i l i t y " , whilst T i l l i c h r e i t e r a t e s Nietzsche's theme of 
"courage", Kierkegaard's themes of "passion" and " r i s k " , and Jaspers* 
theme of "struggle". 
Just as important, however, i s the extent t o which Bultmann and 
T i l l i c h are prepared to adapt e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes, or take t h e i r 
cues from them. Thus, for example, Bultmann describes his Man of 
Faith i n f u l l knowledge of Kierkegaard's "Knight of Faith", Nietzsche' 
"Apollo-Dionysius", and Heidegger's "Dasein" - a l l of which contribute 
aspects to Bultmann's Man of Faith: e.g. his i n d i v i d u a l i t y , strength, 
and place i n time and the world. Also, Bultmann describes f a i t h 
with reference t o Heidegger's authentic existence, resolution, 
understanding, and care, deriving from the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t thinker 
ideas which he inserts i n t o his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h . S i m i l a r l y , 
T i l l i c h describes f a i t h i n terms of community and p a r t i c i p a t i o n with 
ideas which are p a r a l l e l t o Heidegger's theme of "being-in" and 
"being-with", and describes f a i t h i n terms of acceptance which remind 
one of Kierkegaard's " i n f i n i t e resignation" and Nietzsche's amor f a t i 
both pa r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes. With each theologian, d i r e c t 
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reference to the e x i s t e n t i a l thinker i s often lacking, especially 
i n the case of Jaspers, except f o r Bultmann's dire c t references to 
Heidegger. Nevertheless, we have shown i n our thesis that they not 
only share the same e x i s t e n t i a l i s t concepts and themes, but t h e i r 
thought i s i n keeping with the general tenor of existentialism, both 
h i s t o r i c a l l y and philosophically. We have shown that Bultmann and 
T i l l i c h both adopt and adapt e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes i n t h e i r 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h , and that t h e i r exposition runs p a r a l l e l 
with both the general thought and the p a r t i c u l a r views on f a i t h held 
by our four e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . 
Many evaluations of the theological positions held by Bultmann 
and T i l l i c h have been made by other commentators, and we can only 
h i n t at some of them here as we indicate our own views and evaluation. 
Bultmann has been c r i t i c i s e d as being too i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c i n 
his understanding and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h ( f o r example, by 
E.M. Good^). This i s probably a f a i r comment when one considers 
Bultmann,!.s in t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h as self-surrender, self-understanding, 
decision, and detachment from the world. On the other hand, i t should 
be said that whilst Bultmann admits that he approaches theology and 
f a i t h from a personal, i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , standpoint, i t i s s t i l l 
related t o wider perspectives such as freedom, openness t o the 
future, p o s s i b i l i t y and venture, problems and paradox etc. Another 
common c r i t i c i s m (voiced, f o r example, by J. Macquarrie ) , i s that 
Bultmann i s unduly influenced by j u s t one phase of j u s t one 
philosopher's thought, and i s therefore narrow i n his philosophical 
outlook. Our thesis has shown that t h i s c r i t i c i s m , though not 
without foundation, cannot be pressed too f a r . Bultmann i s very much 
indebted to Kierkegaard, shares not a few of the views of Jaspers, and 
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has a few allusions to Nietzsche. Furthermore, any reading of 
Essays Philosophical and Theological shows a wider philosophical 
knowledge than Macquarrie credits Bultmann. 
T i l l i c h has been accused ( f o r example, by G. Tavard ) of 
being too unduly influenced by philosophy and psychology when he 
interprets f a i t h . Whereas B i b l i c a l f a i t h separates man from the 
world (as Bultmann naturally does), T i l l i c h does not. Rather, f o r 
T i l l i c h , f a i t h i s a basic human a t t i t u d e which underlies a l l that 
any individual may do. There i s some t r u t h i n t h i s c r i t i c i s m ; f o r 
T i l l i c h f a i t h i s a general phenomenon of ultimate concern which 
everybody has about something, but t h i s ultimate concern may not even 
be i n the divine. A l l t h i s , of course, i s opposite t o what we have 
seen Bultmann teach. Our c r i t i c i s m i s rather that T i l l i c h , although 
he describes f a i t h i n useful e x i s t e n t i a l i s t terms, does not re l a t e 
t h i s s u f f i c i e n t l y t o God, possibly because he i s too anthropocentric 
i n his psychological and sociological considerations i n i n t e r p r e t i n g 
f a i t h i n terms of community and p a r t i c i p a t i o n , ultimate concern, 
and courage. Another complaint against T i l l i c h i s that i n producing 
Systematic Theology etc., he has not followed Kierkegaard f a i t h f u l l y 
i n his abhorence of systems, and so has blunted the challenge of 
g 
f a i t h t o the individual personally (thus K. Hamilton and 
J. Heywood Thomas^ argue). The f i r s t point cannot r e a l l y be l e v e l l e d 
as a c r i t i c i s m as such, f o r although T i l l i c h admired Kierkegaard, he 
nevertheless never regarded himself as a pure e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , and 
therefore should not be expected t o follow Kierkegaard i n a l l 
things. The second point i s a f a i r c r i t i c i s m linked with our f i r s t 
c r i t i c i s m of T i l l i c h : because f a i t h i s general phenomenon f o r 
T i l l i c h , i t s personal significance and r e l i g i o u s fervour are l o s t . 
And t h i s i s not j u s t a shortcoming of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t expectations, 
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but of any understanding of the nature of f a i t h . 
A general c r i t i c i s m sometimes le v e l l e d at theologians l i k e 
Bultmann and T i l l i c h i s that they are wrongly influenced by prevailing 
philosophical thought, and so d i s t o r t the p u r i t y of the Christian 
gospel. I n reply t o t h i s i t must be pointed out that philosophical 
influences are part of any culture and i t s language, including r e l i g i o n 
and the Bible. The Christian church has always debated the question 
of the r e l a t i o n of philosophy t o theology, but the answer has always 
been that t o some extent philosophical language and concepts are 
useful exegetical and hermeneutical t o o l . Bultmann and T i l l i c h 
share t h i s general conclusion, but they s t i l l d i f f e r i n the extent t o 
which they allow philosophy t o influence t h e i r theology. Bultmann i s 
quite convinced that existentialism (especially i n the form propounded 
by Heidegger) i s the best t o o l f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g f a i t h , whereas 
T i l l i c h balances t h i s influence with that of other philosophies he 
knows, so acknowledging the l i m i t e d value of existentialism as a 
t o o l f o r theology. 
Is existentialism the best philosophy f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g 
theology, or s p e c i f i c a l l y i n our case, faith? Certainly, as Bultmann 
argues, i t serves well i n analysing human nature, thereby helping 
theologians t o re l a t e f a i t h t o man. But i s existentialism s t i l l a 
v a l i d analysis of man? I t has been argued that twentieth century 
existentialism i s essentially a product of the inter-war years, when 
Kafka, Camus, Sartre, Heidegger, and Jaspers were w r i t i n g t o 
Europeans disturbed by the aftermaths of the F i r s t World War. I n 
those times of f r u s t r a t i o n and heartsearching, the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ' 
analysis of man was quite accurate and perceptive, but t h i s i s no 
longer relevant i n an age of affluence, materialism, and self-confidence. 
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That existentialism i s now j u s t a h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon i s argued, 
for example, by A. Kee^ and he applies t h i s c r i t i c i s m to Bultmann 
and T i l l i c h and t h e i r modern disciples. There may well be some 
v a l i d i t y i n t h i s argument, but i t w i l l not detract from the work and 
aims of Bultmann and T i l l i c h inasmuch as they sought t o express i n 
terms relevant t o t h e i r age and trut h s of f a i t h . 
Nevertheless,.there are many timeless aspects of the human 
predicament which existentialism has highlighted, and t h i s j u s t i f i e s 
Bultmann and T i l l i c h i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h as courage, 
paradox, doubt, ultimate concern, self-understanding, openness to the 
futu r e , and decisiveness, as has been argued by Macquarrie."1"^" I f 
f a i t h i s t o mean anything t o a people who are estranged from God, 
only by speaking of f a i t h i n terms of e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement, 
weakness, and loneliness, w i l l these people r e l a t e f a i t h t o t h e i r 
personal s i t u a t i o n , and see i t as the answer t o t h e i r needs. I t i s 
with t h i s evangelistic motive i n mind that Bultmann and T i l l i c h wrote 
t h e i r e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theologies. 
3. Conclusion 
I n the Preface t o t h i s thesis i t was stated that the aim i s 
to examine the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t influence on Bultmann and T i l l i c h i n 
t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f a i t h i n a systematic way. We have shown 
that Bultmann and T i l l i c h belong t o the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t r a d i t i o n and 
wrote on f a i t h conscious of that heritage. We have seen that t h e i r 
interpretations of f a i t h may be analysed i n terms of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
themes, and we have shown i n some d e t a i l how i n fact they do follow 
the themes, terms, and concepts of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, 
and Heidegger. The indebtedness shown makes i t clear that Bultmann 
and T i l l i c h expound f a i t h with the aid of existentialism, both 
adopting and adapting e x i s t e n t i a l i s t themes t o s u i t t h e i r purpose. 
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We have argued that t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n spite of some 
h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m , not only does j u s t i c e t o the concept of 
f a i t h , but p o s i t i v e l y helps t o elucidate the character of the l i f e 
of f a i t h i n terms of man's e x i s t e n t i a l experience. 
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